Super Powers and the India-pakistan War-1971 by Clement, Nnamdi Okolie
SUPER POWERS AND 
THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR-1971 
OIS8BRTATION 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 




NNAMOI OKOLIE CLEMENT 
Under the supervision of 
DR. T. A. NIZAMI 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) I , '"' "\ 
19 8 8 j:!!-;.-] 





• / Ace : . . 
y6 4 JAt; l^-'O 
1 L I U I I L I i 1 n i l l L l t l 1 1 1 Z . L 1 U 1 1 
M.A.. P h . D . DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCiEiMCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH-202001 (INDIA) 
Data:- 3 0,08.88. 
This i s to Cer t i fy tha t ths e n t i r e v;ork on 
"Super pov/ers and the India-Pakis tan v;ar-1971" 
has been Carried out by Mr. Nnamdi Okolie Clement 
under my superv i s ion . The d i s s e r t a t i o n i s su i t ab le 
for submission for the award of the degree of 
Master of Philosophy in P o l i t i c a l Science. 
Tjk.Nizami U 
Reader in p o l i t i c a l Science, 
Aligarh Muslim Universi ty , 




I INDO-PAK RELATIONS 194 7 - 1 9 7 1 - A HISTORICAL 1 
PERSPECTIVE 
I I INDIA Ai:!Q THE EXSRGEl-JCE OF BANGLADESH 34 
I I I THE U . S . A . AND BAINIGLADESH 69 
IV THE U . S . S . R . AlsID BANGLADESH 1 0 0 
CONCLUSION 13 2 
APPENDIX 
I THE Il'IDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIEl^jDSHIP 15 7 
mu CO-OPERATION - 9 AUGUST 1 9 7 1 
I I WASHE^'GTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING ON 164 
nsiDIA/PAKISTAN - 3 DECEMBER 19 7 1 
BIBLICGRAPh-Y 1 7 0 
* * * 
PREFACE 
The p r e s e n t work i s an a t t e m p t t o s tudy t h e r o l e of 
t h e Super pov/ers i n the I n d i a - P a k i s t a n war of 1971 which 
was a f a l l ou t of t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and c o n s t r a i n t s 
i n h e r e n t i n the p o l i t i c s of t h e Uni ted P a k i s t a n and u l t i m a -
t e l y l e d t o i t s b r e a k - u p and t h e b i r t h of i ndependen t 
s o v e r e i g n s t a t e of B a n g l a d e s h . 
I n d i a with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of the S o v i e t Union s u p p o r t e d 
t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e of Bangladesh, wh i l e the Un i t ed 
S t a t e s and China took s i d e w i t h P a k i s t a n i n i t s d e s i g n t o 
c r u s h t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e . 
The d i s s e r t a t i o n c o n s i s t s of four c h a p t e r s . The f i r s t 
c h a p t e r p r o v i d e s a backdrop t o c e r t a i n f a c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r the b i t t e r r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n from 
1947-1971. The I n d i a n invo lvement i n the Bangladesh c r i s i s 
has been a n a l y s e d i n t h e s econd c h a p t e r . V^hile t h e t h i r d 
and l a s t c h a p t e r s su rveys t h e Uni ted S t a t e ' s and the S o v i e t 
Un ion ' s r o l e i n t h e e n t i r e c r i s i s . 
The c o n c l u s i o n sums up t h e account of the p r e v i o u s 
c h a p t e r s and makes s u g g e s t i o n s aimed a t m a i n t a i n i n g peace 
in t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
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CHAPTER"! 
INDO-PAK RELATIONS 1947-1971 - A HISTORIAL PERSPECTIVE 
I n d i a and P a k i s t a n emerged on the wor ld map a s 
Sovere ign i ndependen t c o u n t r i e s i n August 1947, b u t e v e r 
s i n c e t h e p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a , t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e 
two c o t m t r i e s have b e e n u n f r i e n d l y . From t h e ve ry b e g i n -
n i n g , b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s f e l t t h r e a t e n e d by each o t h e r and 
have been c o l l e c t i n g arms t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r armed fo i^res , 
Numerous r e a s o n s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e fo r t h i s u n f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s . 
MINORITY QUESTION 
The p a r t i t i o n of t h e I n d i a n s t i b - c o n t i n e n t on t h e b a s i s 
of t h e two n a t i o n t h e o r y propounded by Rahmat A l i , I q b a l 
and J i n n a h , c r e a t e d a problem of m i g r a t i o n of p e o p l e on 
a v e r y l a r g e s c a l e . A l a r g e number of Hindus r e s i d i n g i n 
P a k i s t a n c o u l d n o t m i g r a t e frc»n t h e r e and s o a l s o a l a r g e 
number of Muslims r e s i d i n g i n I n d i a cou ld n o t m i g r a t e , and 
had t o s e t t l e and s t a y pe rmanen t ly i n P a k i s t a n and I n d i a 
i r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s c r e a t e d t h e problem of M i n o r i t y f o r 
b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s . S i n c e p a r t i t i o n , on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , 
s e r i o u s communal r i o t s have t a k e n p l a c e i n I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , 
and thtas c r e a t e d t e n s i o n between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , 
1 . J h a , D.C. , I n d o - P a k i s t a n R e l a t i o n s ( P a t n a , 1972) , 
p p . 2 3 0 - 7 0 . 
BORDER ISSUE 
On S e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h e r e have been serioxjs c l a s h e s 
between t h e a rmies of b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s because of b o r d e r 
d i s p u t e s . The most i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e c l a s h e s was t h e 
Rann of Kutch d i s p u t e . A f t e r t h e c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh , 
t h e c o n t r o v e r s y over t h e Berxabari e n c l a v e s of Dahagram, 
L a t h i T i l l a , Dunabar i g roup of f i v e v i l l a g e s and t h e d i s p u t e 
o v e r t h e f e n i r i v e r a r e a on the b o r d e r between T r i p u r a and 
2 
Bangladesh have been s e t t l e d . 
UTILIZATION OF V^ ESTERN AND EASTERN RIVERS 
Agreement was r e a c h e d between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n in 
May 1948, s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t in due c o u r s e , t he l a t t e r was 
t o t a p an a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e fo r t h e w a t e r of t h e e a s t e r n 
3 
r i v e r s . But i t f a i l e d t o Implement t h i s agreement t h e r e b y 
a g g r a v a t i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n . A f t e r s i x y e a r s of h a r d work, 
t h e World Bank succeeded i n convinc ing t h e two c o u n t r i e s 
t o a c c e p t a d r a f t t r e a t y , i t was fo rma l ly s i g n e d i n 
September 1960 a t Rawalpendi by t h e t h e n Prime M i n i s t e r 
of I n d i a and t h e P a k i s t a n i P r e s i d e n t . But the d i s p u t e o v e r 
t h e K a r n a f u l i Dam P r o j e c t , t h e Parakka Ba r rage and t h e 
I n d o - P a k i s t a n P r o j e c t s over the T e s t a cou ld n o t be s e t t l e d . 
2 . B i n d r a , S . S . , Indo-pak R e l a t i o n s (New D e l h i , 1981) , p . 1 9 . 
3 , J h a , D.C. , n . l , p . 4 . 
The Farakka Barrage dispute is the most important and a l l 
attempts made to solve i t has proved f r u i t l e s s even a f t e r 
4 
the emergence of Bangladesh. 
The issue again came up af ter the follow up of the 
Tashkent Declaration was undertaken by both countr ies . On 
the proposed agenda which Pakistan presented for the 
Minis ter ia l - level talks in February 1966, had the Farrakka 
Barrage inserted, and th is was rejected by India. The 
Indian action was described by the foreign Minister of 
Pakistan as "contrary to internat ional law and p rac t i s e " . 
He pointed out tha t the water of the r ive r Ganga be shared 
equally by both sides on the basis of genuine needs and 
5 in conformity with in terna t ional law. 
Continued attempts were made to solve the problem and 
in the second week of May 1968 in New Delhi, the v i s i t i n g 
delegation expressed t h e i r fears about the diversion of 
the Ganga water into the Bhagmati, The Indian experts 
t r i ed to argue the i r case on saving the Calcutta po r t . 
Final ly , a decision was reached whereby Pakistan engineers 
were to Visit-Farakka. Pakistan had also accepted to have 
4. Bindra, S.S», n.2, p.19. 
5. Bains, J.S., "The Farakka Barrage: International Law 
Aspects", Modern Review. (New York) vol, CXII, no.5, 
p.366. 
the Indian engineers inspect their Ganga Kobadak Project 
in East Pakistan, which Pakistan claimed was being planned 
to irrigate three and half million acres of land. India 
rejected the suggestion made by Pakistan which clamoured 
for a third party to use its good offices to resolve the 
deadlock over the utilization of the water of the eastern 
rivers. The deliberations which concluded on 26 May, 
became fruitless as no agreement was reached because of the 
Pakistani stand on adjudication by a third party which was 
Q 
not acceptable to I n d i a . 
Talks were again held on the Farakka i ssue in December 
1968, The f ive day Indo-Pakis tan Sec re t a ry - l eve l t a l k s 
ended iia f i asco in New Delhi on 19 December 1968, The only 
gain of the tallcs was the Pak i s t an i wi l l ingness to provide 
q 
c e r t a i n data which i t had e a r l i e r withheld, 
Severa l rounds of t a l k s were held in 1969-70 bu t t o 
no a v a i l , P a k i s t a n ' s ob jec t ive was mainly to deceive t he 
East P a k i s t a n i s by posing t h a t i t had i n t e r e s t in t h e i r 
a f f a i r s and to d i v e r t the a t t e n t i o n of the opposi t ion 
p a r t i e s t o something e l s e . 
6. The Hindustan Times (New De lh i ) , 17 May 1968, 
7 . The Times of India (New Delh i ) , 23 May 1968, 
8, The Hindustan Times (New Delh i ) , 27 May 1968. 
9, Asian Recorder (New D e l h i ) , 22-28 January 1969, pp ,872-
5"9, 
10, Bindra, S .S . , n , 2 . , p . 1 0 1 . 
DISPUTE OVER THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
P a k i s t a n became i n d e p e n d e n t on 14 A u g u s t 1947 , a n d on 
t h a t d a y t h e c a s h b a l a n c e o f I n d i a w e r e a b o u t f o u r t h o u s a n d 
m i l l i o n r t t p e e s , P a k i s t a n demanded t h a t s h e b e g i v e n o n e 
t h o u s a n d m i l l i o n r u p e e s a s h e r s h a r e , b u t t h i s was n o t 
a c c e p t a b l e t o I n d i a . The i s s u e was r e f e r r e d t o an A r b i t r a l 
T r i b u n a l wh ich f i x e d P a k i s t a n ' s s h a r e a t 750 m i l l i o n r u p e e s . 
I n d i a r e f u s e d t o g i v e P a J c i s t a n h e r s h a r e , I n d i a ' s r e f u s a l 
was b a s e d on h e r . i n t e n t i o n t o l i n k t h e i s s u e w i t h t h e 
s e t t l e m e n t of K a s h m i r i s s u e , S a r d a r P a t e l d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e a g r e e m e n t was t o b e , a s f a r a s 
p o s s i b l e , s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e K a s h m i r 
12 i s s u e P a l c i s t a n F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r a t a P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e a t 
K a r a c h i on 8 J a n u a r y 1948 d e c l a r e d t h a t , ' A t n o s t a g e of 
t h e d i s c x i s s i o n s , w h i c h l e d t o t h e s i g n i n g of t h e a g r e e m e n t , 
was t h e q u e s t i o n of K a s h m i r e v e r m e n t i o n e d o r c o n s i d e r e d , 
i f i t h a d b e e n , P a k i s t a n would n e v e r h a v e b e e n a p a r t y t o 
13 t h e a g r e e m e n t . ' 
I n a b i d t o r e c o n c i l e t h e i s s u e , Mahatma G a n d h i on 
13 J a n u a r y 1948 wen t on an i n d e f i n i t e f a s t t o p r e s s f o r 
harmony among a l l c o n r o u n i t i e s . The f a s t was e q u a l l y a 
11 , Das Gupta, J . B , , Indo-Pakistan Rela t ions (Amsterdam, 
1958), p , 4 6 , 
12, I b i d , 
13, I b i d , 
p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t he d e c i s i o n of I n d i a n o t t o hand ove r 
P a k i s t a n ' s s h a r e t o h e r . However, on 15 J a n u a r y , the I n d i a n 
Prime M i n i s t e r S e c r e t a r i a t a c c e p t e d t o g i v e P a k i s t a n h e r 
s h a r e . 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE RESERVE B;i^K OF INDIA 
I t was ag reed by bo th c o u n t r i e s b e f o r e t h e p a r t i t i o n , 
t h a t t h e Rese rve Bank of I n d i a would a c t as t h e banker and 
c u r r e n c y a u t h o r i t y f o r bo th I n d i a and P a k i s t a n u n t i l 
1 Oc tober 1948, when P a k i s t a n was e x p e c t e d t o s e t up i t s 
own b a n k i n g and cxirrency a u t h o r i t y . On 8 Janua ry 1948, 
P a k i s t a n ' s Finance M i n i s t e r , Mr, Ghulam Muhamroad, s a i d a t 
a P r e s s Conference a t K a r a c h i , t h a t I n d i a had i n t e r f e r r e d 
w i t h t h e Reserve Bank of I n d i a in d i s c h a r g e of i t s d u t i e s 
towards P a k i s t a n and d e s c r i b e d I n d i a ' s a c t i o n "as an a c t 
15 
of a g g r e s s i o n " . The I n d i a n Finance M i n i s t e r , Mr, C h e t t y 
den ied t h e P a k i s t a n i a l l e g a t i o n and as a r e p l y on 12 J a n u a r y , 
.he s a i d , ' I can s a y , c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t i n f a c t -tiiere has 
been no i n t e r f e r e n c e * . P a k i s t a n took t h e m a t t e r t o t h e 
S e c u r i t y Counc i l of t h e Uni ted Na t ions on 15 J a n u a r y , 1948 
and charged I n d i a of d e s i g n s to d e s t r o y h e r monetary and 
14 , I b i d . 
15, The Statesman (New Delhi) 9 January 1948, 
16, Ibid, 13 January, 1948. 
curirency f a b r i c . The i s s u e was l a t t e r abandoned a s 
17 P a k i s t a n s e t up h e r own S t a t e Bank on 1 J u l y 1948. 
DIVISION OF MILITARY STORES 
On t h e d i v i s i o n of M i l i t a r y s t o r e s , P a k i s t a n cha rged 
I n d i a f o r f a i l i n g t o s u p p l y h e r w i t h Hie M i l i t a r y S t o r e s 
she was due t o have from I n d i a and t h a t I n d i a had t a k e n 
t h i s s t a n d because s h e wanted t o keep P a k i s t a n p e r p e t u a l l y 
m i l i t a r i l y weak.""-® 
I n v iew of the u n d e c l a r e d war between the two c o u n t r i e s 
o v e r Kashmir and in the c o n t e x t of I n d i a ' s h a n d l i n g of t h e 
f i n a n c i a l agreement , i t would n o t be s t r a n g e i f I n d i a d i d , 
i n f a c t , w i t h h e l d s u p p l i e s of arms t o P a k i s t a n . 
TRADE DISPUTE 
Since t h e p a r t i t i o n was based on p o l i t i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s grounds r a t h e r t h a n economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a 
t r a d e d i s p u t e e r u p t e d be tween the two c o u n t r i e s . An a g r e e -
ment was s i g n e d on 5 Augus t 1947, t h e ag reement s i ^ p o r t e d 
f r e e flow of goods between t h e two c o u n t r i e s u n t i l 29 
February 1948, and t h a t no b a r r i e r o f any k ind would be 
19 
s e t u p . 
1 7 . Das Gupta , J . B , , n . l l . p . 4 8 . 
1 8 . I b i d , p . 4 9 . 
19 . White Pape r on I n d o - P a k i s t a n Trade R e l a t i o n s . 15 August 
1947-31 December 1949, (New D e l h i , 1950) Annexure 1, 
S t a n d s t i l l Agreement, p p . 1 - 4 . 
8 
However, d i s p u t e enap ted as b o t h I n d i a and P a k i s t a n 
20 
advanced d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t o t h e ag reement . 
I n d i a r e f u s e d t o s h a r e t h e j u t e and e x c i s e du ty w i th 
P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n d e c l a r e d t h a t i t r e s e r v e d t h e r i g h t t o 
21 
r e v i s e t h e ag reemen t , 
To r e c o n c i l e t h i s i s s u e , an ag reemen t was s i gned on 
26 May 1948 f o r f a c i l i t a t i n g t r a d e b u t bo th cox in t r i es d i d 
no t a g r e e on p r i c e s and t a r i f f r a t e s . D e s p i t e t h e c h a r g e s 
and c o u n t e r - c h a r g e s of "tiie v i o l a t i o n s of t h e agreement , 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s e n t e r e d i n t o a f r e s h agreement on 
22 
24 J u n e , 1949. The t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between t h e two coun-
t r i e s f u r t h e r s u f f e r e d a s e t back because of t h e d e v a l u a t i o n 
of I n d i a n r u p e e s , wh i l e P a k i s t a n r e f u s e d t o deva lue h e r 
23 
own c tar rency, 
DISPUTES OVER , THE INDIAN STATES 
At t h e l a p s e of t h e B r i t i s h paramountcy i n August 
1947, t h e P r i n c e l y S t a t e s were g iven o p t i o n s of e i t h e r t o 
accede t o I n d i a o r t o P a k i s t a n o r t o remain i n d e p e n d e n t . 
Gradxial ly, t h e p r i n c e l y s t a t e s dec ided t h e i r op t i ons w i t h 
t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e r x i l e r s of Junagadh, Hydrabad and 
Kashmir . 
2 0 . I b i d . , p p . 1 0 - 1 1 . 
2 1 . I b i d . , p . 4 . 
22 . Das Gupta, J . B . , n . l l . p . 5 1 . 
2 3 . I b i d . 
Junagadh 
On 15 August 1947, Junagadh announced i t s d e c i s i o n 
t o accede t o P a k i s t a n and i s s u e d a cormixinique t o t h a t 
e f f e c t . But I n d i a d i d n o t l i k e t h i s d e c i s i o n and t r i e d t o 
make t h e r u l e r of Junagadh change h i s mind in favour of 
I n d i a , b u t t h i s cou ld n o t happen . Soon a f t e r , the s i t u a t i o n 
in Junagadh s t a r t e d d e t e r i o r a t i n g and on 9 November 194 7, 
I n d i a t ook o v e r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Junagadh , The P a k i s t a n 
Government p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e I n d i a n a c t i o n and demanded 
24 t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t of t h e Nawab, 
I n an e f f o r t t o s o l v e t h e i s s u e , a p l e b i s c i t e was 
25 h e l d on 2o February 1948 and t h e r e s u l t favoured I n d i a . 
The P a k i s t a n Government never welcomed t h i s development 
and d e c l a r e d t h a t I n d i a n ac t icm was an a c t of a g g r e s s i o n 
a g a i n s t h e r and p r o t e s t e d t o t h e s e c u r i t y coioncil of t h e 
u n i t e d N a t i o n s . 2 « 
L a t e r on, Mr Menon and Lord Mountba t ten i n t e r v e n e d 
t o a v e r t , what might have become a s o u r c e of s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t 
between t h e two c o i i n t r i e s a s a r e s u l t , Junagadh acceded t o 
27 I n d i a , 
24. The Times of I n d i a (New Delhi) 12 November 1947. 
2 5 . Menon, V#P,, The S t o r y of t h e I n t e g r a t i o n of t h e I n d i a n 
S t a t e s (Bombay, 1961) p , 1 4 2 . 
2 6 . I b i d . 
2 7 . Das Gupta, J . B . , n . l l , p p , 6 5 - 6 8 . 
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Hydrabad 
The ruler of Hydrabad never wanted to accede to 
either India or Pakistan but to remain independent. However, 
on 29 November 1947, the Indian Government signed an agreemeit 
with the ruler of Hydrabad and it was expected that the 
agreement would ultimately lead to the accession of Hydrabad 
to India. Soon, the internal situation in the state worsened. 
The delay to accede to India was considered as a 'stop-gap 
measure to strengthen its independence'. The happenings 
there forced India to take 'polite action' against the Nizam, 
and so on 13 September 1948, the Indian forces marched into 
Hydrabad, and took over the administration on 18 September 
1948, Pakistan protested against the Indian action to the 
28 
security council of the United Nations. 
Kashmir 
Like some o ther r u l e r s of the Indian S t a t e s , Maharaja 
Hari Singh was undecided as t o whether to accede t o Ind ia 
or to Pak is tan or to remain independent . But when t r i b a l 
r a i d e r s , who were openly supported by the Pakis tan govern-
ment ra ided Kashmir, the Maharaja agreed t o Kashmirfe 
access ion t o India and signed the ins t rument of Accession 
on 26 Octdber 1947. Pak is tan termed t h i s as an a c t of 
29 
aggress ion by Ind i a . 
28. Das Gupta, J . B . , n . l l . pp.66-73, 
29. Menon, V.P. , n . 2 5 . pp .377-81 . 
11 
India referred the issue to the Security Council as 
i t threatened the maintenance of peace and securi ty . Ever 
since, the issue stands a thorn in the relat ions of both 
the count r ies . All e f for ts to resolve i t taken by India 
have never found favour with Pakistan. 
when on 19 July 1967 an of f ic ia l b i l l was introduced 
in the Lok Sabha, by V.C, Shvikla, the then Minister of State 
for Home Affairs to extend Federal Laws to Kashmir, 
Pakistan protes ted . This amounted t o interference in 
Ind ia ' s in ternal a f f a i r s . 
No doubt, the ruling as well as the opposition e l i t e s 
of Pakistan, have been fanning the Kashmir issue in order 
to e n l i s t the sympathies of the people and to divert t he i r 
a t tent ion fr<xn domestic problems facing them. 
•Since 1948, the Kashmir issue had been debated in 
the United Nations Security Council several times and 
31 several missions were sent by the Council ' . However, 
a l l these effor ts have fa i led to break the ice, ra ther 
i t has complicated the i ssue . 
30, The Statesman (New Delhi) 16 September, 1966. 
31. Bindra, S.S., n . 2 . p ,29. 
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HINDU-MUSLIM RIVALRY 
Hinduism and I s lam a r e two d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n s , hav ing 
d i f f e r e n t v iew p o i n t s i n eve ry f i e l d of l i f e , 
During Hie freedom s t r u g g l e , t h e Muslim League was 
c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e s o l e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Muslims, w h i l e 
t h e I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress was c o n s i d e r e d t o be an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n of the H i n d u s , The a c t i v i t i e s of t he l e a d i n g 
p o l i t i c i a n s who were r e l i g i o u s l y c a r r i e d away paved t h e way 
f o r t h e bir-tii of P a k i s t a n . I f t h e Hindus had t r e a t e d t h e 
32 Muslims f a i r l y , t h e r e would n o t have been P a k i s t a n t o d a y , 
The c o n g r e s s l a c k t h e a b i l i t y t o d e a l w i th t h e v a r i o u s 
33 
c r i s i s between t h e Hindus and t h e Mus l ims , The c r e a t i o n 
of P a k i s t a n t h e r e f o r e , gave t h e Hindu-Muslim r i v a l r y a 
permanent s t a t u s , 
With t h i s background , b o t h I n d i a and P a k i s t a n have 
been wa tch ing each o t h e r w i t h h a t r e d , m i s t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n 
and f e a r , P a k i s t a n presumes t h a t I n d i a has n o t r e c o n c i l e d 
h e r s e l f to t h e p a r t i t i o n and the s l i g h t e s t o p p o r t u n i t y 
g iven h e r , she would d e s t r o y P a k i s t a n , Ayub Khan in h i s 
au tob iog raphy wrote t h a t : " I n d i a ' s a m b i t i o n was t o absorb 
35 P a k i s t a n o r t u r n h e r i n t o a s a t e l l i t e " . S i m i l a r l y , I n d i a 
3 2 , Aziz , K.K., The Making of P a k i s t a n - A Study i n 
N a t i o n a l i s m TLondon, 1967) p , l 8 4 . 
33, Ib id , , p,336. 
34, Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom (London, 
1960) p,265, " 
35, Khan, M.A,, Friends Not Masters: A political autobio-
graphy (London, 1967) p,115. 
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has the a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t P a k i s t a n would go a g a i n s t h e r 
36 
a t t he l e a s t O p p o r t u n i t y . 
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
Ideo logy p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e i s s u e of 
" c o n f l i c t and harmony". A l l t h e known d e f i n i t i o n s s t r e s s 
t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s , a sys tem of b e l i e f s and i t s r e l a t i o n -
s h i p t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . Ideo logy and s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
a r e i n t e r - r e l a t e d and t h e r e i s some s o r t of i n t e r p l a y 
between them. P a k i s t a n i s d e d i c a t e d t o .Islam whi l e I n d i a 
37 has devo ted h e r s e l f t o s e c u l a r i s m , 
The s t r u g g l e f o r P a k i s t a n was based on i d e o l o g y . I t 
was a demand f o r a homeland for Musl ims, In t h e words of 
Ayub Khan , "Al l ah i n h i s i n f i n i t e mercy, c r e a t e d P a k i s t a n 
t o g i v e t h e Muslims of t h e s e r e g i o n s a homeland in which 
t o mould t h e i r l i v e s i n accordance wi th t h e fundamental 
38 p r i n c i p l e s and t h e s p i r i t of I s l am" , 
The I s l a m i c c h a r a c t e r h a s thus c r e a t e d t h e m i n o r i t y 
p rob lem. I h e peop le of P a k i s t a n c o n s i d e r I n d i a a s a home 
for. H i n d u s . The p o l i t i c i a n s of P a k i s t a n always t e l l f a i r y 
s t o r i e s abou t t h e I n d i a n Musl ims , 
36. I b id . 
37 . J o s e p h F r a n k e l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s - C o n f l i c t and 
harmony (London,"*1969) p . 98 . 
3 8 . S e e , P r e s i d e n t ' s m a n i f e s t o i s s u e d on t h e eve of 
P r e s i d e n t Mohammed Ayub Khan 's e l e c t i o n to h i s second 
term of o f f i c e . Khan, M.A,, n . 3 5 . p p . 2 5 0 - 3 . 
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Th i s a c t i o n of P a k i s t a n e n t e r i n g i n t o m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d the I n d o - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s . 
The p a c t s s t r i p p e d P a k i s t a n of t h e f r e e hands in t a k i n g 
an independen t s t a n d i n h e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a a s she 
43 has t o g e t p r i o r p e r m i s s i o n of t h e w e s t e r n powers , 
INDIA'S FRIENDSHIP WITH USSR 
The r e l a t i o n s be tween I n d i a and t h e USSR s t a r t e d 
growing f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n 1952, when Jacob Mal ik in 
h i s speech i n t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l of t h e u n i t e d Na t ions 
accu sed t h e Uni ted Kingdom and t h e Uni ted S t a t e s of i n t e r -
f e r i n g i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Kashmir, he p a r t i c u l a r l y 
accused t h e US of s e e k i n g m i l i t a r y b a s e i n t h e P a k i s t a n 
44 h e l d Kashmir . 
The USSR came c l o s e r t o I n d i a b e c a u s e of t h e l a t t e r ' s 
p o l i c y o f n o n - a l i g n m e n t which s u i t e d t h e s o v i e t o b j e c t i v e 
of check ing t h e growing menance posed by the US m i l i t a r y 
45 a l l i a n c e s , 
During t h e v i s i t of Khruscheve and Bulganin t o I n d i a , 
t h e y pxib l ic ly d e c l a r e d t h a t Kashmir was an i n t e g r a l p a r t 
4 3 , Sasadha r S inha , I n d i a Independence i n P e r s p e c t i v e 
(Bombay, 1947) p , 2 2 6 . 
4 4 . Bazaz, P .N , , Kashmir in C r u c i b l e (New D e l h i , 1967) p .117 , 
4 5 . Chopra Pran , I n d i a ' s Second L i b e r a t i o n ( D e l h i , 1973) 
p . 1 1 . 
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of I n d i a . I n 1959, Ayub Khan s u g g e s t e d t h a t bo th I n d i a 
and P a k i s t a n should s e t t l e t h e i r p r e v a i l i n g d i s p u t e s and 
47 
work o u t a p l a n fo r t h e j o i n t defence of t h e s rob-con t inen t , 
Nehru r e j e c t e d t h i s on t h e ground t h a t i t would look l i k e 
48 
a m i l i t a r y p a c t w i t h P a k i s t a n . The s i t u a t i o n in -die 
sxab-cont inent took a t u r n fo r the worse wi th t h e r e f u s a l 
of Nehru t o go i n t o a j o i n t defence p l a n w i t h Ay\±i Khan, 
and t h e r e a f t e r , P a k i s t a n s t a r t e d moving c l o s e t o C h i n a . 
THE SINO-INDIAN WAR OF 1962 
P a k i s t a n h a s been s e a r c h i n g f o r an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r 
i n v i g o r a t i n g h e r bonds of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h China , and t h i s 
came handy i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e S l n o - I n d i a war of 1962, 
P a k i s t a n immedia te ly s i d e d wi th China and c r i t i c i z e d I n d i a 
f o r " a t t a c k i n g " China . 
Suppor t i ng t h e Chinese a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t I n d i a , t he 
P a k i s t a n i P r e s i d e n t d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e Chinese j u s t wanted 
t o secxare t h e i r f r o n t i e r s and t h a t t h e f i r s t blow was 
49 g iven by I n d i a . Meanwhile, t he US and the UK Condemned 
4 6 . Budhra j , V . S , , S o v i e t Russ ia and the Hindus tan Sub-
c o n t i n e n t (Bombay, 1973) , p , 1 0 2 . " 
4 7 . The Dawn (Karachi) 27 October 1959. 
4 8 . The Sta tesman (New Delh i ) 3 November, 1959. 
4 9 . The Dawn (Karachi ) 30 October 1962. 
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t h e Chinese a c t i o n and sympathized w i th I n d i a , The I n d i a 
Government appea led f o r h e l p to the US and i t responded 
p o s i t i v e l y . The d e c i s i o n of some Western c o u n t r i e s t o 
arm I n d i a a g a i n s t China was n o t welcomed by P a k i s t a n , who 
c la imed t h a t t h e S i n o - I n d i a war was a mere "camouflage by 
I n d i a f o r g e t t i n g more Western weapons t o be used a g a i n s t 
h e r " . ^ ^ 
SINO-PAK RELATIONS 
Dur ing the Korean c r i s i s , . P a k i s t a n e n l i s t e d C h i n a ' s 
h o s t i l i t y as the former suppor t ed the J S , But when P a k i s t a 
a l i g n e d h e r s e l f w i th t h e Western c o u n t r i e s , China d id not 
p r o t e s t , b u t a c c e p t e d i t m i l d l y . The Chinese r i g h t l y 
a s s e r t e d t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s membership of SEATO was only 
52 d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t I n d i a . 
At t h e Bandung Conference in 1955, t h e then P a k i s t a n 
Prime M i n i s t e r , convinced h i s Chinese c o u n t s r - p a r t Prime 
M i n i s t e r Chou-2n-Lai of P a k i s t a n ' s o b j e c t i v e s in e n t e r i n g 
t h e Western m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . Ever s i n c e , t he r e l a t i o n s 
between China and P a k i s t a n have been c o r d i a l , and t h i s 
e x p l a i n s v;hy P P a k i s t a n s i d e d wi th China in t h e S i n o - I n d i a 
v;ar of 1962 . 
n 
50 . Ranga, N.G. , F igh t f o r Freedom (Uew D e l h i , 1958) . 
p . 1 4 9 . 
5 1 . The P a k i s t a n Times(Lahore) 1 Bovember 1962. 
5 2 . B r i n e s , Russe l , I f i do -Pak i s t an C o n f l i c t (Bombay, 1970) , 
p . 182. 
5 3 . Goswami, B .N . , P a k i s t a n and China - A Study of t h e i r 
R e l a t i o n s (Bombay, 197^) p p . 3 0 - 4 1 . ~ 
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On 2 March 1963, China and P a k i s t a n h u r r i e d i n t o an 
54 
agreement r e g a r d i n g t h e S i n o - P a k i s t a n b o r d e r . The I n d i a n 
Government condemned t h i s agreement as she saw in i t , a 
p l a n by China t o d e f e a t t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n t a l k s which had 
a c h i e v e d some p r o g r e s s a t t h a t time. A f t e r t h e ag reement , 
a b road u n d e r s t a n d i n g developed between China and P a k i s t a n , 
and P a k i s t a n s t a r t e d making p l a n s t o once aga in grab 
Kashmir by fo r ce as she was s u r e of Chinese h e l p in an 
event of war w i t h I n d i a . Z«A. Bhu t to d e c l a r e d , "an a t t a c k 
from I n d i a on P a k i s t a n i s no l o n g e r . c o n f i n e d t o t h e s e c u r i t y 
and t h e i n t e r n a l i n t e g r i t y of P a k i s t a n , An a t t a c k from I n d i a 
on P a k i s t a n i n v o l v e s t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e 
55 l a r g e s t s t a t e i n A s i a " , 
THE KUTCH CONFLICT 
P a k i s t a n had c r e a t e d t r o u b l e i n Kutch i n a b i d t o 
t e s t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e US weapons i n h e r p o s s e s s i o n 
and to t e s t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of h e r army. The Kutch 
e p i s o d e of Apri l -May 1965 f u r t h e r worsened t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n 
r e l a t i o n s . The B r i t i s h government i n t e r v e n t i o n l e d t o a 
c e a s e - f i r e by t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
54 , The Dawn (Karach i ) 3 March 1963. 
5 5 , P a k i s t a n N a t i o n a l Assembly Deba t e s , v o l . 1 1 , 17 J u l y 
1963, p . 6 6 6 . 
56 , Gupta, H.R., I n d o - P a k i s t a n War, v o l . l , (New D e l h i 
1967) p . 5 7 , 
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INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965 
I n d i a and P a k i s t a n f o u ^ t a w a r i n A u g u s t - S e p t e m b e r 
1 9 6 5 . The c a u s e of t h e w a r was t h e a t t e m p t made by P a k i s t a n 
t o S e t t l e t h e K a s h m i r i s s u e b y f o r c e , I n d i a r e s o r t e d t o 
c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e and e v e n t u a l l y M a l a y s i a moved a r e s o l u t i o n 
i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s on 4 S e p t e m b e r 
1 9 6 5 , She p r o p o s e d an i n m e d i a t e c e a s e - f i r e i n Kashmi r w i t h -
57 
o u t b r a n d i n g P a k i s t a n a s a n a g g r e s s o r , and t r e a t e d b o t h 
t h e a g g r e s s e d ( I n d i a ) and t h e a g r e s s o r ( P a k i s t a n ) a l i k e . 
T h i s r e s o l u t i o n f a i l e d t o s t o p t h e w a r , 
The e f f o r t s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l 
5a U. T h a n t t o s t o p t h e w a r a l s o f a i l e d . 
D u r i n g t h e w a r , C h i n a t o o k s i d e w i t h P a k i s t a n and 
c h a r g e d t h e S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n " c o l l u s i o n w i t h h a v i n g e n c o u r a g e d 
59 I n d i a t o a c q u i r e P a k i s t a n ' s t e r r i t o r y " , ' At t h e t e r m i n a t i o n 
of t h e w a r , t h e USSR i n i t i a t e d and c o n v e n e d a m e e t i n g of 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s a t T a s h k e n t which l e d t o t h e s i g n i n g of 
T a s h k e n t a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . 
HOSTILE PROPAGANDA 
A c c o r d i n g t o A r t i c l e i v o f t h e T a s h k e n t D e c l a r a t i o n 
" b o t h s i d e s w i l l d i s c o u r a g e a n y p r o p a g a n d a d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t 
5 7 . R e s / 2 0 9 , 4 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 5 . 
5 8 . G u p t a , H . R , , I n d i a - P a k i s t a n War. 1 9 6 5 , v o l . I I ( D e l h i , 
1 9 6 8 ) , p p . 2 2 6 - 7 . 
5 9 , Anwar S a y e e d . " C h i n a and t h e I n d i a - P a k i s t a n War o f 
1 9 6 5 " , O r b i s , v o l , IX n o . 3 , 1965 , p . 8 6 0 . 
6 0 , B i n d r a , S . S . , n . 2 . p , 3 9 , 
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t h e o t h e r c o u n t r y and w i l l encourage propaganda which 
promotes t h e development of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s " . But t h i s a r t i c l e was n o t implemented, 
P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r s , p r e s s and r a d i o soon a f t e r t h e 
w i t h d r a w a l of t r o o p s s t a r t e d a h o s t i l e propaganda a g a i n s t 
I n d i a . I n d i a informed t h e USSR about t h e P a k i s t a n r e sumpt ion 
of a n t i - I n d i a propaganda and t h e USSR a d v i s e d h e r n o t t o 
r e t a l i a t e . I t i s p e r h a p s b e l i e v e d t h a t P a k i s t a n resvimed t h i s 
a n t i - I n d i a propaganda i n a b i d t o s a t i s f y a s e c t i o n of t h e 
P a k i s t a n i s who d i d n o t l i k e t h e Tashkent D e c l a r a t i o n . 
P a k i s t a n a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t I n d i a had resumed a n t i -
P a k i s t a n propaganda . The I n d i a c o u n t e r propaganda c a r r i e d 
l e s s we igh t as compared t o t h a t of P a k i s t a n . Ihe 1967 
Gene ra l e l e c t i o n s l e d I n d i a t o a n t i - P a k i s t a n mood. Both 
c o u n t r i e s took t o t h i s a c t i o n i n o r d e r t o outdo t h e o p p o s i -
62 
t i o n p a r t i e s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s , 
BORDER VIOLATIONS 
The s h o o t i n g down of P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r y p l a n e which 
P a k i s t a n c la imed was a c i v i l i a n p l a n e w i t h i n t h e I n d i a n 
t e r r i t o r y f u r t h e r s t r a i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s . 
6 1 , The Hindus t an Times (New Delhi) 25 March 1966, 
62, Asian Recorder (New Delhi) 28 A p r i l 1967 p p . 7 6 1 9 - 3 4 . 
6 3 , The S ta tesman (New Delhi ) 3 February 1967. 
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On 3 February 19 67, an Indian Defence Ministry 
spokesman pointed out that during the past year there had 
64 been over seventy air violations. The Rajasthan Home 
Minister gave a similar testimcaiy that in the Rajasthan 
Sector, two hundred and thirty-seven cases of Pakistani 
intrusion had been reported since January 1966, 
The Pakistan Government also complained of several 
border violations, Pakistan asked India to stop those 
activities in the interest of peace and tranquillity of 
the area, India however dismmised the Pakistani protest, 
EXPULSION OF DIPLOMATS 
A clerk of the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi, 
S.A. Shah, was caught while engaged in espionage in July 
1967 and was ordered to leave India within 48 hours. On 
another occasion, a minor functionary of the Pakistan 
mission Anwar Ahmed was involved in a spying case. In 
retaliation, Pakistan Government ordered three officials 
of the Indian High Commission on 23 August 1967 to leave 
the country within 24 hours. It was alleged that the three 
officials had been doing organized espionage and were caught 
64. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 4 February 1967. 
65. The Times of India (New Delhi) 19 June 1967. 
66. The Dawn (Karachi) 5 August 1967. 
67. The Statesman (New Delhi) 6 Augx:u3t 1967. 
68. The Times of India (New Delhi) 20 July 1967. 
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redhanded a l o n g wi th two of t h e i r P a k i s t a n i accompl ie s 
w h i l e r e c e i v i n g " c l a s s i f i e d Government documents" . P a k i s t a n 
Was only r e t a l i a t i n g by e x p e l l i n g t h e I n d i a n d i p l o m a t s 
Says H i t a v a d a , i t w r o t e ; 
" I t was obvious t h a t P a k i s t a n was t r y i n g t o r e t a l i a t e 
a g a i n s t I n d i a ' s a c t i o n i n r e c e n t l y e x p e l l i n g a c l e r k i n the 
Pak High Commission". Expu l s ion of I n d i a n d i p l o m a t s 
c o n t i n u e d under the g u i s e of A g a r t a l a c o n s p i r a c y c a s e . 
The P a k i s t a n Government a l s o d e s c r i b e d Ahmed's 
71 
e x p u l s i o n as a "measure of p e t t y r e t a l i a t i o n " , i n a 
p r o t e s t no t e t o I n d i a . 
AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE 
P r e s i d e n t Ayvib K h a n ' s regime i m p l i c a t e d some I n d i a n 
o f f i c e r s and some l e a d e r s of E a s t P a k i s t a n in a c o n s p i r a c y 
known a s A g a r t a l a c o n s p i r a c y c a s e . 
According to t h e P a k i s t a n Government, t h e p l o t 
i n v o l v e d an armed r e v o l t w i t h weapons s u p p l i e d by I n d i a . 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, t h e l e a d e r of t h e Awami League 
who was a t t h a t t ime i n j a i l was a l s o one of t h e a l l e g e d 
c o n s p i r a t o r s . Four of t h e accused made j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n s . 
6 9 . The Dawn (Karachi) 24 August 1967. 
7 0 . The Hi t avada , ( e d . ) "Dep lo rab le Ac t ion" 26 August 1967. 
7 1 . The Times of I nd i a (New Delh i ) 8 J a n u a r y 1968. 
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However^ a movement was launched i n b o t h wings of P a k i s t a n 
de.TTanding t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e A g a r t a l a Conspi racy c a s e 
and he f i n a l l y bowed t o t h e demands of t h e p e o p l e . The 
w i t h d r a w a l s , H e r b e r t w r o t e : e f a l l t h e r e v e r s e s which Ayub 
Khan s u f f e r e d i n t h e c o u r s e of h i s t e n y e a r s ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
t h i s was t h e most s e r i o u s and most h u m i l i a t i n g . I t was 
i n f l i c t e d by E a s t P a k i s t a n and i t was t h e outcome of h i s 
due l w i th Mujibur Rehman and of h i s e f f o r t t o crush t h e 
72 
s i x - p o i n t movement, 
P a k i s t a n ' s a l l e g a t i o n of I n d i a n invo lvement i n t h e 
ca se was ma in ly t o mal ign I n d i a i n t h e eyes of the wor ld , 
P a k i s t a n ' s o t h e r mo t ive i n a l l e g i n g I n d i a n involvement 
was t o e n l i s t t he sympathy of t h e S o v i e t Union by c r e a t i n g 
an i m p r e s s i o n t h a t I n d i a was n o t implement ing the Tashken t 
D e c l a r a t i o n . 
AUCTION OF INDIAN PROPERTY 
According t o A r t i c l e v i i i of t h e Tashken t D e c l a r a t i o n 
b o t h I n d i a and P a k i s t a n a g r e e d " t o d i s c u s s t h e r e t u r n of 
t h e p r o p e r t y and a s s e t s t aken ove r by e i t h e r s i d e in 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e c o n f l i c t " . But P a k i s t a n went c o n t r a r y 
t o t h i s a r t i c l e by i t s d e c i s i o n t o s e l l t h e I n d i a n p r o p e r t y 
72 , Feldman, H e r b e r t , From C r i s i s t o C r i s i s . (London 
1967) p . 1 8 9 . ~ 
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t h a t were t a k e n over by h e r dt ir ing t h e 1965 c o n f l i c t . 
Fxirther, i n 1967, P a k i s t a n f o r c e f u l l y s e i z e d numerous 
p r o p e r t i e s b e l o n g i n g t o r e s i d e n t m i n o r i t i e s i n Eas t 
73 P a k i s t a n and then d e c l a r e d t h e s e t o b e enemy p r o p e r t y , 
I n d i a p r o t e s t e d t o P a k i s t a n a g a i n s t t he s a l e of 
t h e s e p r o p e r t y b u t t o no a v a i l . C r i t i c i z i n g t h e P a k i s t a n 
b e h a v i o u r i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e S ta tesman wro te t h a t t h e 
P a k i s t a n d e c i s i o n "runs c o u n t e r t o t h e s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s 
made i n t h e D e c l a r a t i o n and i t may pe rhaps be p o i n t l e s s 
t o t a l k a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t o t h e Government of 
P a k i s t a n . " ^ ' * 
ARMS AID 
Soon a f t e r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of the I n d o - P a k i s t a n 
war of 1965, bo th c o u n t r i e s s t a r t e d a c c u s i n g each o t h e r 
of c o l l e c t i n g arms and ammunit ion. 
During t h e war of 1965, t he US s topped arms s u p p l i e s 
to. b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s . From August 196 6, b o t h t h e 
c o u n t r i e s s t a r t e d a c c u s i n g each o t h e r of a c q u i r i n g arms 
75 and v/eapons. 
On 12 A p r i l 1967 t h e US announced i t s d e c i s i o n t o 
t e r m i n a t e m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n 
7 3 . See, t h e s t a t e m e n t of B.R. Bhagat , M i n i s t e r of S t a t e 
in t h e M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Lok Sabha Deba t e s , 
v o l , XXII, n o , 1 3 , 27 November 1968, C o l s . 1 4 8 - 5 8 . 
7 4 . The S ta t e sman (New De lh i ) (ed . ) " P i n p r i c k s from 
p i n d i " , 9 November 1968 . 
7 5 . The P a k i s t a n Times (Lahore) 11 August 1966, see Lek 
Sabha Deba tes , v o l . LVI I I , no 11 , 8 August 1966. Cols . 
3236-39, a l s o See t h e Dawn (Karachi) 24 March 1966. 
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on a g r a n t b a s i s , b u t i t r e - o p e n e d t h e door of t h e s a l e 
of s p a r e p a r t s f o r m i l i t a r y equipments a l r e a d y s u p p l i e d , 
Th i s was n o t b e n e f i c i a l t o I n d i a b u t t o P a k i s t a n . Th i s 
i s so b e c a u s e I n d i a d id n o t use t h e US weapons a g a i n s t 
P a k i s t a n i n Hie 1965 war, moreover, P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d more 
m i l i t a r y a i d a s compared t o what I n d i a r e c e i v e d . I n d i a 
e x p r e s s e d i t s a p p r e h e n s i o n a b o u t the US a c t i o n when a 
Government spokesman s a i d t h a t t h e US d e c i s i o n " w i l l pose 
a t h r e a t a g a i n t o I n d i a " . 
The I n d i a n p r e s s a l s o r e p o r t e d t h e s a l e s of arms t o 
77 P a k i s t a n by t h e USSR and West Germany. 
Moscow, p robab ly migh t have done t h i s i n an a t t e m p t 
t o wean P a k i s t a n away from China b u t she f a i l e d . China 
a l s o s u p p l i e d P a k i s t a n arms and weapons i n a b i d t o r e p l a c e 
78 
P a k i s t a n l o s s e s d u r i n g t h e 1965 c o n f l i c t . 
The d e c i s i o n of t h e US t o rearm P a k i s t a n a f t e r -die 
1965 c o n f l i c t was t o wean away P a k i s t a n from h e r comnunis t 
s u p p o r t e r s and t o have h e r s t a y in t h e S o u t h - E a s t Asia 
Trea ty O r g a n i z a t i o n (SEATO) and C e n t r a l T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n 
(CENTO), b u t t h e US f a i l e d t o ach i eve t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s . 
7 6 . The H i n d u s t a n Times (New Delh i ) 13 A p r i l 1967. 
7 7 . Asjia n R e c o r d e r (New Delh i ) 20-26 August 1967, pp .7872-3 
7 8 . Lok Sabha Debates n . 7 5 . c o l s . 3 236-39 . 
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INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
Accord ing t o A r t i c l e i i i of the Tashkent D e c l a r a t i o n 
which s a y s ; " t h e Prime M i n i s t e r of . India and t h e P r e s i d e n t 
of P a k i s t a n have a g r e e d t h a t r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n s h a l l be based on t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e 
in t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of each o t h e r , " b u t t h i s was 
i g n o r e d . Both t h e c o u n t r i e s accused each o t h e r of i n t e r -
f e r i n g i n i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . 
Ilie I n d i a n Government a l l e g e d t h a t P a k i s t a n s u p p l i e d 
arms and ammunition t o Nagas and Mizos and gave tiiem 
t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s f o r g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e . On 12 May 19 66, 
G.L. Nanda, t h e then I n d i a n M i n i s t e r of Home A f f a i r s s t a t e d 
i n t h e Lok Sabha, t h a t P a k i s t a n had s u p p l i e d arras t o Nagas . 
He s t a t e d a l s o t h a t t h e r e were r e p o r t s t h a t some grovips of 
h o s t i l e Nagas and o t h e r t r i b e s , were g i v e n t r a i n i n g a t 
79 
c e r t a i n p l a c e s i n Eas t P a k i s t a n , On t h i s c o u n t , I n d i a 
r e s t r a i n e d i t s e l f ^ and was n o t p r e p a r e d even t o r a i s e "tiie 
80 P a k h t o o n i s t a n i s s u e i n t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s , 
THE HIJACKING OF AN INDIAN PLANE 
The h i j a c k i n g of an I n d i a n M r l i n e s Fokker F r i e n d s h i p 
p l a n e t o Lahore by t h e s o c a l l e d N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Fron t 
7 9 . Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , vol .LV, no 58, 12 May 19 66, 
C o l s . 1 6 3 2 4 - 2 5 . 
8 0 , Lok Sabha Deba tes , v o l . V , no .30 , 3 J u l y 19 67, 
C o l s . 8973-74 . 
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e v e n t u a l l y blown up in P a k i s t a n by the h i j a c k e r s , and 
the P a k i s t a n Government g r a n t e d t h e h i j a c k e r s asylum, 
While Mrs I n d i r a Gandhi h e l d P a k i s t a n r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e i n c i d e n t and warned h e r of d i r e "consequences" , 
Z*A.Bhutto p r a i s e d t h e s o c a l l e d "freedom f i g h t e r s " and 
Mujibur Rehman condemned t h e h i j a c k i n g and demanded an 
i n q u i r y i n t o t h e whole a f f a i r s . 
The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of t he Awami League, Tajuddin 
Ahmad, denounced the b lowing up of t h e p l a n e a s "a c o n s p i r a c y 
by West P a k i s t a n to d e p r i v e the Eas t P a k i s t a n peop le of the 
83 p o s s i b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g democra t i c r u l e i n the c o u n t r y " . 
I n d i a demanded compensat ion f o r t h e damaged p l a n e , and on 
3 February 1971, she banned the f l i g h t s of t h e P a k i s t a n 
84 p l a n e s o v e r h e r t e r r i t o r y , 
The demands fo r compensa t ion and handing over the 
h i j a c k e r s were r e j e c t e d by P a k i s t a n who c l a imed t h a t t h e 
h i j a c k e r s were "not I n d i a n n a t i o n a l s ' * and t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e 
was no q u e s t i o n of t h e i r b e i n g handed over to I n d i a . Radio 
P a k i s t a n d e s c r i b e d the h i j a c k e r s a s "Kashmiri freedom 
f i g h t e r s " . ® ^ 
8 1 • The P a k i s t a n o b s e r v e r , 2 February 1 9 7 1 . 
8 2 . Radio P a k i s t a n News B u l l e t i n (New Delh i ) 1 February 
1 9 7 r 7 ~ p . 4 . 
8 3 . L ink 4 February 1 9 7 1 . 
8 4 . The P a k i s t a n Observer 4 February 1971 
8 5 . N a t i o n a l H e r a l d , 7 Feb rua ry 1971 . 
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DIPLOMATIC TUSSLE 
When on 18 A p r i l 1971, t h e P a k i s t a n Deputy High 
Commissioner, Hussa in A l i , changed h i s l o y a l t y from P a k i s t a n 
t o Bangladesh , s d i p l o m a t i c war e r u p t e d between I n d i a and 
ftfi P a k i s t a n , f o l l o w i n g the P a k i s t a n High Commissioner i n 
New D e l h i , S a j j a d H a i d e r ' s no te t o t h e E x t e r n a l Af f a i r s 
M i n i s t r y on 2o A p r i l , r e q u e s t i n g the I n d i a n Government t o 
hand over t h e p r emise s of t h e Deputy High Corttnissioner t o 
Mahdi Masud who would now work as Deputy High Connraissioner. 
I n d i a r e g a r d e d t h e sc ramble fo r t h e p r e m i s e s a s an i n t e r n a l 
88 
a f f a i r of P a k i s t a n , 
FURTHER BORDER VIOLATIONS 
Both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n accused each o t h e r of b o r d e r 
v i o l a t i o n s . On 15 A p r i l 1971, I n d i a p r o t e s t e d to P a k i s t a n 
a g a i n s t t h e "wanton and unprovoked a g g r e s s i v e a c t s of t h e 
P a k i s t a n armed f o r c e s " a l o n g t h e I n d i a - Eas t P a k i s t a n 
89 b o r d e r . The P a k i s t a n t r o o p s b u r n t a nxarober of houses in 
Bashapacha i , i t a l s o f i r e d on the Ind ian b o r d e r o u t p o s t s 
a t Be lon ia and Sone Mura in T r i p u r a . The t r o o p s e q u a l l y 
e n t e r e d Boyra V i l l a g e i n 24 parganas d i s t r i c t and gunned 
8 6 . The S ta t e sman (New Delh i ) 19 A p r i l 1971 . 
87. Ibid., 21 April 1971. 
88. Ibid., 23 April 1971. 
89. Ibid., 16 April 1971. 
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90 do\vn f i v e p e r s o n s . On t h e Kashmir b o r d e r , two Mirage 
f i g h t e r s of t h e P a k i s t a n A i r fo rce flew low over the 
S r i n a g a r A i r p o r t f o r e s p i o n a g e a c t i v i t i e s , and I n d i a 
91 lodged a p r o t e s t w i th P a k i s t a n . The I n d i a n p r o t e s t was 
r e j e c t e d by P a k i s t a n and d e s c r i b e d t h e I n d i a ' s cha rges as 
92 
"comple t e ly b a s e l e s s and m a l i c i o u s " , 
In J u l y , when t h e s i t u a t i o n became h i g h l y dangerous , 
t h e I n d i a n Government i n s t r u c t e d i t s Border S e c u r i t y Force 
t o r e p l y e f f e c t i v e l y t o any a t t e m p t by t h e P a k i s t a n i army 
t o v i o l a t e t h e I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y e i t h e r by i n t rx i s i on , 
bombing o r f i r i n g a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r . Th i s was s t a t e d by 
K.C. P a n t , t h e then M i n i s t e r f o r Home A f f a i r s , du r ing a 
d e b a t e i n the Lok Sabha over t h e repeated P a k i s t a n i p r o v o -
93 
c a t i o n s on t h e e a s t e r n b o r d e r . 
PAKISTAN'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 
A spy r i n g c a l l e d A l - F a t a h , wi th a p l a n t o a s s a s s i -
n a t e t h e Chief M i n i s t e r G.M, Sadiq and h i s c o l l e a g u e s , 
was Smashed by t h e Kashmir p o l i c e i n e a r l y J a n u a r y 1971, 
and t h e I n d i a n Government h e l d t h e op in ion t h a t t h e 
P a k i s t a n High Commission i n New Delh i was i n v o l v e d . And so , 
90 . I b i d . , 29 A p r i l 1971 . 
9 1 . The H i n d u s t a n Times (New Delh i ) 23 J u l y 1971. 
9 2 . Ihe Mother land 26 J u l y 1971 . 
9 3 . Lok Sabha Deba t e s , v o l . V I , no .49 , 29 J u l y 1971, 
C o l s . 135 -46 . 
9 4 . I n d i a n E x p r e s s , 6 J a n u a r y 1971 . 
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on 24 J a n u a r y , Za fa r I q b a l , F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of t h e 
P a k i s t a n High Coninission i n New De lh i was e x p e l l e d f o r 
i t s invo lvement in t h e a c t i v i t i e s of A l -Fa t ah o r g a n i z a -
95 t i o n . 
P a k i s t a n r e t a l i a t e d by e x p e l l i n g B.L. J o s h i , F i r s t 
S e c r e t a r y of t h e I n d i a n High Conmission in Is lamabad, 
a l l e g i n g h i s engagement i n "esp ionage" a c t i v i t i e s . 
In t h e second week of August 1971, P a k i s t a n ' s a g e n t s 
aga in s t a r t e d s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s . On 14 August , t hey 
blew up a goods t r a i n be tween Bhanga and Chargo la s t a t i o n s 
on the S i l c h a r s e c t o r of t h e N o r t h - E a s t e r n F r o n t i e r 
Railway i n Cachar D i s t r i c t of Assam b o r d e r i n g E a s t 
97 P a k i s t a n , Three b o g i e s of a r e l i e f t r a i n which was 
rushed t o t h e scene from Badarpu a l s o ran i n t o Mine i n 
98 t h e v i c i n i t y . I t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t a t l e a s t fou r hundred 
t r a i n e d P a k i s t a n i a g e n t s were a r r e s t e d i n Assam and Meghalaya 
s i n c e the evacuees from E a s t P a k i s t a n s t a r t e d coming to 
99 I n d i a . 
While P a k i s t a n i s p i e s were cxi t h e one hand busy 
blowing up t r a i n s , t h e P a k i s t a n Government was on t h e o t h e r 
9 5 . The Hindu (Madras) 24 J a n u a r y 1971 . 
9 6 . The Hindus tan Times (New Delh i ) 25 J a n u a r y 1971. 
97 . The Hindu (Madras) 15 August 1971 . 
9 8 . I b i d . 
99 . The Hindus tan Times (New Delhi ) 31 August 1971. 
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making proposals for reduction of tension between her and 
India, 
The Pakistan permanent representative at the United 
Nations, suggested good offices of the security council to 
visit the areas of tension on the border. 
The Pakistan Govejmment* s move was to convert the 
ongoing war between her and East Pakistan into an Indo-
Pakistan problem. She had created the tension and surpri-
singly was making proposals for diffusing same. 
Now, why did Pakistan indulge herself in such 
subversive activities ? In the first place, her aim was 
to create panic in the minds of the people that the law 
and order situation had broken down in India. Secondly, 
she wanted to disrupt the relief supplies to the East 
Pakistan refugees. Thirdly, Pakistan wanted to create an 
East Pakistan - like situation in Assam where a large 
number of Muslims were living, who were previously citizens 
of East Pakistan and lastly, she needed information 
regarding the Indian military installations and locations 
so that in an event of war, "tiiey could be destroyed with 
ease. These factors seriously strained the relations 
between the two countries as a result of the political 
100 . The Mothe r l and , 18 AugiiSt 1971 . 
1 0 1 . B i n d r a , S . S . , n . 2 . p , 1 6 7 . 
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upheaval in Pakistan. However, a f te r the 1971 c r i s i s , 
certain agreements between India and Pakistan were concluded 
by which 5,000 sq. miles of Pakistani t e r r i t o r y was vacated 
by the Indian troops; 93,000, Pakistanis prisoners of war 
(POW's) were repat r ia ted from India to Pakistan, Bangladesh 
was recognized by Pakistan, trade was restamed between India 
and Pakistan, diplomatic re la t ions were restored, 
communications were re-establ ished, the t r a i n link was 
restored, and a long term framework for normalization of 
relat ions was la id down. 
Though the mil i tary junta in Pakistan have been remark-
able in the use of sweet language, reasonable tone and 
uninhibited charm. Vis-a-vis India. Yet, the record of 
behaviour has not given much cause for hope. Despite the 
conclusion of cer ta in agreements in peripheral areas l ike 
consular matters, tourism, conrounications, agr icu l tu ra l 
technology, e t c . numerous meetings between the two countries 
a t Minis ter ia l and of f ic ia l levels on expansion of trade 
t i e s , free flow of information and culture or signing of 
a Treaty of No-war/Peace, cooperation and friendship have 
yielded no r e s u l t s , 
102, Kumar, S,, "India Pakistan Tensions" The Hindustan 
Times, 1 October 1985. 
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That the confidence level between the two coxontries 
has gone down does not have to be proved. The siachin 
Glacier incidents continuing since ttie middle of 1984, 
the Indian perception of Pakis tan 's role in the "Khalistan" 
issue, are evidences, Pakistan on i t s par t was c r i t i c a l 
of India for i t s alleged role in the Sind agi ta t ion of 
1983.IM 
Raising tiie level of confidence between the two 
countries i s tiierefore important and th i s could only be 
done on the willingness of both the countr ies , but this 
may never happen a t l ea s t for now as both countries 
appears not t o be r ea l ly keen in the improvement of 
relat ions between them. 
103. Ib id . 
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b i r t h of i n d e p e n d e n t B a n g l a d e s h . 
BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS 
The r o o t of t he c r i s i s i n P a k i s t a n which c u l m i n a t e d 
in t h e emergence of i n d e p e n d e n t Bangladesh l a y i n t h e ve ry 
3 
s t r u c t u r e of P a k i s t a n . 
P a k i s t a n was c o n s t i t u e n t of two wings , t he E a s t and 
t h e West, s e p a r a t e d by a d i s t a n c e of one thousand m i l e s of 
4 
I n d i a t e r r i t o r y . This s e p a r a t i o n was a g r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e . 
Added t o t h i s d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n was t h e 
d i v e r g e n t c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e of t h e two wings of P a k i s t a n . 
These two f a c t o r s were pe rhaps t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s 
t h a t s t r u c k t h e wide c o n t r a s t between t h e two wings of 
5 
P a k i s t a n . 
The o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t h i g h l i g h t e d the growing 
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two wings of P a k i s t a n was t h e 
language i s s u e . The E a s t P a k i s t a n i s were n o t p r e p a r e d t o 
g i v e up t h e i r B e n g a l i l anguage and" c u l t u r e f o r Urdu 
language t h e o f f i c i a l l anguage of West P a k i s t a n , 
Coupled wi th t h e above f a c t o r s was t h e economic 
7 
i n j u s t i c e m e l t e d on t h e E a s t P a k i s t a n , 
3 , The New York Times ( I n t e r . Ed.) 14 A p r i l 1 9 7 1 . 
4 , Rahamthul la , B . , Indo-American P o l i t i c s , (New D e l h i , 
1980) , p . 2 5 , 
5 , I b i d . , p . 4 5 . 
6, Chowdhury, S .R. , The G e n e s i s of Bangladesh - A s^udy 
i n I n t e r n a t i o n a 1 Tega l norms and p e r m i s s i v e c o n s c i e n c e . 
(Bombay, 1972) , p . 5 8 . 
7 , Lewis , R., P a k i s t a n ; I n d u s t r a l i z a t i o n and t r a d e 
P o l i c i e s (London, 1970) p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 . 
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Contrary to the commonly accepted opinion, the two 
wings of Pakistan had very little in common. During a 
debate in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the 
1956 Constitution Bill, Abul Mansur said: 'Pakistan is a 
unique country, having two wings which... differ in all 
matters excepting two things - a common religion and a 
common struggle, with the exception of these two things, 
all other factors, viz, the language, the traditions, the 
culture, the costume, the dietary, the calender, the 
standard time, practically everything is different. There 
is in fact, nothing common to the two wings, particularly 
in respect of those things which are the sine qua non to 
g 
form a nation'. 
Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e u n i t y o f P a k i s t a n was 
ve ry much doubted and t h e emergence of Bangladesh s i g n i f i e s 
n o t h i n g u n i q u e , 
PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S STEP MOTHERLY TREATMENT 
The P a k i s t a n Government t h a t had most of i t s 
o f f i c e r s from t h e wes t adop ted a c l e a r p o l i c y of s t e p -
mother ly t r e a t m e n t a g a i n s t E a s t P a k i s t a n in p o l i t i c a l , 
c u l t u r a l , s o c i a l , economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s p h e r e s . 
From t h e o n s e t , t h e p e o p l e of ^ a s t P a k i s t a n had occupied 
8 . C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly of P a k i s t a n D e b a t e s , v o l . 1 p .1816 
J a n u a r y 1956. 
themselves with the thoughts of t h e i r fu tu re in respec t 
t o West Pakis tan high-handedness tov/ards them. The Bengali 
members in the Cons t i tuent Assembly were denied the r i g h t 
t o speak in t h e i r own Mother tongue. What a humi l ia t ion , 
when they p ro t e s t ed a g a i n s t t h i s the Prime Minis te r of 
Pakistan Liaquat A l i Khan, himself r e p l i e d : 
"Pakis tan i s a Muslim S ta te and i t must have as i t s 
Linqua franca the language of the Muslim n a t i o n . , , The 
mover should r e a l i z e t h a t Pakis tan has been c rea t ed because 
of the demand of a hundred mi l l ion Muslims in t h i s sub-
cont inen t and the language of a hundred mi l l i on Muslims 
i s U r d u , . . I t i s necessary for a na t ion t o have one language 
Q 
and that language can only be Urdu and no other language", 
Such utterances were against the assurances that were 
given to the representatives of East Pakistan before they 
accepted to join Pakistan, that on all matters they would 
get at least equal treatment. But the promises given seems 
to have gone to the dust. According to Rounaq Jahan "the 
cultural policy of the National elite gave a wider 
emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and helped to 
develop a linguistic nationalism among the other classes of 
Bengalis". It was felt that there was only one way of 
9. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol,II 
25 February 1948, Motion moved by D.N, Dutta, p.15 
replied to by Liaquat Ali Khan. p.17. 
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holding t o g e t h e r the two wings i . e . , by one language and 
one c u l t u r e between them. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali 
J innah ' s famoixs Dacca speech of 1948 defending Urdu as 
the S ta te language t y p i f i e d t h i s view; 
Let me make i t very c l e a r t o you t h a t the s t a t e 
language of Pakis tan is going to be Urdu and no other 
language. Anyone who t r i e s t o mislead you i s r e a l l y the 
enemy of Pak i s t an . Without one s t a t e language, no na t ion 
11 can remain t i e d up s o l i d l y toge the r and func t ion . 
When the Pakis tan Government eventua l ly declared 
Urdu as the na t iona l language of Pakis tan, there were r i o t s 
in Bengal as a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the c u l t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t 
approach, leading t o the death of three s t uden t s of Dacca 
12 
University 
The Bengalis reacted violently because, according to 
the census figures of 1951, Bengali was the language of 
54.6 per cent of East Pakistan while Urdu was the language 
13 
of only 7.2 per cent. However, the constitution in 1956 
recognised both Urdu and Bengali as national languages of 
Pakistan. 
10. Rounaq Jahan, Pak is tan ; F a i l u r e in Nat ional I n t e g r a t i o n (London, 1972) p . 3 7 . 
11 . Jamilud Din Ahmad, ( e d . ) . Speeches and wr i t ings of 
Mr. J innah , v o l . I I (Lahore, 1964) p .490 . 
12. Choudhury, G.W., "Bangladesh, why i t happened?" 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 4 8 , no .2 , Apr i l 1972, p.24 7. 
13. Costa Bendict , Dismemberment of Pakis tan (Ludhiana, 
1973) p . 5 1 . 
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Thus, the assimilationist cultural policy, rather 
than uniting the two wings, drove a wedge between them. It 
alienated the Bengali intelligentsia, the professionals 
14 
and the students, 
To make things worse, all vital decisions as it 
relates to political, defence, economic or diplomatic 
matters, were arrived at by the ruling elite, which was 
composed mainly of West Pakistan civil and military officers. 
Looking at provincial matters, the situation was not in 
any way favourable to the Bengalis, All the posts in West 
Pakistan were occupied by West Pakistanis. In theory, 
however, there was a federal constitution in Pakistan, 
but practically the provincial Government was totally sub-
ordinated to the Centre, more particularly in financial as 
15 
well as in administrative matters, 
The revelations of a group of scholars in Vienna, 
exposed vividly the discriminatory treatment melted out 
to East Pakistan in various fields. The study revealed 
the following; 
On the average annual budget. East Pakistan provided 
60 per cent against West Pakistan's 40 per cent of the 
total revenue, but it received just about 25 per cent for 
14 , Rounaq J a h a n , n . i o . p . 3 8 , 
15 . I b i d . , p . 2 0 3 . 
40 
i t s expendi ture aga in s t t h e remaining 75 pe r cent of 
West P a k i s t a n . In foreign t r a d e . East Pakis tan expor ts 
c o n s t i t u t e d 59 per c e n t of the t o t a l bu t imports only 
30 per cen t which cons i s ted of consumer goods and food, 
Nothing v i r t u a l l y was l e f t for development p r o j e c t s . During 
1958-69, West P a k i s t a n ' s share was 41 per cen t of the t o t a l 
foreign exchange ea rn ings . Most of the development p r o j e c t s 
1 6 
were s e t up in West Pak i s t an , 
So far as bureaucracy was concerned whether i t be 
m i l i t a r y or c i v i l i t was overwhelmingly drawn from the 
West, T i l l the data the m i l i t a r y Junta seized power, there 
was not a s i n g l e Bengali Secre tary amongst the 19 Sec re t a r i e s 
in the Cent ra l government, t he re were only two among the 
50 J o i n t S e c r e t a r i e s , 10 among 135 deputy S e c r e t a r i e s , 
30 among 130 under S e c r e t a r i e s and 16 among 151 a s s i s t a n t 
S e c r e t a r i e s , Al l the 9 members of the Press Commission were 
West P a k i s t a n i s , worse s t i l l was the p o s i t i o n of Bengalis 
in the ar.-ny in which they had only 5 pe r cent r ep resen ta t ion 
17 and t h a t too was a t the lower l e v e l , 
In the Publ ic Health Sector , the s i t u a t i o n was a l so 
shocking. The number of h o s p i t a l s beds in 1968 in West 
Pakistan was es t imated t o be around 26,200 while t h a t in 
16. Bangladesh Doc\aments, n . l . p ,16 , 
17. I b i d . , p . 2 0 . 
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East Pakistan was only 6,909, The number of doctors in 
West Pakistan was 12,400, whereas for East Pakistan it 
was merely 7,600; the number of rural health centres in 
18 
West and East Pakistan were 325 and 88 respectively. 
In educational field, it was also a baleful state 
of affairs. The East Bengalis got 240 million against 52 0 
million rupees for West Pakistan. This development stood 
19 to stop the intelligentsia growth of East Pakistan. 
Even before Sheikh Muj ibur Rehman came into limelight 
in Pakistan politics, some prominent Bengali politicians 
20 had bitterly denounced this unhappy trend. Even President 
Yahya Khan in an interview with a Newsweek correspondent 
admitted the fact that East Pakistan had never got its 
right share from the government of Pakistan. He said: "No 
21 
one (leader) has ever treated the Bengalis fairly". 
It is against this discriminatory policy of the 
Pakistan Government that a movement for full autonomy was 
launched in East Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan 
conflict. It was an attempt aimed at achieving self-
18, Chopra (ed.) The Challenge of Bangladesh. (New Delhi 
1971) pp.79-101. 
19. Bangladesh Documents n.l. p.20. 
20. Shartna, R., Bangladesh Crisis and India Foreign Policy, 
(New Delhi 1978) p.40, 
21, Newsweek, vol, 78, 8 November 1971, p.19, 
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s u f f i c i e n c y in defence and t o accord f u l l autonomy t o i t , 
s i n c e i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e 1965 c o n f l i c t . E a s t P a k i s t a n 
was c o m p l e t e l y i s o l a t e d from West P a k i s t a n , Sheikh 
Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League l e a d e r , gave t o the 
people of Eas t P a k i s t a n a s i x p o i n t s programme. The s i x 
p o i n t s formula which l a t e r became t h e main source of 
subsequen t c o n t r o v e r s y , a r e as f o l l o w s : The f i r s t asked 
f o r a f e d e r a l s t a t e w i t h a l l t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y form of government . The second sought t o l i m i t 
f e d e r a l powers t o defence and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s o n l y ; a l l 
o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g those of conduc t ing f o r e i g n t r a d e and 
f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l , b e i n g w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u e n t u n i t s of 
which Bangladesh would be o n e . The t h i r d proposed s e p a r a t e 
c u r r e n c i e s f o r t h e two wings or a l t e r n a t i v e s a f e g u a r d s t o 
p r e v e n t i n t e r - w i n g f l i g h t of c a p i t a l . The f o u r t h den ied 
t h e c e n t r e t h e r i g h t of t a x a t i o n and v e s t e d i t in t h e hands 
of the f e d e r a t i n g u n i t s . The f i f t h d e a l t wi th economic 
d i s p a r i t i e s and how t o remove them through a s e r i e s o f 
economic, f i s c a l and l e g a l r e f o r m s . The l a s t r e q u i r e d 
s e t t i n g up of a m i l i t a r y o r p a r a - m i l i t a r y fo r ce in o r d e r 
22 t o c o n t r i b u t e e f f e c t i v e l y towards n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y . 
An a n a l y s i s of t h e s i x - p o i n t s formula , v i v i d l y 
r e v e a l s t h a t they were mere ly t o r e d r e s s the uneven s t a t e 
22 , Bangladesh Docxaments n . l . p p . 2 3 - 3 3 , 
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of a f f a i r s in Pak is tan in p o l i t i c a l and economic sphe res , 
The formula received a tremendous welcome in ^ a s t 
Pakis tan and made t h e m i l i t a r y regime s h i v e r . The m i l i t a r y 
regime's po l i cy towards the s ix -po in t s movement d isplayed 
i t s i n a b i l i t y to respond p o l i t i c a l l y t o p o l i t i c a l demands, 
Mujibur Rehman made the s i x -po in t s negot iab le b u t 
Ayub Khan f a i l e d to t ry h is hands on nego t i a t i on , he 
decided to confront the Awami League l eade r and branded 
Mujibur Rehman's demands as " s ece s s ion i s t " , " d i s r u p t i o n i s t " , 
"a demand for g r e a t e r Bengal" e t c . during h i s tour of East 
23 Pakistan i n March 1966, But such accusa t ions were hard ly 
tenable in East Pakis tan, and so the movement for autonomy 
went on d e s p i t e a l l t h r e a t s and the r e p r e s s i v e po l i cy of the 
Government. I t generated so much hea t t h a t forced Ayxab Khan 
t o s tep down on 25 March 1969 and handed over power to t h e 
0 A 
Army Commander-in-chief, General Yahya Khan. 
In an address to the nat ion on 28 November 1969, 
Pres ident Yahya Khan dec lared : "My aim i s to t r a n s f e r power 
to the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the peop le" . 
23 . The Pak i s tan Observer, 15 March 19 66. 
24. The Dawn. (Karachi) 2 6 March 1969. 
25 . I b i d . 28 November 1969. 
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A f t e r t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e e l e c t i o n w e r e a n n o u n c e d , 
S h e i k h M u j i b u r Rehman was i n a p o s i t i o n t o form t h e G o v e r n -
m e n t , w h i l e t h e P a k i s t a n P e o p l e ' s p a r t y l e d by Z , A l l 
B h u t t o emerged a s t h e m a i n o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y . B h u t t o b e i n g 
u p s e t by t h e v i c t o r y o f t h e Awami League l e d by S h e i k h 
M u j i b u r Rehman, d e c l a r e d t h a t he v/as n o t r e a d y t o t a k e 
i t s o p p o s i t i o n b e n c h e s i n t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly and t h a t 
no c o n s t i t u t i o n would be f ramed , n o r c o u l d any g o v e r n m e n t 
2 6 
a t t h e c e n t r e b e run w i t h o u t h i s p a r t y ' s c o o p e r a t i o n , 
BATTLE FOR POWER BETV7EEN THE AWAMI LEAGUE AND TH5 PAKISTAN." 
PEOPLE'S PARTY 
T h e r e e r u p t e d a s t r u g g l e f o r pov;er i n P a k i s t a n b e t w e e n 
t h e Awami L e a g u e and t h e P a k i s t a n p e o p l e ' s P a r t y l e d b y 
S h e i k h M u j i b u r Rehman and Z.A. B h u t t o r e s p e c t i v e l y . B h u t t o 
on 15 F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 1 , d e c l a r e d in P e s h a w a r t h a t h i s p a r t y 
would n o t a t t e n d t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly s e s s i c n s t a r t i n g on 
3 March 1971 a t Dacca u n l e s s i t was made c l e a r t o hirr. and 
h i s p a r t y m e n t h a t t h e r e v;ould be some d e g r e e of r e c i p r o c i t y 
27 
from t h e m a j o r i t y p a r t y , e i t h e r p u b l i c l y o r p r i v a t e l y . 
B h u t t o ' s d e c i s i o n and u t t e r a n c e s met w i t h h a r s h 
c o n d e m n a t i o n s i n t h e h a n d s of A t t a u r Rehman, v/ho was 
26 . B ind ra , S . S . Indo-Pak R e l a t i o n s . (New D e l h i , 1981) , 
p . 1 2 6 , 
2 7 , The Dawn ( K a r a c h i ) , 1 6 February 1971 . 
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the then Chief of the Pakis tan National League when he 
descr ibed Bhutto* s s tand as a move to d iv ide the country, 
Maulana Bhashani the then p r e s i d e n t of the Nat ional Awarai 
Par ty , descr ibed Bhu t to ' s p re -cond i t ions as a " th r ea t " t o 
29 East Pak i s t an . 
On 28 February Bhutto demanded the postponement of 
the Nat ional Assembly s e s s ion t o f a c i l i t a t e fresh t a l k s 
between h i s par ty and the Awami League. Yahya Khan gave 
a in and on 1 March in broadcas t to the na t ion , announced 
the postponement of the National Assembly s e s s i o n . His 
reasons for t h i s dec is ion were t h a t he f e l t t h a t i t was 
use less holding t h e s e s s ion vrfien the Pak i s tan People ' s 
Par ty as wel l as c e r t a i n o ther p a r t i e s had declared t h e i r 
i n t e n t i o n of not a t t end ing , adding t h a t " the genera l 
s i t u a t i o n of t ens ion cireated by India has f u r t he r compli-
31 
cated the whole p o s i t i o n " . This Indian f ac to r only 
confirmed iftie b e l i e f i n East Pakis tan t h a t the des t ruc t ion 
of the hi jacked Indian plane and the var ious m i l i t a r y and 
o ther measures adopted by Pakistan t h e r e a f t e r were a l l 
p a r t of an a t tempt to c r e a t e tension with Ind ia so as to 
provide the m i l i t a r y regime with an excuse for withholding 
28. The Pakis tan Observer, 17 February 1971. 
29. I b i d . , 18 February 1971. 
30. The Pak i s tan Times, 2 March 1971. 
3 1 . I b i d . 
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the transfer of power to the elected representatives of 
the people, 
After the postponement of the National Assembly 
Session, which Mujibur Rehmsn described as a result of 
•a deep rooted conspiracy* Mujibur's Awami League launched 
a civil disobedience movement. Strikes were observed all 
over East Pakistan, 
In an effort to arrest the situation. President Yahya 
Khan invited twelve political leaders of both the wings to 
a round table conference on 10 March, But Mujibur Rehman 
32 
refused to attend. On 6 March Yahya Khan conceded the 
popular demand and summoned the National Assembly on 2 5 
March, At the same time, he appointed Lt, General Tikka 
Khan, a tough man in Pakistani military bureaucracy as 
Governor of East Bengal with the obvious intention that 
he would crush Mujibur Rehman and his party movement. It 
was rightly said that the postponement of the Assembly 
meeting was the beginning of the end. The end itself came 
25 days later when the army was ordered to undertake a 
final solution of the East Bengal problem, 
Mujibur Rehman responded by organizing a rally on 
7 March and announced at that gathering that he was 
32, Sharma, R., n,20, p.26, 
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not going t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the Assenbly de l i be r a t i ons 
unless ( i ) Mar t i a l Law was l i f t e d ( i i ) Pakis tan artny 
re turned t o the bar racks ( i i i ) enqxiiry was ordered in to 
the k i l l i n g s in East Bengal and l a s t l y (iv) Power was 
33 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o the people , 
The e f f ec t iveness of the a u t h o r i t y of Mujibur Rehman, 
compelled Yahya Khan to adopt a c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e in 
h i s t a l k s with him during the c r u c i a l period from 16 to 
25 March.^^ 
At the end of the f r u i t l e s s ta lks held a t Dacca 
between P re s iden t Yahya Khan and the r ep re sen t a t i ve s of 
the Awami League, the Pakis tan People ' s Par ty and other 
p a r t i e s , p r e s i d e n t Yahya Khan on 2 6 March banned a l l 
35 p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s throughout Pak i s t an . On the same 
day before the P r e s i d e n t ' s broadcas t , Mujibur Rehman 
declared East Pakis tan as an independent S ta te of Bangla-
desh. G,w. Chowdhury i s of the opinion t h a t P res iden t 
Yahya Khan made the f i r s t and l a s t a t tempt a t pu t t ing the 
complicated r e l a t i o n s h i p between East and West Pakis tan 
on a sound p o l i t i c a l b a s i s . A t t r i b u t i n g reasons for the 
33 . The Dawn (Karachi) 8 March 1971. 
34. Chowdhury, S.R., n . 6 . p . 6 6 , 
35 . The Dawn (Karachi) 2 7 March 1971. 
36. The Statesman (New Delhi) 27 March 1971, 
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f a i l u r e of Yahya Khan, Chowdhury f e e l s t h a t Yahya Khan 
f a i l e d because of t h e growing t e n s i o n , s u s p i c i o n and even 
h a t r e d between the r u l i n g e l i t e of West P a k i s t a n and the 
Bengal i i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . The f a i l u r e of Dacca t a l k s was 
37 
s o l e l y due t o Bhutto and h i s f r i e n d s in t h e army. While 
Yahya Khan would be blamed fo r h i s mis judgement of t h e 
38 p o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n i n t h e e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e , Bhu t to and 
Mujibur Rehman f a i l e d t o accommodate each o t h e r and thus 
paved the way f o r t h e m i l i t a r y t o occupy a key p o s i t i o n 
of a r b i t r a t o r . Bhutto was i n s i s t i n g on s h a r i n g of power 
because t h e r e was a p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t y i n West P a k i s t a n 
i n a c c e p t i n g the i dea of Mujibur Rehman's dominat ion a t 
t h e c e n t r e . B h u t t o ' s demands were tu rned down by Muj ibur 
Rehman b e c a u s e he was n e v e r a popu la r f i g u r e i n E a s t P a k i s t a n , 
h i s a s s o c i a t i o n wi th Ayub Khan in the p a s t , h i s s t a n d a g a i n s t 
t h e s i x - p o i n t s i n 1966 and h i s f r e q u e n t mee t ings with Yahya 
Khan, t h e G e n e r a l s and t h e members of t h e C i v i l S e r v i c e , 
were t h e main r e a s o n s of h i s b e i n g d i s l i k e d in E a s t 
39 P a k i s t a n . 
INDIA AND THE EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS 
The c i v i l war which b r o k e o u t i n P a k i s t a n and t h e 
a t r o c i t i e s committed by t h e P a k i s t a n army on t h e unarmed 
3 7. Chowdhury, G.W., "The l a s t days of Un i t ed P a k i s t a n ; 
A p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t " , i n t e i m a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 4 9, 
no .4 ; ^ r i l 1973, p p . 229 -39 , 
3 8 . K l a t t , W,, "The I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t a f t e r t h e war" 
World Today, v o l . 2 8 , March 1972, p p . 1 0 9 - 1 0 . 
3 9 . Rounaq J a h a n , " E l i t e i n C r i s i s ; Ihe f a i l u r e of Muj ib-
Yahya N e g o t i a t i o n s " , O r b i s , v o l . 1 7 , n o . 2 , 1973, p . 5 9 5 . 
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and defence less people of East Pakis tan , and the eventual 
dismeiribennent of Pakistan was a c l e a r demonstration of 
P a k i s t a n ' s f a i l u r e to achieve na t iona l i n t eg ra t i on and the 
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p . 
Ind ia became involved in the c r i s i s due to the 
following f a c t o r s , one, a major c r i s i s po in t had emerged 
on I n d i a ' s doors teps which had inev i t ab l e repercussions on 
India , p a r t i c u l a r l y in view of the emotional overtones the 
c r i s i s evoked on the Indian s i d e . Secondly, the i n t e r n a l 
upheaval in East Pakistan crea ted refugee problem for 
India which in tu rn gave r i s e to seve ra l o thers complicating 
i s sues , p o l i t i c a l , soc i a l as well as economic. Thirdly, 
the fear of the major powers who played some r o l e in the 
c r i s i s mainly for s t r a t e g i c reasons might t u r n the region 
40 i n to a second Vietnam c r i s i s on a much l a rge r s c a l e . 
After d i scuss ing the i s sue in a cab ine t meeting arid 
a l so with the opposi t ion l eaders in Par l iament , I nd i a , 
adopted a cau t ious approach to the c r i s i s , b u t Mrs Gandhi 
made i t c l e a r t h a t the quest ion of c los ing I n d i a ' s border 
aga ins t the refugees was not debatable as Ind ia would 
render humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e to the refugees who might 
40 . Sharma, R., n.20, pp.56-57. 
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come i n t o I n d i a , and t h a t as a Government, i t could not 
support a s e c e s s i o n i s t movement in a neighbouring country, 
This was to ward off i n t e r n a t i o n a l condemnation on Ind ia . 
In the Lok Sabha, the members unanimously urged the 
government t o help the Eas t P a k i s t a n i s , by sending r e l i e f 
and medical a id , grant ing asylum t o people who seek t o 
cross over to India , r a i s i n g the i ssue in i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
forums and evoking the Geneva Convention on "genocide" 
t h a t was being committed aga ins t the East P a k i s t a n i s , 
Mrs Gandhi in he r response t o a l l these suggest ions , expre -
ssed sympathy for the people of East Pakis tan and sa id t h a t 
the Government fu l ly shared the agony, emotions and tiie 
deep concern of the people in Ind ia , she assured the House 
t h a t the Government would take a dec is ion regarding t h e i r 
42 suggest ions s h o r t l y , 
Meanwhile, the High Commissioner of Pakis tan lodged 
a se r ious ve rba l p r o t e s t a l l e g i n g t h a t Ind ia was i n t e r -
fer ing in her i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . He condemned the coverage 
of the c r i s i s in East Pakis tan by Indian Newspapers and 
Al l India Radio as " f a l s e , mischievious and h o s t i l e " . He 
a l s o objected to the proceedings in the Indian par l iament 
41 , The Statesman (New Delhi) 28 March 1971. 
42. Lok Sabha Debates, v o l . 1 , no.7 , 27 March 1971. c o l s . 
42-43. 
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on the c r i s i s on 27 March. India refused to e n t e r t a i n 
these p r o t e s t s of Pak is tan , by informing the Pakis tan High 
Contnissioner t h a t the newspapers and the All India Radio 
were f ree to r epor t and b roadcas t a l l the information they 
could g e t , India a l so po in ted out tha t the Government 
could not s top any member of the House or any p o l i t i c i a n 
43 in India from expressing h i s views. The Lok Sabha demanded 
the immediate cessa t ion of the use of force and the massacre 
of defenceless people . Al l a long, India has been extending 
i t s moral support t o the people of East Pak i s t an . 
Thereaf ter , Ind ia s t a r t e d arousing world publ ic 
opinion aga in s t the r u t h l e s s and ba rba r i c repress ion in 
East Pak i s t an . She asked the USSR to use he r good of f ices 
t o put a s top t o the ugly happenings in East Pak is tan , The 
USSR was approached because of i t s ro le in nortnalisat ion 
of the Indo-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s , e spec ia l ly in connection 
44 with the Tashkent Conference of 1966. India a l s o approached 
the then Secretary-General of the United Nat ions , U. Thant 
and members of the uni ted Nations Secur i ty Council . The 
Indian Ambassador in the United Nations samir Sen a t a 
press conference sa id t h a t the object ive of these consu l t a -
43 . The Statesman (New Delhi) 29 March 1971. 
44. I b i d . , 2 Apri l 1971. 
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tions was to see how best the United Nations and inter-
national opinion could express itself in the crisis, 
without violating Article 2(7) of the United Nations 
Charter which forbids interference in domestic affairs of 
member states. The impression at the United Nations head-
quarters was that the crisis was an "internal affairs" of 
Pakistan and that in any event, the situation at least in 
Dacca seemed to be under control of the Pakistan Govem-
45 
ment. 
All these efforts by India clearly demonstrated that 
she was sincere in ending the crisis in Pakistan without 
outside interference. Pakistan termed the crisis as her 
internal affairs, but this was not, as the effects of what 
46 
was happening in Pakistan was heavily felt in India. 
India objected to the Pakistan stand on the groxands 
that, ten million Pakistanis had entered India without 
proper documents, these people had no means of livelihood 
and no means of returning to their coxintry, the ten 
million people included some infiltrators and spies, India 
was not in a position to support these people without 
running into financial crisis of great magnitude and finally, 
45. Ibid., 1 April 1971. 
46. Sharma, R-, n.20. p.43 
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many of -ttiese people brought with them hazards of hea l th 
which was capable of i n f e c t i n g the l o c a l popu la t ion . The 
outbreak of cholera epidemic in the sunmer of 1971 speaks 
volume for what dangers were inheren t in the movement of 
these r e fugees . Above a l l these , were the s t o r i e s of Hindu 
persecu t ion in East Bengal which were bound to c r e a t e law 
and order problems in I n d i a . 
As to why India permit ted the refugees t o en te r i t s 
t e r r i t o r y ? Ind ia f e l t i t would be the he igh t of inhumanity 
t o close her border for those who sought s h e l t e r in India , 
i t s po l i cy s ince 1947 allows persecuted people from e i t h e r 
wing of Pakis tan to e n t e r Ind ia when they a r e persecuted 
and forced to leave Pakis tan , publ ic opinion in India 
would not t o l e r a t e the government to watch pass ive ly the 
mass massacre of Hindus in Pak i s tan . No government in India 
would have l a s t ed a day i f i t refused the s h e l t e r seekers 
47 
en t ry i n t o I n d i a . 
There i s no denying the fac t t h a t the Indian Govern-
ment had f u l l sympathies with the l i b e r a t i o n movement in 
East Pak is tan , bu t t he re i s no concrete evidence to prove 
i t s involvement. India had never nvirsed the dismemberment 
of Pakis tan and to t h i s end, she s t r e s sed on the p o l i t i c a l 
so lu t ion of the i s sue in East Pakistan wi th in the frame-
47. I b i d . , n .20 . pp .43-45. 
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work of P a k i s t a n . I n d i a wanted a s e t t l e m e n t t h a t was 
a c c e p t a b l e t o the d u l y e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of E a s t 
48 P a k i s t a n . 
THE REFUGEES AND ITS PROBLEMS 
Fo l lowing t h e m i l i t a r y crackdown on E a s t P a k i s t a n , 
thousands of r e f u g e e s s t a r t e d pour ing i n t o I n d i a . They 
came t o I n d i a t o save t h e i r l i v e s , a g a i n t h e y chose Ind i a 
becat ise i t was t h e e a s i e s t c o u n t r y t h e y cou ld run t o s i n c e 
E a s t P a k i s t a n was sur rounded by I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y from 
t h r e e s i d e s , 
Prom 25 March t o 16 December 1971, a t o t a l number of 
49 9 ,899,305 r e f u g e e s f l e d t o I n d i a . In A p r i l , 57,000 p e r s o n s 
came t o I n d i a . I n May t h e d a i l y in f l t r c of r e fugees a l m o s t 
doubled i . e . , 102,000 a day . But i n t h e l a t e r months t h e 
flow became l e s s , 
Speaking a t t h e S i x t h Uni t ed N a t i o n s Committee on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e I n d i a ' s spokesman r e f e r r i n g t o t h e 
i n f l u x of r e f u g e e s i n t o I n d i a and t h e a t t e n d i n g problems 
s a i d ; ' T h i s c o u l d be a s p e c i a l type of b l o o d l e s s a g g r e s s i o n 
r e s u l t i n g from a v a s t i n c e s s a n t flow of m i l l i o n s of human 
4 8 . The Times of I n d i a . (New De lh i ) 9 September 1971 . 
4 9 . Bangladesh Documents, v o l . I I , ( D e l h i , Govt , of I n d i a ) 
p . 8 0 , 
50 . I b i d , , p , 8 1 . 
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beings who have been forced to leave their country into 
another'. The influx of refugees into India created a 
heavy financial burden on India. The World Bank warned 
India of the disastrous effect of the influx of refugees 
52 into India, 
In an interview given by the military Governor of 
East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan had alleged that India 
was obstructing the return of refugees to East Pakistan. 
But this allegation was proved wrong by Prince Sadruddin 
Aga Khan, the United Nations High Coinnissioner for refugees 
after his visit to the various refugee camps, he told a 
press conference that the allegation of General Tikka Khan 
53 has no roots, 
Regarding the posting of United Nations observers 
in India t e r r i t o ry , India objected to th i s move on p o l i t i c a l , 
legal and prac t ica l fac to rs . The posting of few observers 
on e i ther side of the border would not correct the present 
repulsive s i tua t ion , India saw no Jus t i f i ca t ion in posting 
foreign personnel into i t s t e r r i to ry to prevent the massive 
influx, the proposed "observation" was seen as a del ibera te 
51. Foreign Affairs Records, External Affairs Ministry, 
Govt, of India, December 1971, p.345. 
52. ibia. 
53. The Times of India (New Delhi) 1 July 1971. 
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move t o b y p a s s t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
C h a r t e r of t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s Chap te r S i x , which p r o v i d e s , 
t h a t ma in tenance of peace and s e c u r i t y i s t h e b u s i n e s s of 
t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l f o r which s p e c i f i c m o d a l i t i e s were 
s p e c i f i e d and l a s t l y , i t was seen a s a c l e v e r move t o 
e q u a t e P a k i s t a n w i th I n d i a , t h e v i c t i m of t h e c i v i l i a n 
54 
a g g r e s s i o n i n t h e form of r e f u g e e s i n f l u x , 
I n d i a made t remendous e f f o r t s t o m o b i l i s e p u b l i c 
op in ion i n favour of s a f e r e t u r n of t h e r e f u g e e s . Mrs Gandhi 
h i g h l i g h t e d t h i s in "ttie c o u r s e of h e r f o r e i g n t o u r , and a l l 
t h e c o u n t r i e s s h e v i s i t e d a g r e e d t o c r e a t e an a tmosphere f o r 
55 t h e r e t u r n of t h e s e r e f u g e e s . 
The P a k i s t a n Government d id n o t h i n g t o c o n t r o l t h e 
f low of r e f u g e e s i n t o I n d i a . Althoiigh, t he US could r e a l i z e 
t h e magni tude of t h e impending danger in t h e S u b - c o n t i n e n t , 
y e t i t d id n o t p l a y any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e t o p u t an end t o 
t h e c r i s i s . The then US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Rogers s t a t e d 
i n t h e Gene ra l Assembly of t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s on 4 Oc tober 
1971, t h a t t h e US i n t e n d e d t o keep a l o o f t h e e v e n t s , b e c a u s e 
t h e y were i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of P a k i s t a n . 
54. The Statesman (New Delhi) 22 July 1971. 
55. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. VIII, no 1, 15 November 1971. 
col. 243. Countries visited: USA, the U.K., F.R.G., 
Prance, Belgium and Australia, 
56. GAOR, 2 6th Session, 1950th plenary meeting, 4 October 
1971, para, 56, p.4. 
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The then President of the US Mr Richard M. Nixon, 
requested the Congress for an additional 3um of $ 150 
million for the re l i e f and rehabi l i ta t ion of refugees 
from East Pakistan on humanitarian grounds, Nixon said 
in the Congress: 
"I therefore urge, tha t in addition to completing 
action on the House i n i t i a t i v e , the Congress authorises 
and appropriate an addit ional sum of $ 150 million for 
the re l i e f and rehab i l i t a t ion of refugees from East 
Pakistan and for humanitarian re l ief in East Pakistan under 
the Foreign Assistance Act. Together with food supplied 
tinder public Law 480, these funds will enable us to do 
our share in mitigating the effects of the human c r i s i s 
and thus help avert the deepest tragedies that a l l easi ly 
57 could follow". With t h i s , one could be logical ly r ight 
to draw a conclusion tha t President Nixon had full knowledge 
regarding the s i tua t ion in the sub-continent when he 
decided to favour Pakistan against India, 
In an effor t to solve the Bangladesh c r i s i s , the 
Indian Government sent several central Ministers to various 
57. Department of State Bullet in (Washington), 25 October 
1971, vo l . LXV, no.1687, p.445. 
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countries to inform them of the happenings in the region. 
The then prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi paid a v i s i t 
to the Soviet Union and some western Exuropean countries 
and the United States, Swaran Singh v i s i t ed the USSR, 
German Democratic Republic, Canada, the US, the UK, France 
and the United Nations. On his return, he informed the 
Lok Sabha of his impression on the foreign tour on 25 June, 
he said tha t besides meeting Government au thor i t i es , he 
a lso met in every cap i ta l , l eg is la tors , ed i to rs , social 
workers and leaders of public opinion. In the course of h is 
discussion, the focus of a t tent ion and emphasis was on 
the grave and serious s i tua t ion tha t had been created for 
India by the influx, of refugees from East Pakistan and 
the continuing c r i s i s in the region. As a resu l t of the 
discussions with these leaders, agreements were reached 
tha t , there should be no mil i tary solution of the East 
Pakistan problem and a l l mi l i tary actions already in force 
there must be halted immediately, the flow of refugees 
into India must stop forthwith, conditions be created to 
enable a l l the refugees re turn home in peace and security, 
and this could only happen if the refugees were guaranteed 
of the i r future safety in t h e i r homes in East Pakistan, 
the only solution tha t could be acceptable to the people 
of East Pakistan was a p o l i t i c a l solution ensuring return 
of normalcy and las t ly , the present c r i s i s was pregnant 
59 
with serious dangers for the peace and security of the 
, 58 
region. 
G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g t h i s f o r e i g n t o u r was ve ry 
h e l p f u l t o ^ndia i n c r e a t i n g world op in ion i n h e r favoxir 
and demons t r a t ed t h a t she was no t i n f avour o f dismembering 
P a k i s t a n , 
In t h e l a s t week of September 1971, Mrs Gandhi 
v i s i t e d Moscow on a t h r e e day t o u r . She impressed upon t h e 
Kremlin t h e urgency of c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n Eas t P a k i s t a n 
f o r t h e r e t u r n of t h e r e f u g e e s . The S o v i e t P remie r Kosygin 
c a l l e d upon Genera l Yahya Khan t o make e f f o r t s i n o r d e r t o 
e a s e t h e t e n s i o n i n the s u b - c o n t i n e n t . The j o i n t communique 
i s s u e d a f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e v i s i t c a l l e d " f o r an 
u r g e n t s o l u t i o n t o t h e p rob lem, i n keep ing w i t h t h e w i s h e s , 
59 t h e i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s and lawful i n t e r e s t s of i t s p e o p l e " , 
Mrs Gandhi i n O c t o b e r 1971, conducted a t o u r of 
Western European c o u n t r i e s , wi th t h e i n t e n t i o n s of b r i n g i n g 
t o t h e i r n o t i c e t h e r e a l happen ings i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t , 
Secondly , s h e was o u t t o know t h e f e e l i n g s of t h e s e Western 
European c o u n t r i e s l e a d e r s as to what t h e y t h o u g h t 
5 8 . Lok Sabha Deba tes , v o l , IV, n o , 2 5 , 25 June 1971 
C o l s . 1 3 3 - 4 , 
59 , The Times o f I n d i a (New Delhi) 30 Septerriber 1971, 
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and proposed to do in order to solve the East Pakistan 
issue. Thirdly, her tour enabled her to warn the West that 
time was running out and if nothing was done to stop 
Pakistan from implementing a spurious solution and to 
obtain the freedom of Muj ibur Rehman, the war between India 
and Pakistan would be unavoidable. 
On her return, Mrs Gandhi told the cabinet political 
Affairs Committee that she was hopeful that some world 
leaders would try to persuade President Yahya Khan to 
initiate a political settlanent of the crisis and that these 
world leaders were now convinced of the necessity of a 
61 political settlement in East Pakistan. Speaking in the 
parliament on 15 November, she said that her tour gave her 
the opportunity to exchange ideas with the Heads of 
Governments and leaders of Public opinion. The discussions 
helped in removing certain misgivings and focused attention 
on the refusal of the Pakistan military regime to respect 
the verdict of their own people. The US, UK, France, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany assured her that no arms 
62 
would be supplied to Pakistan. 
60. Christiana Tirimagni Hxirting, "The Indo-Pak war and 
the ending of a Power Balance in South Asia", Indian 
Journal of Political Science, vol, XXXV, no.3, July-
September 1974, p.215. 
61. The Statesman (New Delhi) 15 November 1971. 
62. Lok Sabha Debates, vol, VIII, no 1, 15 November 1971, 
Cols, 242-46. 
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Mrs G a n d h i ' s toxur was v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t and t i m e l y 
on c e r t a i n r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , i t c l e a r e d t h e wrong impres s ion 
t h a t I n d i a was i n t e r f e r i n g i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of 
P a k i s t a n , s e c o n d l y , i t convinced the v i s i t e d c o u n t r i e s 
t h a t war m i g h t be i n e v i t a b l e becaiase of P a k i s t a n ' s 
a t t i t u d e by v i o l a t i n g t h e I n d i a n b o r d e r and i t s army 
i n d u l g i n g i n s a b o t a g e a c t i v i t i e s . T h i r d l y , t h e a c c e p t a n c e 
of t h e Western C o t m t r i e s n o t t o send arms t o P a k i s t a n seems 
t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s welcomed t h e I n d i a n p o l i c y 
towards t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e as r i g h t and l a s t l y , I n d i a 
convinced them, t h a t s h e was no t i n f avour of d i s i n t e g r a t i n g 
P a k i s t a n b u t was on ly ou t f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e 
c r i s i s . 
Meanwhile, t h e r e grew a widespread demand i n I n d i a 
t h a t she s h o u l d a c c o r d t o t h e new government of Bangladesh 
63 
r e c o g n i t i o n . However, Mrs Gandhi w i t h h e l d r e c o g n i t i o n . 
When on 3 December 1971, P a k i s t a n a t t a c k e d I n d i a 
and both were engaged i n war , I n d i a a f t e r c a r e f u l a s s e s s m e n t 
of t h e s i t u a t i o n ex tended r e c o g n i t i o n t o Bangladesh on 6 
December 1971 , 
E x p l a i n i n g t h e c a u s e s of I n d i a ' s d e c i s i o n , Mrs Gandhi 
s a i d t h a t two developments had l e d t o t h e I n d i a ' s d e c i s i o n , 
63 , I n d i a n E x p r e s s , (New D e l h i ) 8 May 1 9 7 1 . 
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one , was t h e v i c t o r y of Awami League in t h e December 1970 
g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n , and t h e second was t h e v a l i a n t s t r u g g l e 
of t h e Bangladesh people i n the face of t remendous 
o b s t a c l e s . She added t h a t ' w i t h t h e unanimoi:is r e v o l t of 
t h e e n t i r e p e o p l e of Bangladesh and the s u c c e s s of t h e i r 
s t r u g g l e , i t ha s become i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e 
s o c a l l e d Mother S t a t e of P a k i s t a n was t o t a l l y i n c a p a b l e 
64 
of b r i n g i n g t h e p e o p l e of Bangladesh back t o i t s f o l d ' , 
Meanwhile , t h e war be tween I n d i a and P a k i s t a n c o n t i n u e d 
and t h e I n d i a n army wi th t h e a s s i s t a n c e of Mukti Bahini 
f i n a l l y l i b e r a t e d Bangladesh on 16 December 1 9 7 1 . 
THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY 
See ing t h e t e n s i o n on t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n b o r d e r s and 
t h e P a k i s t a n - A m e r i c a n - C h i n a ' s a x i s t h r e a t e n i n g h e r b e f o r e 
t h e war b r o k e o u t , I n d i a s i g n e d a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p and 
c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the USSR on 9 August 1971 in New D e l h i . 
The Immediate o b j e c t i v e of the t r e a t y was t o defend 
I n d i a ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of 
wor ld p e a c e which was t h r e a t e n e d by t h e US, P a k i s t a n and 
C h i n a . The t r e a t y c o n t a i n e d twelve a r t i c l e s . I t r e a f f i r m e d 
t h a t I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of n o n - a l i g n m e n t b e i n g t h e c o m e r s t o n e 
64 , S e l e c t e d Speeches of I n d i r a Gandhi, p u b l i c a t i o n D i v , , 
M i n i s t r y of i n f o r m a t i o n an<i B r o a d c a s t i n g , Govt , of 
I n d i a (New D e l h i , 1975) p . 5 9 3 . 
6 5 . The S ta t e sman (New Delh i ) 10 August 1971 . 
6 6, Das Tapan, Two Year s of I n d o - S o v i e t T r e a t y (De lh i , 
1973) p p . 6 - 7 . 
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of I n d i a f o r e i g n p o l i c y had c o n s t i t u t e d an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r 
In t h e ma in t enance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and in r e d u c i n g 
t e n s i o n i n t h e wor ld . Four a r t i c l e s s t r e s s e d t h e o b j e c t i v e 
of world peace and c o o p e r a t i o n , o t h e r a r t i c l e s t a l k e d a b o u t 
t h e economic, c u l t u r a l and s c i e n t i f i c r e l a t i o n s between t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s , 
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A r t i c l e s e i ^ t and n i n e were t h e most i m p o r t a n t 
a r t i c l e s of t h e t r e a t y i n l i g h t of t h e 1971 c r i s i s , t h e s e 
a r t i c l e s made i t c l e a r by i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t shou ld China 
a t t e m p t t o i n t e r v e n e i n an i n d o - P a k i s t a n War, t h e USSR would 
do a l l w i t h i n i t s power t o h a n d l e the s i t u a t i o n . F u r t h e r , 
t h e i s s u e of r i g h t o r wrong would have no b e a r i n g as f a r 
a s i t i s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h e l p t o I n d i a from t h e 
USSR, so long as I n d i a was a g a i n s t China , 
Commenting on t h e t r e a t y , t h e I n d i a n e x p r e s s , s a i d 
t h a t t h e t r e a t y was a r e s p o n s e " t o t h e d e v e l o p i n g s i t u a t i o n 
in t h e I n d i a s u b - c o n t i n e n t " . 
J a n a Sangh a major o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y of I n d i a was i n 
doubt as t o whether I n d i a would be a b l e t o t a k e a c t i o n 
70 in Eas t P a k i s t a n . 
6 7 . S u r v i v a l , XIIJ October 1971, p p . 3 5 1 - 3 , 
6 8 . Shah Z a f a r , M.A,, I n d i a and t h e Super Powers (New 
D e l h i , 1983) , p . 5 5 . 
6 9 . I nd i an E x p r e s s , I n d o - S o v i e t T r e a t y 10 August 1971 . 
7 0 . The Times of I n d i a , (New Delh i ) 10 August 1 9 7 1 . 
A.B. Vajpayee e x p r e s s e d t h i s doxibt. 
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The Hindustan Tiroes in i t s e d i t o r i a l under the 
capt ion "Was i t necessary" remarked on 10 August tha t the re 
was "abso lu te ly no dovibt t h a t in en te r ing i n t o a Secur i ty 
arrangement with one of the world' s super powers, India 
had abandoned non-alignment" and had "a l igned i t s e l f with 
the Soviet b l o c " . Morarj i Desai of the Congress (o) a lso 
took a c r i t i c a l view of t h e t r e a t y and said t h a t l i k e a l l 
t r e a t i e s between a s t rong and a weak power, i t would help 
72 
mainly t he Soviet Union. I t was held by many t h a t under 
the e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , the Sovie t backing 
could have been secured by Ind ia without paying the p r i ce 
of a t r e a t y for twenty y e a r s . This popular view was 
expressed c l e a r l y in an e d i t o r i a l which wrote; "The Soviet 
Veto in t h e Secur i ty Council and Soviet a id in a c r i s i s 
could su re ly have been ensured without t he cos t of so 
73 comprehensive a t r e a t y " . In the Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh 
the then Externa l Affa i rs Min i s te r , to ld t h e members on 
10 August 1971 t h a t -tiie t r e a t y did not debar India from 
tak ing any xmi la t e ra l a c t i on on Bangladesh. 
Thus, though t h e popular reac t ion t o t he Indo-Soviet 
t r e a t y was mixed, the dominant t rend of t he Indian publ ic 
was not in i t s favour. The main charge a g a i n s t the t r e a t y 
7 1 . The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 10 August 1971. 
72. The Motherland 23 August 1971. 
73 . The Statesman (New Delhi) 10 August 1971. 
74. Lok Sabha Debates, v o l . VII, no 57, 10 August 19 71, 
c 3 I s . 330-43. 
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was, t h a t i n s t e a d of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e freedom movement 
of Bangladesh, i t would impose l i m i t a t i o n s upon I n d i a ' s 
freedom of a c t i o n . I t was assumed -tiiat t h e S o v i e t Union 
was s t i l l committed t o a p o l i c y of m a i n t a i n i n g f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h b o t h I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , and t h a t s h e might 
f a v o u r on ly a Tashkent t y p e of s e t t l e m e n t as t h e s o l u t i o n 
of t h e c r i s i s , The p e r s i s t e n t S o v i e t appea l s f o r a 
s o l u t i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e " e n t i r e " peop l e of 
P a k i s t a n and t h e cause of peace i n t h e r e g i o n seemed t o have 
75 confirmed t h i s s u s p i c i o n . 
The r e a c t i o n in P a k i s t a n was a d v e r s e . The o f f i c i a l 
r e a c t i o n of P a k i s t a n c o u l d be judged from t h e s t a t e m e n t of 
i t s Ambassador t o t h e Uni t ed S t a t e s Agha Shah i , who i n a 
t e l e v i s i o n i n t e r v i e w e x p r e s s e d the concern t h a t I n d i a 
might use t h e t r e a t y t o " a t t a c k P a k i s t a n " , He was convinced 
t h a t t h e t r e a t y was a mutua l defence p a c t and t h e USSR wo\ild 
a c t i v e l y h e l p I n d i a m i l i t a r i l y in case of a war wi th 
P a k i s t a n . 
Communist China , d i s l i k e d t h e t r e a t y . A spokesman 
of t h e seven-member t r a d e d e l e g a t i o n of China a f t e r i t s 
c o n c l u s i o n of a seven day v i s i t t o Guyana s a i d t h a t China 
7 5 . Ghosh, S . The Role of I n d i a in the emergence of 
Bangladesh ( C a l c u t t a , 1983) , p . 1 7 2 . "" 
76 . The Hindu (Madras) 17 August 1971 . 
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c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t r e g a r d t h e t r e a t y as a f r i e n d l y a c t a s 
77 f a r a s i t was c o n c e r n e d , 
I t was r i g h t l y p o i n t e d o u t in an e d i t o r i a l of t h e 
New York Times t h a t though t h e t r e a t y was made p r i m a r i l y 
t o d e t e r P a k i s t a n a g a i n s t any a t t a c k on I n d i a w i t h t h e 
Chinese s u p p o r t , i t might make I n d i a " b o l d e r " in h e r 
"Suppor t f o r B e n g a l i l i b e r a t i o n army and t h u s i n c r e a s e t h e 
danger of I n d o - P a k i s t a n c l a s h e s t h a t cou ld g e t ou t of 
h a n d s " . The p a p e r doubted whe the r t h e t r e a t y could promote 
peace in t h e a r e a and wro te t h a t t h e Kremlin could no 
l o n g e r p l a y t h e r o l e o f a m e d i a t o r which i t d id a f t e r t h e 
war of 1965 a t T a s h k e n t . By s i g n i n g t h i s t r e a t y w i th I n d i a , 
Moscow, i t obse rved had "compromised any c r e d i t i t s t i l l 
78 
may have had i n I s l a m a b a d , " 
The I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y was a p r o d u c t of two i m p o r t a n t 
developments i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r ena - one g l o b a l and 
t h e o t h e r r e g i o n a l . I n d i a was mainly concerned wi th t h e 
l a t t e r w h i l e the S o v i e t Union wi th b o t h . Though China had 
h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h b o t h Moscow and New D e l h i , t h e 
growing Sino-US rapprochement was n o t d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y 
a g a i n s t I n d i a , n o r was i t conce ived a g a i n s t t h e backdrop 
77 . I b i d , , 4 Oc tobe r 1971. 
7 8 . The New York Times, ( e d i t o r i a l ) "Major Fore ign P o l i c y 
Coup•', 10 August 1 9 7 1 . 
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of the developments in the sub-continent. I t was the 
Moscow's i n t e r e s t which was being d i rec t ly threatened by 
i t . China's foreign policy was guided bas ica l ly by i t s 
dispute with Moscow and the Sino-US accord would also 
provide the US with a bargaining leverage over the Soviets. 
By that time, i t was largely believed in India tha t the 
coTontry's in t e res t s would be be t t e r served by holding on 
to tiie policy of non-alignment in these moves and counter-
moves of big powers p o l i t i c s . Inspi te of China's hos t i l i t y , 
India did not rule out the chances of normalizing i t s 
relat ions with Peking. The Sino-Soviet Schism was, however, 
more fundamental and deeprooted and i t took the form of a 
new cold war. The Indian e l i t e s were almost unanimous in 
holding tha t t h e i r confl ic t with China should in no way 
be linked with the Sino-Soviet dispute and i t was apprehended 
by many in India that a general and long term t reaty with 
the USSR might ultimately reduce India to the posit ion of 
a junior partner in Moscow's policy of containing China. 
The Chinese and the American support to Yahya Khan created 
serious problems for India, and the USSR was also interested 
in eliminating the i r influence from the sub-continent as far 
as possible . Though the ctojectives of both Moscow and New 
Delhi synchronized in t h i s respect, the Kremlin looked a t 
the problem from the point of i t s global s t ra tegy, whereas 
Ind ia ' s involvement was l imited. Threatened with isolat ion 
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by the Sino-US a c c o r d , t h e S o v i e t Union sough t f r i e n d s h i p 
wi th the second l a r g e s t coiantry of Asia and a f r a i d of 
Sino-US i n t e r v e n t i o n i n f a v o u r of P a k i s t a n on t h e Bangladesh 
i s s u e , I n d i a was e a g e r t o conc lude a t r e a t y wi th Russ i a . 
The i n t e r e s t s of bo th t h e c o u n t r i e s r e q u i r e s an a l l i a n c e 
- t h e I n d i a n i n t e r e s t needed i t on a s h o r t - t e r m b a s i s and 
t h e S o v i e t i n t e r e s t demanded a t r e a t y of long d u r a t i o n . 
The I n d i a n r e a c t i o n t o t h i s t r e a t y shou ld be unde r s tood 
in t h e l i g h t of t h i s convergence as w e l l a s d i v e r g e n c e i n 
79 t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
7 9 . Ghosh, S . , n . 7 5 , p p . 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 . 
CHAPTER-m . 
THE U.S.A. AND BANGLADESH 
The American grand des ign i n t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d which 
focused on t h e s t r u c t u r e of supe r power r e l a t i o n s h i p s , shaped 
t h e US r o l e i n t h e Bangladesh c r i s i s . I t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s 
t h u s d e r i v e d n o t i n r e f e r e n c e t o a g iven c o u n t r y , b u t t o one 
o r more wor ld powers . The US f o r e i g n p o l i c y of con t a inmen t 
has been i t s b a s i c s t r a t e g y in South Asia and so has been 
q t i i t e f irm wi th i t s a l l i e s , r u t h l e s s and even b r u t a l w i th 
i t s f o e s , and b o t h s c o r n f u l and s t e m towards n e u t r a l s . 
The US p o l i c y towards the Bangladesh c r i s i s shou ld 
t h e r e f o r e , be seen from the US g l o b a l s t r a t e g y aimed a t i t s 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n South A s i a . 
The c r i s i s in P a k i s t a n f o r an end t o m i l i t a r y r u l e and 
r e s t o r a t i o n of democracy, which fo rced Yahya Khan t o o r d e r 
f o r e l e c t i o n s i n December 1970 and saw t h e v i c t o r y of Sheikh 
Muj i b u r Rehraan and h i s Pirfsml League p a r t y . But t h i s v i c t o r y 
was an i n s u l t to the m i l i t a r y j u n t a of West P a k i s t a n and so 
i t embarked on a compaign t o l i q u i d a t e t h e peop le of E a s t 
P a k i s t a n by o r g a n i z i n g mass murder, r a p e , d e s t r u c t i o n and 
e x t e r m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t the B e n g a l i s towards t h e end of March 
1971 .^ 
1 . Misra , K . P . , ( ed . ) F o r e i g n P o l i c y of I n d i a (New D e l h i , 
1977) p . 2 7 6 . 
2 , Vibhakar , J . , A Model R e l a t i o n s h i p , 25 y e a r s of I n d o -
S o v i e t D ip lomat i c t i e s (New D e l h i , 1972) p . 5 0 . 
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;j^ERICAN*S ROLE IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS 
AS soon a s t h e c r i s i s e r u p t e d , t h e US adopted an 
a n t i - I n d i a n and p r o - P a k i s t a n a t t i t u d e t i l l t h e end of t h e 
c r i s i s t h a t w i t n e s s e d the b i r t h of i ndependen t Bangladesh . 
The Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a n t i - I n d i a n s t and emanates 
frcm t h e c o n v i n c t i o n of the a d - n i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t I n d i a was 
t o annex Bang ladesh , s e c o n d l y , I n d i a would c a r r y t h e war 
t o t h e West and annex l a r g e a r e a of West P a k i s t a n , t h i r d l y , 
t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union was working i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n wi th 
3 
I n d i a t o e s t a b l i s h m i l i t a r y and nava l b a s e s in I n d i a . These 
b e l i e f s were a g a i n s t t h e American p r o f e s s i o n s of m a i n t a i n i n g 
peace i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t . F o u r t h l y , t h e American s t r a t e -
g i s t s he ld t h a t , I s lamabad regime p r e s e n t e d a l i n k t o 
e n c i r c l e t h e S o v i e t Union and China . In an e f f o r t t o s t o p 
t h e Is lamabad regime from going i n t o t h e hands of China, 
t h e American government t h e r e f o r e , had t o c o n t i n u e t h e 
4 
supply of m i l i t a r y equipments to P a k i s t a n , 
N i x o n ' s p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t was a l s o a t p l a y in be ing 
good t o P a k i s t a n . Th i s was t o reward P r e s i d e n t Yahya Khan ' s 
e f f o r t s i n a r r a n g i n g N i x o n ' s v i s i t to Ch ina . The use of 
^» The S ta tesman (Nexv Delhi ) 30 December 1971 . 
4 . I b i d , 
5, Homer, A, Jack, "US, India and Bangladesh", Motherland, 
6 September 19 71. 
71 
Pakis tan a i r b a s e of Peshawar in May for t h e f l i g h t of U2 
which went on a Spy mission over the Soviet Union was 
s t i l l very fresh in the mind of Pres ident Nixon, 
Numerous o the r reasons for Nixon's a n t i - I n d i a and 
p ro -Pak i s t an i a t t i t u d e could be c i t e d , Nixon hated the 
pol icy of non-alignment of Jawahar Lai Nehru, he condemned 
the non-al igned po l i cy as fa r back as 1954, when he was 
reported to have f e l t i nc l ined ' to favour m i l i t a r y aid t o 
Pakistan as a counter force to the I n d i a ' s po l icy of non-
a l ignment ' , Nixon stuck to h is guns even when the arming 
of Pakis tan had proved d i sa s t rous to the e n t i r e sub-
cont inen t . 
Furthermore, the cold recept ion accorded to Nixon 
in 19 69 when he v i s i t e d India as an ex-Vice P res iden t of 
the US seems to have added to h is a n t i - I n d i a s t and . When 
he v i s i t e d Ind i a , no body in the Indian government took 
no t i ce of h i s v i s i t . On the o ther hand, h i s v i s i t to 
Pakis tan was markedly d i f f e r e n t . He was warmly rece ived, 
The m i l i t a r y regime under Ayub Khan, arranged a banquet 
9 
and a l s o a p o l i c e t a t t o o in his honour. This never faded 
6, Kulkarni , V.B., "Mr Nixon's indophobia", Indian Express, 
12 January 1972. 
7, The Times of India (New Delhi) 9 December 1971), 
8 , I b i d . , 18 December 1971, 
5« The Statesman (New Delhi) 13 December 1971. 
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from h i s mind and so co\ild always find a reason to oppose 
India both on na t iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , 
Then came the s igning of the indo-Sovie t f r iendship 
and cooperat ion t r e a t y on 9 August 1971. The US was not 
amused with the growing Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . 
Another explanat ion for Nixon's pro-Pakis tan a t t i t u d e , 
was t ha t he did not want Pakis tan t o be dismembered, because 
i t had always supported the United S ta t e s on var ious i n t e r -
na t i ona l i s sues be i t in o r out of the United Nat ions , 
al though not on a l l i s s u e s , India on the o the r hand, had on 
many occasions clashed with tiie US on a number of i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l i s s u e s . 
Perhaps, t he Indo-Soviet t r e a t y hardened Nixon's 
a t t i t u d e towards t h e Bangladesh c r i s i s , as Nixon feared 
t h a t the Soviet Union's inf luence in the sub-con t inen t 
would c e r t a i n l y increase i f India succeeded in dismembering 
12 Pakis tan , and the US would be pushed to the backgroiind. 
Kiss inger had in h i s White House yea r s , t r i e d t o j u s t i f y 
Nixon's t i l t towards Pakis tan on the grounds among o the r s , 
10, I b i d . 
11, Ram Raghu Nath, Super Powers and Indo-Pak is tan i Sub-
con t inen t , Percept ives and po l i c i e s " {New Delhi , 1985), 
p .300. 
12. I b i d . , pp .312-3 , 
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were, h i s d i s l i k e far Mrs Gandhi* s p e r s o n a l i t y , h i s des i r e 
t o e x p l o i t Sino-Soviet d i f f e rences , and h i s ambition t o 
make America the dominant power i n the world by propping 
up al igned s t a t e s l i k e Pakis tan and opposing independent 
13 
non-aligned s t a t e s l i k e I n d i a . One more a l l e g a t i o n 
l eve l l ed a g a i n s t India by Nixon's admin is t ra t ion was t h a t 
India had an assurance from the USSR t o in te rvene , should 
e i t h e r the US or China in te rvene in the sub-cont inent , 
14 But Mrs Gandhi denied t h i s a l l e g a t i o n . 
Analysing the motives of Pres ident Nixon, an American 
j o u r n a l i s t , C.L, Schulzberger, sa id t h a t each of the two 
count r ies of the sub-con t inen t - India and Pakis tan - was 
a l ign ing i t s e l f with one or the o ther communist power. 
India had gone under the inf luence of Russia and Pakis tan 
under the Chinese. Nixon had to favoxir one of the two 
groups, he could not s tand n e u t r a l . N e u t r a l i t y , would have 
cos t the US inf luence in both India and Pak i s t an . 
Schulzberger remarked: 
'A p r o - I n d i a posture would have abandoned any ro l e 
in Pakis tan , damaging improved r e l a t i o n s wi th China, and 
1 3 . Kaul, T.N,, The Kiss inger Years, Indo-American Relat ions 
(New Delhi , 1980) pp. 33-34. 
14. The Hindu (Madras) 9 January 1972. 
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s t i l l leave Uncle Sam second f iddle in I n d i a , A p ro -
Pak i s t an i pos tu r e would have destroyed the remnants of 
our pos i t i on in Ind ia , perhaps recaptur ing some r o l e in 
Pakis tan, b u t c e r t a i n l y would improve chances of Nixon's 
15 Pro jec t t o gain f r i endsh ip in Peking*. 
Nixon chose the l a t t e r option and stuck t o i t t i l l 
the end. His aim was to ge t c l o se r t o China and for t h a t 
he could no t bo the r t o offend I n d i a . He be l ieved t h a t 
improved r e l a t i o n s with China would enable him t i l t the 
balance of world power in the United S t a t e s ' favour and he 
considered t h i s t o be a major foreign po l i cy objec t ive 
16 
which would se rve h i s persona l p o l i t i c a l fortvme r i g h t . 
And since China had good r e l a t i o n s with Pakis tan and no t 
with Ind i a , Nixon c e r t a i n l y would do nothing which could 
go counter t o China ' s wishes and l i k e s . . 
With t h i s a n t i - I n d i a a t t i t u d e of Nixon, India feared 
the chances of the Nixon adminis t ra t ion being tempted t o 
convert the Bangladesh c r i s i s in to a second Vietnam.''"'^ This 
f ea r was t r u l y r e f l e c t ed in the US Congress blocking a l l 
a id to Pakis tan and loud c r i t i c i s m given out by the press.^® 
15 . Schulzberger, C.L., "Why Nixon chose to be p ro-pak is tan" , 
The Hindu (Madras) 12 January 1972. 
16. I b i d . , 9 January 1972. 
17. The Motherland, 24 August 1971. 
18. The New York Times, 14 Ju ly 1971. 
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The warm recept ion accorded by Ind ia t o sane American 
v i s i t o r s who were p o l i t i c a l l y opposed to Nixon l i k e Senator 
19 Kennedy added t o Nixon's ha t red for Ind ia . 
Ohe supply of m i l i t a r y eqtiipment worth about $ 3 
mi l l ion by the US t o Pak is tan was p ro tes t ed a g a i n s t , K i s s i n g e r 
objected t o what he termed propaganda launched by India in 
t h i s r ega rd . However, Nixon to ld Mrs Gandhi in Washington 
during he r t o u r not to be \induly bothered about American 
m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s t o Pakis tan which were only marginal and 
21 
which in any case , were l a t e r stopped. 
The US admin i s t r a t ion blamed India and complained 
t h a t India had e sca l a t ed the war by taking m i l i t a r y ac t ion 
on 22 November 1971 a t a time when there was a minor 
skirmish between the t roops of India and Pakis tan on the 
22 Bengal bo rde r , Ind ia , however, denied t h i s a l l e g a t i o n 
as she claimed tha t t he th ree Pak i s tan i j e t s were in t he 
Indian t e r r i t o r y to s t r a f e an Indian town, Agar ta la . 
A White House spokesman said t h a t t h e war obs t ruc ted 
the s e c r e t nego t ia t ions undertaken by the US which had 
19. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 18 Deconber 1971. 
20. The P a t r i o t , 26 December 1971, US rushed arms to 
Pakis tan f i ve days before c o n f l i c t . 
2 1 . Sharma, R,, Bangladesh C r i s i s and Indian foreign 
Pol icx/ (New Delhi , 1978), p .220. 
22. Gupta, v . , Anderson papers - A Study of Nixon Blackmail 
o f Ind ia (Delhi, 1972), p . 5 1 , 
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achieved a great deal of success before it was terminated 
23 by the war. 
T h i s a l l e g a t i o n was c o m p l e t e ^ f i c t i t i o u s as even t h e 
S o v i e t Union a l l e g e d t h a t i t had no knowledge and no ev idence 
of any s o r t , p r o v i n g t h a t Yahya Khan was making such a move 
f o r a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . The S o v i e t s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t i t 
was t h e US b a c k i n g t o Yahya Khan t h a t was c o m p l i c a t i n g t h e 
s i t u a t i o n and f i n a l l y l e d t o t h e pre-en^iptive a t t a c k on 
I n d i a . 
The r e f u s a l t o wi thdraw t r o o p s by I n d i a was no t l i k e d 
by Washington, I n d i a r e f u s e d t o honour t h e p r o p o s a l on t h e 
ground t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s m i l i t a r y b a s e s lay c l o s e t o t h e b o r d e r 
25 
whi le I n d i a ' s were f a r away, 
P r e s i d e n t Nixon a t one s t a g e wrote t o inform 
Mrs Gandhi , t h a t Yahya Khan was w i l l i n g t o t r o o p s wi thdrawal 
u n i l a t e r a l l y i n an e f f o r t t o l e s s e n t h e t e n s e b o r d e r 
2 6 
s i t u a t i o n . However, no c l a r i f i c a t i o n was v i s i b l e v/hether 
N i x o n ' s p r o p o s a l was t o w i t h d r a w a l of t r o o p s from t h e w e s t e r n 
o r bo th w e s t e r n and e a s t e r n b o r d e r s , I n d i a ' s s t a n d was t h a t 
2 3 . The S t a t e s m a n (New De lh i ) 9 Deceaiber 1971 , 
24 , Sharxa , R,, n , 2 l , p . 2 2 1 , 
2 5 . I b i d . 
26 , Amrit Baza r P a t r i k a ( C a l c u t t a ) 2 December 1971 
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withdrawal should s t a r t with Pakistan withdrawing troops 
from East Pakistan. This would certainly portray a big 
gesture of peace on the par t of Pakistan to solve the 
27 Bangladesh c r i s i s . Ind ia ' s refusal to withdraw i t s 
troops had three major advantages, from the mil i tary point 
of view, i f once withdrawn,restoration would take a longer 
time as compared to the time Pakistan would take in doing 
same, 
Secondly, it prevented Pakistan government from 
committing more atrocities and thereby helped the Mukti 
Bahini and thirdly, it stopped the influx of refugees into 
India.^® 
It is clear that the US practically did nothing by 
way of influencing Pakistan to seek a political settlement 
in Bangladesh, The US said nothing about the heinous crimes 
such as mass rape, looting and other atrocities committed 
by the Pakistan army. It was very unkind for certain quarters 
close to Nixon to have claimed that an additional ten million 
people to India's five hundred million population would make 
no difference and that India with time ^ «^il'S'^ 4^^ ^^ « to 
absorb them. / /" 
27, Ibid. ^%^^ ...} 
28, The Times of India (New Delhi) 27 NbV^ WftHi»^ $71, (edit). 
Uncalled for advice, '^ 
29, Indian Express (New Delhi) 30 November 1971. 
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Certain sources in America argued tliat India was 
refusing to permit the refugees to return because it was 
gaining from the international aid that the refugees brought. 
This was totally mischievous, the truth, was that for nine 
million refugees, India had to spend Rupees seven hundred 
crores a year or nine hundred and ninety three million 
dollars. The international aid that was provided to India 
upto 3o September was one hundred and fourteen million 
dollars in which the US contributed most with seventy million 
dollars. The US also offered certain commodities such as 
rice, sugar and edible oils. 
However, the US assistance to India for maintaining 
the refugees was,therefore considered by India as "woefully 
Inadequate and addressed to the sympton rather than the 
31 
cause of the ttoxiile." 
During the crisis, the US made an effort to befriend 
the Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta and persuaded them to 
take 'a more realistic view of their tragic tangle with 
West Pakistan so that the Big Powers could extend a helping 
hand to them in bringing about a reasonable political 
30. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 29 October 1971. 
31. Barnds, William. J., India, Pakistan and the Great 
Powers. (London, 1972), p.247. 
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s e t t l e m e n t between t h e Eas t and West P a k i s t a n . I n d i a viewed 
t h i s a s c r i m i n a l i n t e n t i o n s a s i t was meant t o b a l e ou t t h e 
West P a k i s t a n i s from a c r i t i c a l s p o t w i t h o u t mee t ing t h e 
genuine n e e d s of t h e Eas t P a k i s t a n i s , 
The US frowned a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Bangladesh 
government t o s e n d a d e l e g a t i o n t o the UN t o p l e a d t h e i r 
c a s e . The US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t t h e UN avoided meet ing 
t h e Bangladesh d e l e g a t e s . S t i l l ou t t o browbeat t h e 
Bangladesh l e a d e r s i n t o s u b m i s s i o n , t h e l e a d e r s of Bangladesh 
were t o l d t h a t t h e s a f e t y of Mujibxir Rehman could no t be 
g u a r a n t e e d n o t u n t i l t h e y ag reed t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t wi th 
Yahya ' s r e g i m e , ©le o f f e r of a c o n f e d e r a t i o n o r l o o s e 
f e d e r a t i o n of b o t h wings of P a k i s t a n was a l s o made a l l in 
32 
a b i d t o make them go wi th t h e US, 
Nixon i s a l s o r e p o r t e d t o have t h r e a t e n e d Moscow 
t h a t he would c a n c e l h i s proposed v i s i t t o Moscow in May 
1972, should i t s t i c k t o i t s approach i n t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n 
33 
c r i s i s . 
Before the outbreak of the war, the US had supplied 
substantial quantities of arms on urgent request to Pakistan 
32, Sharma, R., n.2l, pp.229-30, 
3 3 , Dai ly Te l eg raph (London) 2 l December 1 9 7 1 . 
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by C-141 Cargo planes, which were found offloading arms in 
Karachi a t 10.30 jxn on 29 November 1971. The US adminis-
t r a t ion accepted loading the planes but denied having 
offloaded the arms. The US government claimed that i t had 
made a l l efforts to bring about a p o l i t i c a l settlement of 
the c r i s i s and held India as "unreasonable and reca lc i t r an t 
nation" but absolved Pakistan pf the responsibi l i ty for the 
war. The State Department in Washington held India as "an 
aggressor" and the economic aid programme for India was put 
under .review, Nixon on his par t , publicly supported Pakistan 
action in East Pakistan and held India responsible for the 
consequences and asked Dr. Kissinger to take a tough stance 
35 
towards India. 
As soon as the war broke out on 3 Decennber 1971, 
president Nixon lifted the military embargo placed on 
Pakistan. This came to the notice of the then American 
Ambassador Kenneth B, Keating in New Delhi by General 
Manekshaw. In a classified telegram to the State Department, 
Keating had stated: 
"I consider General Manekshaw one of the most honest 
and straight forward Indian i have ever met, I have 
34, Gupta, v., n,22, pp. 19-20. 
35. Kunhi Krishna, T.V., The Unfriendly Friends, India and 
America (New Delhi, 1974) pp.101-2. 
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no doubt t h a t Manekshaw h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e s what he r e p o r t e d , 
I f t r u e , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of p u b l i c l y 
36 
announced p o l i c y " . During t h e war, t h e US arms con t inued 
37 t o be d e l i v e r e d t o P a k i s t a n through t h i r d c o u n t r i e s . 
The arms d e l i v e r i e s were made on t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n 
of the White House , I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e US Ambassador 
in Jordan i s r e p o r t e d to have s e n t a c a b l e r e g a r d i n g King 
H u s s a i n ' s r e q u e s t f o r the t r a n s f e r of a i r c r a f t s t o P a k i s t a n , 
According t o White House p a p e r s , K i s s i n g e r s t a t e d : 
The P r e s i d e n t may want to honour t h e s e r e q u e s t s . The 
m a t t e r h a s n o t been b r o u g h t t o the P r e s i d e n t i a l a t t e n t i o n , 
b u t i t i s q u i t e obvious t h a t the P r e s i d e n t i s n o t i n c l i n e d 
38 t o l e t t h e P a k i s t a n i s be d e f e a t e d . 
The a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o supp ly arms by. J o r d a n t o P a k i s t a n 
was i s s u e d on 7 December and j e t s reached P a k i s t a n on 
10 December. And t h e same day, t h e N i x o n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
i n s t r u c t e d T u r k i s h p i l o t s i n Libya t o be p r e p a r e d t o f l y 
p l a n e s to R a w a l p i n d i . These p i l o t s were i n Libya on t r a i n i n g 
m i s s i o n . Under N i x o n ' s p l a n , t h e y were t o go t o Saudi Arabia 
39 
and Turkey t o t a k e American f i g h t e r s and bombers t o P a k i s t a n . 
36. Gupta, v., n.22, pp.19-20. 
37. Ibid., pp.141-3. 
38. Ibid,, p.142, 
39. The Times of India (New Delhi) 7 January 1972. 
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This was done d i s rega rd ing the sanct ion of the Congress 
and the assurances to I n d i a . The US au thor ized Saudi Arabia, 
I ran and Turkey t o supply arms t o Pakis tan and assured 
these pro-American count r ies of replacements in l i e u of 
40 
suppl ies made t o Pakis tan• 
Kiss inger while in New E)elhi on 6 J u l y , t a lk ing about 
the arms deal admit ted t h a t there was some ' b u r e a u c r a t i c 
muddle' in the implementation of Washington's 25 March arms 
41 ban po l i cy and t h a t the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were being r e c t i f i e d . 
This was not convincing, becaxose i f the US was s ince re 
nothing prevented i t fron stopping f u r t h e r supply of arms 
to P a k i s t a n . 
On 7 July, Kissinger while in Pakistan made an announ-
cement, that the US had assured Pakistan that it would not 
interfere with four or five more ship loads of military 
Spare parts and anwunition purchased by Pakistan in the US 
42 
under valid licences and still scheduled to arrive. When 
the US officials attention was drawn to this announcement, 
they said that the policy of providing limited amounts of 
aid for relief projects and allowing arms shipments had 
given the US an opportunity to hold a 'private dialogue* 
40. Gupta, v., n.22, p.143. 
4 1 . The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 7 Ju ly 1971. 
42. I b i d . , 8 J u l y 1971. 
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wi th t h e P a K i s t a n i m i l i t a r y regime in a b i d t o f ind a 
43 
s o l u t i o n t o t h e E a s t P a k i s t a n c r i s i s . 
S e n a t o r Kennedy c r i t i c i z e d the US government f o r 
having o f f e r e d m i l i t a r y equipanent t o t h e t u n e of about n ine 
m i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o P a k i s t a n i g n o r i n g an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
44 
morator ium on arms s h i p m e n t s , 
Throughout t h e c r i s i s , tJie US did n o t i s s u e a 
s i n g l e s t a t s n e n t d i s a p p r o v i n g I s l a m a b a d ' s r e p r e s s i v e a c t i o n s 
in Eas t P a k i s t a n . 
The US Consu l -Genera l i n Dacca s e n t s e r i e s of c a b l e s 
t o Washington, u rg ing i t t o denounce t h e P a k i s t a n r e p r e s s i v e 
a c t i o n s t h e r e . T h e US Ambassador in New D e l h i , Kenneth B. 
Kea t ing a l s o t o l d t h e US t h a t he was "deep ly shocked a t t h e 
massacre" and was " g r e a t l y concerned a t t h e US v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
t o damaging a s s o c i a t i o n w i th a r e i g n of m i l i t a r y t e r r o r " . 
He urged t h e US t o d e p l o r e " t h i s b r u t a l i t y " p r o m p t l y , 
p u b l i c l y and p r o m i n e n t l y and suspend a l l m i l i t a r y d e l i v e r i e s 
t o P a k i s t a n . P r e s i d e n t Nixon go t offended and found i t 
"courageous" t h a t h i s d i p l o m a t s should send " p e t i t i o n s 
r a t h e r t han r e p o r t s " . He o r d e r e d h i s t r a n s f e r from Dacca . 
4 3 . The S ta t e sman (New De lh i ) 13 J anua ry 1972. 
4 4 . I b i d . , 6 October 1 9 7 1 . 
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He chided Keating for allowing himself to be "taken over 
45 by tile Indians" Nixon blamed India and accused her of 
creating the c r i s i s ,on the other hand, he praised Pakistan 
for in ternat ional iz ing the re l i e f efforts in East Pakistan; 
for the replacement of the mi l i ta ry Governor in East 
Pakistan by a c iv i l i an ; for the se t t ing of a time table 
for retxim to fu l l c iv i l ian rule ; for the proclamation 
of a general amnesty covering a l l people not charged with 
Specific criminal a c t s ; for the promise not to execute 
Mujibur Rehman; for i t s agreement to un i l a t e ra l withdrawal 
of Pakistani forces from the borders; for Yahya Khan's 
willingness to ta lk to the leaders of the Bangladesh Govern-
ment in ex i l e and for the acceptance of the good offices of 
46 the UN observers on both s ides of the border • He again 
c r i t i c i zed India for withholding i t s co-operation from 
Pakistan, the US and the UN.*'' 
While in Washington . in June 1971, the then Indian 
External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh appealed to 
President Nixon and the then Secretary of State William 
Rogers to persuade Pakistan to find a p o l i t i c a l solution 
to the c r i s i s . He also urged them to suspend economic and 
45. Kissinger, A.M., The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979) 
pp. 853-4. 
46. US Foreign policy for the 1970's; The Emerging Structure 
of peace. A Report t o the Congress by Richard M. Nixon," 
PresiderTt of the United States , 9 February 1972, 
(Washington, D.C, 1972) p.49, 
47. Ib id . , p . 146. 
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m i l i t a r y a id to Pak is tan .^ The US leaders expressed concern 
over the refugees proble.-n t h a t was facing India and assured 
Swaran Singh t h a t no fu r the r shipments of arms would be made 
t o Pak i s t an , But even when Swaran Singh was s t i l l in the US, 
a ship loaded with arms l e f t New York harbour for Pak i s t an . 
Economic a id t o Pakistan cont inued. This us ac t ion provoked 
indignat ion of members of Lok Sabha in Ind ia and t h e i r 
f r i end ly pos ture towards t he US suffered a se tback. 
Swaran Singh, d i sc losed the fac t of Senator Church* s 
s ta tement , i n which i t was o f f i c i a l l y admit ted t h a t t h i r t y 
f ive mi l l i on d o l l a r s worth of equipment were a c t u a l l y s e n t 
49 to Pak i s t an , 
Senator Church c r i t i c i z i n g the US a t t i t u d e remarked: 
"We say in Vietnam t h a t we a r e f ight ing for s e l f -de te rmina -
t i o n so t h a t t he people t h e r e can have t he opportuni ty to 
choose t h e i r own government. Yet in Pakis tan we continue 
t o give suppor t to an a u t h o r i t a r i a n c l ique t h a t conduct 
business by Mar t ia l Law and fo rc ib ly depr ives i t s own 
c i t i z e n s of the r i g h t of s e l f -de t e rmina t ion even a f t e r a 
50 free and f a i r e l e c t i o n . " 
48, Kiss inger , A.H., n .45 , p . 8 5 8 . 
49, Lok Sabha Debates, vo l . V, no,36, 2 J u l y 1971. 
50, Congressional Records, 92nd Congress, 1s t sess ion, 
vo l . 107, p t . 18, Wednesday 17, Ju ly 1971, p.24036. 
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Nixon repor ted ly warned India on 31 Ju ly tha t should 
i t in te rvene in East Pak is tan , i t would pay very dear ly 
for i t . Kiss inger a l s o issued a warning t o the Indian 
Ambassador in the US L,K, Jha, saying t h a t if India c o n t i -
nued to forment t roub le fo r Pakis tan in East Pakis tan and 
i f China comes to P a k i s t a n ' s a i d , I n d i a "must not expect 
52 
any help from the US". Columnist Tom Braden d isc losed 
t h a t on 12 October, Ambassador Kenneath B. Keating conveyed 
the US Warning to the Ind ian government t h a t should India 
f a i l to d e s i s t from i t s he lp t o the insxirgents in East 
53 Pakis tan , Pakis tan would a t t a c k her from the West. Nixon 
a l s o despatched a l e t t e r to Mrs Gandhi, though i t remains 
a s ec re t document but c e r t a i n well-informed American Press 
c a r r i ed r e p o r t s a l l e g i n g t h a t Nixon had warned Mrs Gandhi 
t h a t America would d i r e c t l y in te rvene in the Indo-Pakis tan 
war s ince t h e r e was a mutual defence pact between the US 
and Pak i s t an . Mrs Gandhi in a subsequent speech sa id in 
Delhi, though not mentioning any country, t h a t t h r e a t s were 
being given to India and c e r t a i n pac t s with Pakis tan were 
54 being mentioned. Mrs Gandhi added t h a t our understanding 
of these pac t s was t h a t they were d i r ec t ed towards the 
containment of communism and no t t o arm t h e government 
concerned to suppress t he peop le . This c l e a r l y brought home 
51.The Times of Ind ia (New Delhi) 1 August, 1971. 
52. The Times (London), 23 August 1971. 
53. Krishan Bhat i "About Some Leaks", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 12 January 1972. "" 
54. Indian Express (New Delhi) 21 December 1971, 
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to Indians that she was referring to the threats by the US 
fortunately, good sense prevailed and Nixon never took such 
action, otherwise it should have been hell fire and beyond 
imagination for the US. The US even shamelessly propagated 
that what was happening in East Pakistan was a secessionist 
movement and should be crushed as such, but this never 
55 
convinced anybody in his right frame of mind. 
India was also threatened by the US Secretary of State 
regarding the prospects of stopping American assistance to 
her. Meanwhile, Mrs Gandhi visited the US, the UK, Belgium, 
Austria, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in 
October - November 1971, her mission was to inform the 
leaders of these countries of tiie realities of the East 
Pakistan problem, while speaking at a dinner in Washington, 
she said: Today some countries want to support the prestige 
of one man, they are threatening peace in the entire sub-
continent. I do not personally think that they can save 
Pakistan or keep it united or keep it strong by supporting 
a person who is not an elected person, who is a military 
dictator. Here she was referring to the US and China. She 
made it clear that the refugees problem was too heavy a 
5 5 . Sharma, R. , n . 2 l , p p . 2 3 0 - 3 1 . 
5 6 . Govt , of I n d i a M i n i s t r y of i n f o r m a t i o n & B r o a d c a s t i n g 
P i i b l i . D i v . , " I n d i a Speaks" . (New D e l h i , 1971), p . 1 1 . 
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burden f o r I n d i a and t h a t s o n e t h i n g needed t o be done b e f o r e 
t h i n g s went off h a n d s , Nixon in h i s r e p l y , enumerated t h e 
ga ins t h e us had ach i eved through n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th t h e 
Government of P a k i s t a n and t h e l e a d e r s of t h e Awami League 
p a r t y . He a s s u r e d Mrs Gandhi t h a t t he "outcome was bound t o 
be autonomy f o r Eas t P a k i s t a n l e a d i n g t o i ndependence" , 
He asked I n d i a t o comple te h e r round of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h 
57 
P a k i s t a n and t h e Bengal i l e a d e r s , Mrs G a n d h i ' s v i s i t t o 
t h e US t h u s became a f a i l u r e , as Nixon s t u c k t o h i s g u n s . 
On 6 December 1971, V^ashington suspended $ 87 .6 
58 
m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a i d t o I n d i a which was in t h e p i p e l i n e . 
An o f f i c i a l of t h e US government remarked t h a t : ' I n 
c o n d i t i o n s of war i t i s p a t e n t l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r a c o u n t r y 
t o c a r r y on any s o r t of development programme*, But M\e 
r e a l mot ive b e h i n d the s u s p e n s i o n of a i d to I n d i a was t o 
make s u r e that such h e l p n e v e r went i n t o I n d i a ' s hands t o 
59 
c a r r y on w i t h t h e war . However, t h i s d id n o t d e t r a c t 
I n d i a from t h e p u r s u i t of h e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . 
CHINA'S ROLE 
The Chinese, more than any other people, were, from 
the very start, deeply involved in the Bangladesh crisis, 
57. K i s s i n g e r , A.H., n . 4 5 , p , 8 8 1 , 
5 8 . The Times of I n d i a (New Delh i ) 7 Decernber 1971, 
59 . The S ta tesman (New D e l h i ) 8 December 19 7 1 . 
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The c r i s i s was of nnich conern to the Chinese government, 
which for most of the s i x t i e s had nursed a steadily-
growing f r i endsh ip with Pak i s t an , A Pak i s t an i author f e l t 
t h a t China opposed the c r ea t i on of Bangladesh a s an inde-
pendent s t a t e , under t h e inf luence of the Soviet Union, 
because in her opinion, the Soviet influence would weaken 
her s e c u r i t y on her Western and Southern f r o n t i e r s . Both 
US and China seem to have co-operated dur ing the Indo-
Pakistan war. C*L. Schulzberger, the New York Times columnist 
wrote t h a t the re was a movement of Chinese t roops along i t s 
f r o n t i e r wi th Ind ia while the US sent the Seventh F l ee t to 
Bay of Bengal. He added: "both China and the US working with 
r a re harmony made b luf f manoeuvers aga ins t I n d i a ' s land and 
sea f r o n t i e r s " . He sa id the US and China "found themselves 
v i r t u a l l y c o - b e l l i g e r e n t s when they backed Pakis tan" - t h i s 
marked dramatic depar ture from the t r a d i t i o n a l US pol icy 
which al though a l l i e d to Pakis tan had sought t o bu i ld up 
India as an A s i a t i c counterpoise to China, Senator Kennedy 
l inked the US s tand on the Indo-Pakistan war with the 
normal i sa t ion of r e l a t i o n s with China. 
Almost immediately a f t e r the j u n t a ' s crackdom on 
East Pak i s t an , Zhou Enla i , i n h i s l e t t e r of 12 Apr i l t o 
General Yahya Khan, p ra i sed the jun ta for i t s ac t ions 
60, Bindra, S .S , , Indo-Pak Rela t ions . (New Delhi , 1981) 
p .187. 
6 1 . I b i d . 
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des igned t o p r e v e n t t h e dismemberment of P a k i s t a n and t o 
p r e s e r v e i t s i n t e g r i t y . He, a s a f r i e n d of P a k i s t a n , 
a d v i s e d Yahya Khan to i s o l a t e the handfu l of p e r s o n s , who 
were out t o "Sabotage the u n i t y of P a k i s t a n " , Concluding 
h i s l e t t e r , he w r o t e : Your Exce l l ency may r e s t a s s u r e d t h a t , 
shou ld t h e I n d i a n e x p a n s i o n i s t s dare t o l a u n c h a g g r e s s i o n 
a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n , t h e Chinese government and peop le w i l l , 
as a lways , f i r m l y s u p p o r t t h e P a k i s t a n government and peop le 
in t h e i r j u s t s t r u g g l e t o s a f e g u a r d s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y and 
n a t i o n a l I ndependence" , The C h r i s t i a n Sc ience Moni to r s a i d 
i t was i r o n i c a l t h a t China s u p p o r t e d P a k i s t a n . Th is s u p p o r t 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e newspaper, cou ld only be e x p l a i n e d from t h e 
s t a n d p o i n t o f a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h p o l i c y , and not of 
i d e o l o g y . B e i j i n g denounced t h e n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement 
and s i d e d w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n l e a d e r s h i p of P r e s i d e n t Yahya 
62 Khan, And s o t h e r e was no h u m a n i t a r i a n e.spect in C h i n a ' s 
r e a c t i o n - no c r i t i c i s m of Islamabad* s a c t i o n , no sympathy 
for Ind ia on accoun t of t h e re fugee b u r d e n and no c o n t r i b u -
t i o n f o r any r e l i e f p u r p o s e . According t o China, I n d i a 
e n g i n e e r e d t h e problem and a re fugee problem was c r e a t e d by 
63 I n d i a ' s i n t r a n s i g e n c e . 
6 2 . C i t ed i n Chaudhur i S a i l e n , Bei j ing - Washington 
JL f. I s lamabad e n t e n t e . Genes i s and Development (New D e l h i , 
1982), p . 6 4 . 
6 3 . Ghosh S u c h e t a . The Role of I n d i a i n t h e Emergence 
of Bang ladesh ( C a l c u t t a 19837 p .1821 
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The Chinese support for Pakistan and her hos t i l e 
a t t i tude tov7ards India was d i rec t ly and unequivocably 
indicated in an a r t i c l e pxiblished in the Jen-Minh Jih-pao 
64 
on 11 April 1971. The following points were raised by the 
a r t i c l e . F i r s t , the p o l i t i c a l developments in East Pakistan 
were in ternal af fa i rs of Pakistan and they did not const i tu te 
any threa t to India ' s secur i ty ; Secondly, India, taking 
advantage of Pakistan's internal d i f f i cu l t i e s , s t a r t ed in t e r -
fering in her domestic a f fa i r s which gave r i s e to a great 
security problem for Pakistan; th i rdly , the two super powers, 
par t icu lar ly the USSR, working in close a l l iance with India, 
had also adopted a policy of 'crude' interference in the 
internal a f f a i r s of Pakistan, and f inal ly , China would 
support Pakistan against a l l foreign intervention and 
aggression. 
On 5 July 1971, 250 Chinese army personnel arrived 
in East Pakistan to help the Martial Law Administration to 
restore communications and t r a in Pakistani soldiers in a n t i -
gueri l la warfare. An ordnance factory was b u i l t with China's 
aid near Dacca. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman told an annual 
Congress of the Bangladesh Students' Union on 9 April 1972, 
80 per cent of arms captured from Pakistani troops were 
marked "Made in China" and the r e s t "Made in USA". 
64. Survey of China Mainland Press, no,4882, 22 April 1971, 
pp.109-110. Cited in ib id . , pri82-183. 
65. Chaudhuri, Saile n, n.62, p .63 , 
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A hundred l o r r i e s a day were repor ted ly used for 
m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s by China to Pakistan in i t s Ordnance 
depots in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. I t was a l s o Chinese 's 
he lp t h a t i t permit ted Pakis tan with a l l f a c i l i t i e s to send 
m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t t o -tiie East over t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . 
The shipment of Chinese arms and ammunition in about 
100 c r a t e s were a l s o a s i gn of China 's h e l p . India was aware 
of these a i d . 
Along with m i l i t a r y a id , the re was an increas ing flow 
of Chinese economic a s s i s t a n c e t o Pakis tan during the c r i s i s . 
Peking was repor ted t o have given the Karachi branch and 
the Chit tagong siib-branch of -tiie Bank of China as g i f t s to 
69 Pakis tan government. S t i l l support ing Pakis tan , China 
denounced t h e Indo-Soviet co l lus ion and accused Moscow of 
support ing Ind ia with "Mi l i t a ry provocat ion" and "Subversive 
70 
a c t i v i t i e s " towards Pak i s t an , 
Pak i s tan got a l l the verba l and moral support i t 
needed from China. Beyond o r a l excesses , China did not move. 
In the opinion of a Pakis tan w r i t e r , t he major f ac to r t h a t 
66. The Daily Telegraph, 28 Apr i l 1971. 
67. The Tiroes of Ind ia . (New Delh i ) , 29 January 1972. 
68. - The Statesman (New De lh i ) , 1 June 1971. 
69. Ghosh Sucheta, n .63 , p .18 7. 
70. Bindra, S .S . , n .60 , pp.187-188. 
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71 
r e s t r a i n e d h e r was t h e I n d o - S o v i e t T r e a t y . In t h e UN, 
72 China a l s o l a s h e d ou t a t I n d i a and t h e USSR. 
IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
At t h e r e q u e s t of t h e US Ambassador t o t h e UN, 
George Bush, t h e Bangladesh i s s u e was b r o u g h t t o t h e S e c u r i t y 
Counci l on 4 December 1 9 7 1 . The US-sponsored r e s o l u t i o n 
i n t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l he ld I n d i a r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h$ 
ou tb reak of the I n d i a - P a k i s t a n war . The main aim of t h e 
move was t o s i d e t r a c k t h e b a s i c i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e UN Genera l 
Asseittoly, and t h e USSR v e t o e d t h e r e s o l u t i o n which c a l l e d 
f o r i n m e d i a t e c e a s e - f i r e and wi thdrawal o f I n d i a n and 
P a k i s t a n i t r o o p s t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s i d e s of t h e I n d o -
73 P a k i s t a n i b o r d e r s . Almost a s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n was i n t r o -
duced t h e f o l l o w i n g day and aga in t h e USSR ve toed i t , wh i l e 
B r i t a i n and Prance a b s t a i n e d . Thus, t h e USSR's n e g a t i v e 
v o t e (Veto) b locked t h e i r e so lu t i on and s o n o t h i n g came ou t 
of i t . 
The S o v i e t Ambassador t o t h e UN, J a c o b Malik d e s c r i b e d 
t h e US r e s o l u t i o n as "a one s i d e d and u n a c c e p t a b l e d r a f t " . 
He f u r t h e r s a i d t h a t t h e US approach was t o " s h i f t r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t y from t h e r i g h t t o wrong" . He a l s o c r i t i c i z e d China, 
7 1 . . I b i d . , p . 1 8 8 . 
7 2 . I b i d . 
7 3 . SCOR, S/PV.1606, 4 Dece.iiber 1971, p . 9 1 . 
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though n o t naming h e r fo r t h e p o s i t i o n i t had t aken in t h e 
74 
c r i s i s . China had a l s o a t t a c k e d t h e USSR and Ind i a by 
saying t h a t I n d i a ' s a t t a c k was launched \ander t h e s u p p o r t 
of " S o c i a l i m p e r i a l i s m " and d e s c r i b e d t h e c r i s i s a s " p u r e l y 
75 
an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r of P a k i s t a n " . 
The same r e s o l u t i o n was moved on 7 December 1971, in 
t h e Genera l Assembly and was adop ted a s i t was favoured by 
7 6 104 v o t e s t o 11 / wi th 10 a b s e n t i o n s . 
The I n d i a n Government r e f u s e d t o implement the 
r e s o l u t i o n , b e c a u s e she f e l t t h a t i t was u n r e a l i s t i c t o do 
so , w i t h o u t g i v i n g a h e a r i n g to t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of 
Bangladesh who were d i r e c t l y t h e v i c t i m s of West P a k i s t a n i 
77 
army b r u t a l i t y . 
P a k i s t a n , however, a c c e p t e d t o implement t h e 
78 
r e s o l u t i o n , 
Speaking in the S e c u r i t y Counc i l on t h e same day, 
George Bxish p r a i s e d P a k i s t a n for i t s a c c e p t a n c e of t h e 
74. For t h e t e x t of t h e speech s e e . I b i d . , pp .116-137 . 
7 5 . I b i d . , p . 1 0 6 - 7 . 
7 6, A/RES/2793, 7 December 1971. 
77. A/8580 and S/10445, 12 December 1971. 
78, A/85 67 and S/10440, 9 December 1971. 
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r e s o l u t i o n and h e l d I n d i a r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e "broadening" 
79 
of t h e c r i s i s . 
The ,US once a g a i n r a i s e d the i s s u e in t h e S e c u r i t y 
Co \mci l on 14 Decannber, c a l l i n g f o r an Immediate I n d o -
P a k i s t a n i c e a s e - f i r e and t r o o p s w i thd rawa l of both s i d e s . 
However, t he USSR aga in used i t s v e t o t o b l o c k t h e US 
r e s o l u t i o n . Mr Jacob Malik s a i d t h a t t h e US r e s o l u t i o n 
c o n t a i n e d t h e " o l d approach" which^ t r i e d t o commit t h e 
80 
c o u n c i l t o a wrong and u n r e a l i s t i c c o u r s e , 
However, t h e Counc i l cou ld only adop t a r e s o l u t i o n 
on 21 December which demanded t h a t a d u r a b l e c e a s e - f i r e 
and c e s s a t i o n of a l l h o s t i l i t i e s in a l l a r e a s of c o n f l i c t 
be s t r i c t l y observed and remain in e f f e c t u n t i l t h e w i t h -
81 d rawals t ook p l a c e . 
Before t h e a d o p t i o n of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , t h e war 
between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n had ended, h e r a l d i n g the b i r t h 
of i n d e p e n d e n t Bang ladesh . 
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP 
AS soon as t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n war b roke o u t , t h e 
Washington S p e c i a l Ac t ion Group met s e v e r a l t i m e s t o a s s e s s 
79 , Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 27 December 1971, pp .727-8 , 
8 0 , Vibhakhar , J . , n . 2 . , p p . 6 1 - 6 2 , 
8 1 , S/RES/307, 21 December 1971 . 
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t h e war s i t u a t i o n and t o p r o v i d e the r e q u i r e d s u p p o r t both 
mora l ly and m i l i t a r y t o P a k i s t a n . The m e e t i n g s r e v e a l e d 
Amer i ca ' s ' t i l t ' towards P a k i s t a n and N i x o n ' s a s s i s t a n c e 
d u r i n g the War, 
i n t h e meet ing of 3 December 1971, Dr K i s s i n g e r had 
s a i d ' " I am g e t t i n g h e l l e v e r y h a l f hour from t h e P r e s i d e n t 
t h a t we a r e n o t b e i n g tough enough on I n d i a . He has j u s t 
c a l l e d me a g a i n . He does n o t b e l i e v e , we a r e c a r r y i n g ou t h i s 
w i s h e s . He wants t o t i l t i n favour of P a k i s t a n . He f e e l s 
82 
e v e r y t h i n g we do comes o u t o t h e r w i s e " . 
The Washington S p e c i a l Ac t ion Group was engaged a l m o s t 
everyday r e v i e w i n g the war i n t h e i r v a r i o u s s e c r e t mee t ings 
i n the White House. The r e s u l t of t h i s c o n s p i r a c y between 
P r e s i d e n t Nixon and t h e WSAG favoured US ' t i l t ' towards 
P a k i s t a n and t h i s ' t i l t ' e x p l a i n s t h e a t t i t u d e of George 
BxiSh in t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , But the US f a i l e d t o ach ieve 
i t s aim b e c a u s e of t h e S o v i e t Veto , George Bush, t h e 
Amer ican ' s Ambassador t o the UN, in t h e c o u r s e of e x p l a i n i n g 
t h e d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n he ld I n d i a r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c r i s i s 
i n E a s t P a k i s t a n when in t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l he s a i d : 
" , . . , b u t s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g of the c r i s i s i t should be 
82» Rahamathul la , B . , Indo-American P o l i t i c s 19 70-78/ 
(New D e l h i , 198C) , p . 4 6 . 
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be c l e a r t h a t I n d i a b e a r s t h e major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
83 b roaden ing t h e c r i s i s . . . " S e n a t o r Church who could n o t 
u n d e r s t a n d why America shou ld • t i l t * towards P a k i s t a n 
remarked t h a t : " I f i n d i t odd t o u n d e r s t a n d why t h e r e i s 
such a p r o - P a k i s t a n i b i a s i n American p o l i c i e s . I n d i a ' s 
p o s i t i o n in t h e war which h a s new broken o u t i s n o t on ly 
c o n s i s t e n t w i th h e r p r o f e s s e d i d e a l s b u t i t i s a l s o t h e 
84 p o s i t i o n which i s most l i k e l y t o p r e v a i l . . . " 
SEVENTH FLEET DEPLORED 
Having f a i l e d t o compel I n d i a t o end i t s m i l i t a r y 
Opera t ions a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n , Nixon on 9 December 1971, o rde red 
t h e " t a s k f o r c e " of t h e Seven th F l e e t , l e d by n u c l e a r -
powered a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r e n t e r p r i s e t o p roceed to Bay of 
Bengal . N i x o n ' s aim was to b o l s t e r t h e sagg ing morale of 
t h e P a k i s t a n i t r o o p s and t o i n t i m i d a t e I n d i a . Ttie o f f i c i a l 
excxise advanced by t h e US f o r send ing the Seventh F l e e t 
was t h e e v a c u a t i o n of 3oO Americans i n Bang ladesh . However, 
t h i s was a lame excuse , because a F l e e t was n o t n e c e s s a r y 
85 t o c a r r y o u t t h i s t a s k . 
According t o Anderson, " t h e e v a c u a t i o n of America 
c i t i z e n s was s t r i c t l y a s econda ry m i s s i o n , adopted more a s 
8 3 . GAOR, 2 6 t h S e s s i o n , 2002nd p l e n a r y mee t ing , 7 December 
1971, p a r a 96 , p . 1 0 . 
8 4 . SCOR, 2 6 t h Year , 1608th meet ing 6 December 1971, p a r a 
78, p . 9 . 
8 5 . Chaudhur i , S a i l e n , p . 6 2 , p . 7 3 , 
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a j u s t i f i c a t i o n than tJie reason for the naval move". He was 
convinced t h a t the mission was a p a r t of America design 
, ^. 86 meant t o scare Indxa. 
According t o Anderson, the American motive behind 
moving t h i s " t a s k force" was four-fold* To compel India to 
d i v e r t both sh ips and war-planes to shadow the task force ; 
to weaken I n d i a ' s blokade aga ins t East Pak i s t an ; to d i v e r t 
the Indian a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r Vikrant from i t s mission and to 
force Ind ia t o keep i t s own war-planes on defence a l e r t , 
thxas reducing t h e i r opera t ions aga ins t the P a k i s t a n i ground 
87 force . However, the t a s k force proved use l e s s as i t was 
s t i l l 30 hours s a i l i n g away when the P a k i s t a n i forces in 
East Pakis tan surrendered t o the j o i n t conmand of Indian 
army and Mukti Bahini on 16 Dece.nriber 1971 in Dacca. India 
declared a u n i l a t e r a l c e a s e - f i r e on the Western f ron t 
vAiich Pakis tan accepted, 
Announcing the v i c t o r y of the Indian army t o the 
members of the Lok Sabha, Mrs Gandhi s a i d : " . . . The West 
Pakistan forces have uncondi t iona l ly surrendexred in 
Bangladesh . . . " She continued "Our ob jec t ives were l imi t ed 
86. Indian Express (New Delhi) 15 December 1971. 
87. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Tribune (Paris) 3 January 1972 
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t o a s s i s t the g a l l a n t people of Bangladesh and t h e i r Mukti 
Bahini to L ibera te t h e i r country from a re ign of t e r r o r 
and to r e s i s t aggression on our own land" . ,H SS 
All the members welcomed the announcement and t h i s 
v i c to ry added to the p r e s t i g e of Mrs Gandhi, Samer Guha 
remarked: 
"The name of Prime Minis te r , Mrs Gandhi w i l l go 
flown ixi the h i s t o r y as the golden sword of l i b e r a t i o n of 
89 Bangladesh." And so Bangladesh became free bu t the US 
and China refused to r econc i l e themselves with the new 
developments in South Asia. 
88. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.X, no.25, 16 December 1971, Col.145 
89 . I b i d . , Col. 147. 
CHAPTER-IV 
THE U.S.S.R. AND BANGLADESH 
The Soviet Union had taken a considerable in te res t in 
South Asia in the post-war period par t ly to project i t s own 
ideology and par t ly to fo res t a l l Western and Chinese moves 
in the region prejudicial t o i t s secur i ty . And so had gone 
out in a big way to cu l t iva te the various countries of the 
region by means of trade, aid, technical and mi l i ta ry 
assistance and cu l tura l exchange. On the p o l i t i c a l plane, i t 
has no doribt sought in i t s own way to win them over to i t s 
side in the context of the cold war. Where th is has not been 
possible, i t has encouraged them to stay e i the r non-aligned 
or neut ra l . 
For the facts that the Soviet Unicxi i s a Super power 
supported by a world-embracing ideology and neighbour of the 
region, and because the countries of South Asia have played 
a notable pa r t in world affa i rs with t h e i r espousal of non-
alignment, and are l ikely to continue to play an equally 
important role in the years to come in view of the i r s t r a t e -
gic location on the Indian Ocean, the i r massive populations, 
t he i r proximity to China and so, the Soviet Union, therefore, 
decided to promote friendly relat ions with both India and 
Pakistan and thus to reduce tiie Chinese influence in the 
region. 
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However, there were two major hurdles barring the 
way for the successful implementation of th is policy: one 
was Mie mutual r ivalry between India and Pakistan and the 
other was the l e t t e r ' s expectation of Chinese support in 
i t s conf l ic t with India. Both these obstacles would have 
been removed with the establishment of an Awami League 
Government in Pakistan, This party was favourably disposed 
towards India and the pro-Peking forces of Pakistan were 
hos t i le to i t . The non-aligned and peaceful foreign policy 
advocated by the Awami League was admirably sui table for the 
Kremlin, Soon af ter i t s victory in the December 1970 
elect ions , an important Soviet journal in i t s internat ional 
commentary appreciated the foreign policy outlined by the 
party in i t s programme. The commentary referred to the 
Awami League's programme of withdrawal from a l l mil i tary 
blocs and i t s determination to adhere to "a policy of 
peaceful co-existence with a l l countries and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes with neighbouring countr ies" . The 
declaration of the Awami League to s e t t l e the Kashmir 
question with India "on the basis of UN resolut ions" and 
to solve peacefully the problem of the d i s t r ibu t ion of the 
water of Ganges which arouse in the context of India ' s 
constructions of the Farakka dam, was given pa r t i cu la r 
1, Internat ional Affairs (Moscow) March 1971, pp.73-75. 
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emphasis in the j o u r n a l . I t was probably expected by 
the Kremlin t h a t i n a par l iamentary system headed by the 
Awami League, the Coimunist Par ty of Pakis tan would regain 
i t s l e g a l ex i s t ence and in an atmosphere f ree from r e l i g i o u s 
fanat ic ism, the pro-Moscow forces would be ab le to mould 
the p o l i t i c s of the country e f f e c t i v e l y . But as the 
t r a n s i t i o n to the Parl iamentary System was being delayed 
due to the r i s e of insuperable d i f f e rences of opinicm over 
the d ra f t ing of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n in Pakis tan , the Soviet 
Government was pe r tu rbed . The Russian concern was c l e a r l y 
expressed by Viktor Mayevsky who wrote in Pravda on 6 March 
1971, t h a t " the Soviet people , who a re c lo se ly following 
events in Pak i s t an , wish t h e i r neighbour a peaceful 
so lu t ion t o the complicated prcblems tha t the Rep\iblic 
2 
faces today" . The way in which Pres iden t Yahya Khan u l t ima-
t e l y t r i e d to solve the problem was viewed by the Soviet 
Government as an at tempt of the " reac t ionary" ru l i ng group 
to maintain i t s a u t h o r i t y by suppressing the peop l e ' s 
v e r d i c t with f o r c e . Moscow undoubtedly pre fe r red an Awami 
League Government to the cont inuat ion of the Yahya Khan's 
regime, which, i n i t s opinion, was being c o n t r o l l e d by 
"powerful l oca l monopoly groups" and "foreign c a p i t a l " and 
which looked mainly to Peking for a s s i s t ance in i t s 
c o n f l i c t with I n d i a . 
2. Current Digest of the Soviet Press , v o l . XXIII, no . 12, 
20 Apr i l 1971, p.3T^ 
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The Soviet role in the Bangladesh c r i s i s should 
therefore be seen from this background. And so, within 
a week of "tiie beginning of the Pakistani holocaust in East 
Pakistan, the Soviet president Podgomy sent a message of 
appeal to President Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971, urging him 
to stop the bloodshed and seek a po l i t i c a l solution of the 
problem "without use of force". An analysis of this message 
of appeal and a c r i t i c a l study of the reports and commen-
ta r ies which appeared in the Soviet Press during the period 
clear ly demonstrates tha t the Soviet sympathy lay, with the 
Awami League and other p o l i t i c a l forces a l l i ed to i t in the 
struggle for l ibe ra t ion . In his message Podgomy wrote: 
"The reports tha t the ta lks in Dacca had been broken 
off and that the mil i tary administration had found i t 
possible to resor t to extreme measures and used armed forces 
against the population of East Pakistan was met with great 
alarm in the Soviet union", "Concern i s a lso caused in the 
Soviet Union", he continued, "by the a r r e s t and persecution 
of Mujibur Rehman and other po l i t i c ians who had received 
such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the 
population of East Pakistan a t the recent general e lec t ions" , 
The Soviet President then pointed out tha t the complex 
pr(±)lems which had arisen, in Pakistan "can and must be 
solved p o l i t i c a l l y , without the use of force", and added 
that tlie "continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed 
in East Pakistan wi l l undoxobtedly, only make the solution 
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of the prcblems more difficult and do great harm to the 
vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan". He, 
therefore, requested the then President Yahya Khan" to 
stop the bloodshed and repression against the population 
in East Pakistan" and to turn "to methods of a peaceful 
political settlement". In making this appeal the Soviet 
Government, he said, was being guided "by the generally 
recognised humanitarian principles recorded in the universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and by concern for the welfare 
of the friendly people of Pakistan", and he requested the 
Pakistan President not to misunderstand the "motive behind 
this appeal". It is our sincere wish that tranquillity and 
justice be established in East Pakistan in the shortest 
3 
possible time", he wrote. The military measures were 
described by Podgomy as "repressive" and the concern for 
Human Rights prompted him to send the appeal. The situation 
thus created, could not, therefore, be regarded strictly as 
an internal problem of Pakistan and the Soviet President 
justified his message largely on that ground, it is signi-
ficant that he never tried to conceal his sympathy for 
Mujibur Rehman and his party which had won the support of 
the overwhelming majority of the people of East Pakistan, 
Therefore, the "peaceful political settlement" and the 
establishment of "tranquillity and justice" in East 
3. Pravda, 4 April 1971 
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Pakistan which were r e f e r r ed to in Podgorny's l e t t e r 
v i r t u a l l y meant an acceptance of the e l e c t i o n v e r d i c t . 
Meanwhile the inf lux of refugees i n t o Ind ia from 
East Pakis tan continued unabated. The in f lux was causing 
India g r e a t concern. 
Dtiring the c r i s i s , the Pakis tan i m i l i t a r y junta 
4 
received a s s i s t a n c e from both the US and China. 
The s p e c i a l Ass is tan t for Nat ional Secur i ty Affairs 
t o P res iden t Nixon, Dr. Henry Kiss inger , i ssued a warning 
to the Ind ian AtO^assador to the US, Mr. L.K, Jha, t ha t in 
the event of China a s s i s t i n g , Pakis tan in a war agains t Ind ia , 
I nd i a should never expect any help from the US, All these 
gave Pakis tan the boldness to th rea ten India with war. 
The Sino-US rappro-^chement with the he lp of Pakis tan 
came to l i g h t . This g r e a t l y t roubled both Ind ia and the 
USSR. They were both apprehensive of China taking s ide with 
Pakistan should the re be a war between Ind ia and Pakis tan , 
Under the p r e sen t c l imate , Moscow found i t impossible 
t o maintain a non committal a t t i t u d e . She-extended i t s 
4 . Choudhuri, S . , Beijinq-Washinqton-Islamabad Entente . 
Genesis and Development (New Delhi, 198^1 pp.62-63, 
5 . Iqbal Narain and Misra , K.P. , (ed,,), Pakis tan p o l i t i c a l 
System in C r i s i s ( Ja ipur , 1972) p.2277 
6. Ram Raghunath, Super powers and Indo-Pak is tan i Sub-
Co nt in en t , percept ions and p o l i c i e s , (New Delhi , 19'85) 
pIT43. 
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m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t and used i t s d i p l o m a t i c s k i l l t o l o c a l i z e 
t h e c o n f l i c t . I t s ensed t h e dangers t h a t were l i k e l y t o 
a t t e n d a p o s s i b l e Chinese involvement i n t l ie C r i s i s , and 
s o , on 5 December 1971, came o u t s t r o n g l y i n s u p p o r t of 
I n d i a and warned a l l powers t o keep off t h e c r i s i s . 
SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS 
The S o v i e t U n i o n ' s a t t i t u d e t o the even t s i n E a s t 
P a k i s t a n i n 1971 was c a u t i o u s and r e s t r a i n e d , 
I t wanted t h e s e t t l e m e n t of t h e c r i s i s i s P a k i s t a n 
w i t h o u t o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . However, wi th t h e e s c a l a t i o n 
of t h e c r i s i s and t h e i n a b i l i t y of G e n e r a l Yahya Khan t o 
f ind an a m i c a b l e s o l u t i o n t o i t , t h e S o v i e t Union became 
alarmed a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of Western powers f i s h i n g in 
t h e t r o u b l e d w a t e r s . The S o v i e t Union wanted a p o l i t i c a l 
s o l u t i o n t o t h e c r i s i s which i n e f f e c t meant t h e t r a n s f e r 
of power t o t h e e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e B e n g a l i 
peop l e w i t i i ou t which t h e r e cou ld be no hope of peace in 
t h e r e g i o n . The S o v i e t a t t i t u d e should t h e r e f o r e be l inder-
s tood from t h e p o s t u r e s of t h e US and China which was no t 
g 
conducive t o p e a c e i n the r e g i o n . 
7 . I b i d . , p p . 3 4 5 - 6 . 
8 . Bha t i a , v . , ( ed , ) I n d o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , Problems and 
P r o s p e c t s , (New Delhi^ 1984) / p . 7 0 . 
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The question that cortmonly comes to our minds i s 
what made the Soviet Union to extend i t s support to India 
during the en t i r e c r i s i s? To th is question, we now turn 
for answer. 
The ire were certain factors tha t made the USSR to 
adopt the pro-India stand during the c r i s i s , m the f i r s t 
instance, the Soviet Union real ised tha t the c r i s i s was 
getting out of hands and t h a t remaining s i l e n t would be 
regarded as connivance a t the actions of Pakistani rxilers. 
This would greatly tarnish her image as a champion of the 
weak nat ions , i t also dawned on Moscow tha t what was a t 
stake in Bangladesh was the issue of self-determination and 
an urge for democratic r igh t s on which the Soviet leaders 
could not admit of any compromise. Under these conditions, 
the best a l te rna t ive l e f t to her was to issue appeals and 
make statements which v/ould cause a chain reaction among the 
world* s big and small nations who would no more hes i ta te to 
come forward with moral, if not material support for the 
9 freedom fighters in Bangladesh. In the th i rd place, Moscow 
had real ized the importance of India in Asia. In view of the 
se t up, i t s t a r t ed cul t iva t ing India. This factor becomes 
clearer when we understand t h a t Moscow had for a long time 
t r i ed to get c loser to Pakistan and even l i be ra l l y supplied 
9. The Motherland, 6 April 1971, (ed.) , "Major Breakthrough", 
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arms to i t b u t t h i s proved unrewarding in the long run. 
Foxirthly, the Soviet Union have a genuine admiration for 
the f a i t h f u l n e s s which Indians a re capable of showing 
towards those whom they have agreed to regard as t h e i r 
a l l i e s and f r i e n d s . F i f t h ly , Moscow saw some t h r e a t s from 
China and India fear from Pakis tan drew both Ind ia and the 
USSR c lo se r , t he re fo re , t h e t h r e a t from China led Moscow 
to normalizing r e l a t i o n s wi th I n d i a . As Moscow's wooing of 
Pakistan had hampered f r i endsh ip with Ind ia , Moscow could 
not take any chance in ru in ing any chance of support in both 
Pakis tan and I n d i a . Ind ia on her own needed a t r u s t e d 
supporter in i t s problems with Pakis tan , China ' s f r iendly 
t i e s with Pak is tan , and with the danger China h e r s e l f cons-
t i t u t e d t o I nd i a , drew India and the Soviet Union c l o s e r , 
Moreover, Moscow was convinced of the success of t h e Bengali 
movement as t he whole of the seventy f ive mi l l ion people of 
Bangladesh and the e n t i r e India with i t s government and 
people, were a rdent ly behind tiie movement. Another f a c to r 
t h a t shaped Moscow pro- Ind ia a t t i t u d e was t h a t i t saw the 
na ture of the movement. The s t rugg le , launched by a majori ty 
aga ins t minor i ty oppression, was a moral i s sue in which 
fence s i t t i n g would amount t o irrenorality,^ And l a s t l y i t 
was Bhu t to ' s t r i p t o China t h a t sha t t e r ed Moscow's pa t i ence , 
10, Shah Zafar , M.A,, Ind ia and t h e Super powers, (New 
Delhi , 1983), p ,38 . 
1 1 . Deshpande, G.p. , Soviet and Chinese Stakes in Mohammed 
Ayoob and o t h e r s , Bangladesh; A Struggle for Nationhood 
Wew Delhi , 1971) p , 1 1 4 . 
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and from tha t date i t extended more whole-hearted assistance 
to India. The Soviet Union's policy had a major impact in 
excluding the UN from the role the US and Pakistan wanted 
i t to play. Moscow fully supported India when i t was cer tain 
12 that the b i r t h of Bangladesh as a nation was inevi tab le . 
The v i s i t of Swaran Singh, India ' s Foreign Affairs 
Minister to Moscow in Jiane was highly successful and the 
Soviet reaction to i t was $n unmistakable evidence of her 
unequivocal sympathy for the Indian stand v i s -a -v i s the 
Bangladesh i s sue . 
Swaran Singh discussed with the Soviet leaders the 
developments in East Pakistan and the i r dangerous potent ia-
l i t i e s for peace and s t a b i l i t y of the area. He explained 
the various problems - economic, social and p o l i t i c a l 
which the influx of refugees was creating for India. He 
stated how the problem of ensuring food and she l t e r to the 
refugees had became a l l the more complicated by the outbreak 
of epidemics. 
A jo in t cortmunique issued on the day he le f t (8 June 
1971) a f te r the completion of his v i s i t , declared: "The two 
sides, a f te r a detailed discussion on the various aspects of 
the problems created in th i s context consider tha t i t is 
12, Sharma, R., Bangladesh c r i s i s and India foreign policy (New Delhi, 1978) pp.315-318. 
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imperat ive for immediate measures to be taken in East 
Pakis tan which would ensure the stoppage of inf lux of 
refugees from East Pak i s t an . Simultaneously, i t is de s i r ab l e 
t o take f u r t h e r s teps t o ensure t h a t peace i s r e s to red and 
a l l condi t ions of s e c u r i t y a re created for the r e t u r n of the 
refugees t o t h e i r homes in Eas t Pak is tan , Taking i n t o account 
the se r iousness of "tiie s i t u a t i o n , the two s ides agreed to 
remain in touch with each o ther in order to review the 
s i t u a t i o n . " ^ ^ 
Immediately a f t e r the conclusicai of Swaran Singh ' s 
v i s i t to Moscow the Soviet Press repor ted t h a t the "ser ious 
s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by the cont inuing flow of refugees from 
East Pakis tan i n t o the ad jo in ing S ta t e s of Ind ia" caused 
g r ea t concern t o the Soviet Union, which was fu r the r 
accentuated by the Indian Foreign Affairs M i n i s t e r ' s s t a t e -
14 
ment about the outbreak of epidemic in the refugee camps, 
The Sovie t Pres ident Kosygin in a speech de l ivered on 
9 June 1971 on the eve of e l e c t i o n s t o t he Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR r e f e r r e d to t h i s problem and s a id : "These events 
provoked profound alarm of the world p u b l i c . All who 
13. Bangladesh Documents, n o . l , v o l . 1 , p .512 , 
14. Ghosh, Sucheta, The Role of India in the emergence of 
Bangladesh (Calcut ta , 1983) p.164. 
I l l 
t reasure the pr inciples of humanism must demand tha t 
conditions be created for the refugees returning to t h e i r 
homes, that t he i r personal Safety and opportunity to l ive 
and work calmly in East Pakistan be guaranteed. I t is our 
opinion t h a t such measures must be immediately taken by the 
Pakistani a u t h o r i t i e s . As in the past we come out for the 
peaceful solution of a l l problems aris ing in the re la t ions 
between India and Pakistan and are convinced tha t such a 
policy would be in accord with the national in te res t s of the 
peoples of India and Pakistan and the cause of procaring 
peace on the Hindustan peninsula. A different development 
of events would play into the hands of those internal and 
external forces which operate to the detriment of the 
in te res t s of both India and Pakistan and persue t h e i r own 
15 se l f i sh aims". President Kosygin's speech was an unmis-
takable evidence of Soviet sympathy for India . I t was an 
endorsement of Ind ia ' s stand by the Kremlin and there was 
no attempt t o be neut ra l . 
Though Kosygin did not specify that the peaceful 
solution (which was the declared objective of India too) 
of the problem must have the sanction of the elected 
representatives of Bangladesh, his warning tha t "a different 
15. Ib id . , p.166. 
16. Ibid. 
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develoiment of events would play i n t o the hands of those 
i n t e r n a l and ex t e rna l forces which operate t o the detr iment 
of the i n t e r e s t s of both India and Pakis tan" implied a 
d isapproval of the way in which Yahya Khan was t ry ing to 
solve the problem with the support of China and the US. 
The supply of arms t o the Yahya Khan's Government by 
17 the US was a l s o condemned in the Soviet P r e s s . 
P r e s iden t Nixon's dec is ion to send Dr. Henry Kiss inger 
t o Peking a t t h a t s tage and Nixon's continued m i l i t a r y and 
economic suppor t to Pakis tan desp i te the genocide in East 
18 Pakis tan , brought Ind ia and the USSR c l o s e r and they 
concluded a Treaty of peace, f r iendship and cooperat ion 
19 for twenty yea r s on 9 August 1971. 
The t r e a t y was viewed by Western diplomats in New 
Delhi as an important event ranking second only t o K i s s i n g e r ' s 
t r i p to Peking, This was a demonstration of Moscow's 
pro- India s t and in the Pak i s t an i confronta t ion with India 
as a l o g i c a l sequence t o the American-Chinese support for 
20 the Yahya Khan's regime. The USSR now r e a l i z e d why Pakis tan 
17. I b i d . 
18. The Times of India (New Delhi) 9 August 1971, (edi): 
Timely Visit. 
19. Survival, XIII, October 1971, pp.351-3. 
20. The Hindu (Madras) 8 August 1971. 
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was th rea t en ing India with a war. The sending of Gromyko 
t o New Delhi expla ins the ex ten t t o which Moscow was concerned 
about the c r i s i s . 
Two main i s sues came up for d iscuss ion with Gromyko-
Bangladesh s i t u a t i o n and the emergence of the Sino-American 
de t en t e . Discuss ions were a l s o held regarding I n d i a ' s need 
in defence equipments to meet the new t h r e a t from across 
21 the border . 
The t r e a t y was aimed a t prevent ing China from involving 
herse l f in any war t h a t might break out between India and 
Pakis tan , and a l s o to de t e r Pakis tan from unleashing a war 
22 
on Ind ia . The t r e a t y was widely i n t e r p r e t e d as a warning 
t o China. The Chinese i n i t i a l response to the t r e a t y was 
low-keyed. La te r they abs ta ined from i ssu ing warnings about 
a l i k e l y "Indian aggress ion" as they had been doing before 
the t r e a t y was s igned . 
Making some observat ions about the t r e a t y , tlie Soviet 
Foreign Affa i r s Minis te r Gromyko sa id : We have been together 
a t a l l t imes, good and bad. This was so in the p a s t . I t i s 
occuring in the p resen t for the f r iendship and cooperation 
between the Sovie t Union and India do no t r e s t on t r a n s i e n t 
21, Indian Express, (New Delhi) 11 August 1971. 
2 2. Mohit Sen, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty", Economic and 
P o l i t i c a l Weekly, 25 September 1971, pp.2047-8. 
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f a c t o r s b u t on t h e l a s t i n g v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of ou r peoples 
and s t a t e s and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e main tenance of p e a c e . 
Our r e l a t i o n s a r e based on mutual t r u s t , e q u a l i t y , r e s p e c t 
and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n each o t h e r s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . The 
c o n c l u s i o n of t h e I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y l a y s a s t i l l s t r o n g e r 
23 p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l b a s e f o r tJiese r e l a t i o n s . 
The P a k i s t a n Times, d e s c r i b e d the t r e a t y a s : a 
d e l i b e r a t e move t o c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which I n d i a may 
f e e l f r e e t o a t t a c k P a k i s t a n w i th t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e 
S o v i e t Commitment t o go t o t h e a i d of I n d i a would p r o v i d e 
a d e t e r e n t t o any Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n on P a k i s t a n ' s b e h a l f . 
Communist China r e g a r d e d t h e t r e a t y a s u n f r i e n d l y as 
, 25 f a r as s h e was c o n c e r n e d . However, the USSR was n o t 
b o t h e r e d abou t t h e r e a c t i o n s of P a k i s t a n and China and 
warned I n d i a ' s u n f r i e n d l y n e i g h b o u r s P a k i s t a n and China t o 
behave t h e m s e l v e s o t h e r w i s e they would i n f u t u r e have t o 
reckon w i t h t h e I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y with a l l i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
The warning was e x p l i c i t in t h e speech of t h e Fore ign A f f a i r s 
M i n i s t e r of t h e USSR, A, Gromyko a t t h e mee t ing of the 
2 6 Supreme S o v i e t which r a t i f i e d the t r e a t y . 
24 
2 3 . Pravda , 10 August 1971 . 
24 . The P a k i s t a n Times, ( e d . ) , " E n c i r c l e m e n t " , 11 August 
1971. 
25 . The Hindu (Madras) 4 October 1971, 
2 6 . B i n d r a , S . S , , i n d o - p a k R e l a t i o n s , (New D e l h i , 1981), 
p . 1 4 2 . 
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The i n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y looked l i k e t h e f i r s t of i t s 
k ind i n the S o v i e t sys tem f o r c o n t a i n i n g Ch inese power in 
A s i a . 
Die US Government o f f i c i a l s , j o u r n a l i s t s and 
28 i n t e l l i g e n t s i a condemned t h e t r e a t y as " a g g r e s s i v e t r e a t y " , 
Though t h e I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y was d e s i g n a t e d as 
be ing e s s e n t i a l l y a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p between two coun-
29 t r i e s , i t had s t r o n g s e c u r i t y u n d e r t o n e s . 
Whatever migh t be t h e long term s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e 
t r e a t y , i t s i r tmedia te aim was to f a c i l i t a t e I n d i a ' s t a s k 
of s o l v i n g t h e problem c r e a t e d by t h e l a r g e i n f l u x of 
r e fugees from Bangladesh w i t h o u t harming I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y , 30 
The USSR from h e n c e f o r t h speeded up i t s d i p l o m a t i c 
s u p p o r t f o r I n d i a and r e p e a t e d l y r e i t e r a t e d i t s s t a n d 
fo rmula t ed e a r l i e r on, t h a t the l e a d e r s of P a k i s t a n should 
s e e k a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t w i th t h e e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e of E a s t P a k i s t a n . 
The j o i n t s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d a t t he end of Grcmyko's 
v i s i t t o I n d i a on 12 August 1971, urged t h a t " u r g e n t s t e p s 
2 7 . I b i d . 
2 8 . Ihe H i n d u s t a n Times (New Delh i ) 17 August 1971, 
2 9 . See A r t i c l e s V I I I , IX and X of the I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y , 
in S u r v i v a l n . l 9 , p . 3 5 2 . 
3 0 . P r a s a d , B , , The Super powers and t h e S u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
D e t e n t e , (New D e l h i , 1975) p . 1 6 8 . 
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be taken in Pakistan for tiie achievement of a p o l i t i c a l 
solution and for the creation of conditions of safety for 
the return of the refugees to thei r homes, which alone 
would guarantee the i n t e r e s t s of the ent i re people of 
Pakistan and the cause of the preservation of peace in 
the area".^^ 
The Soviet s trategy towards the Bangladesh c r i s i s 
became clearer a f te r the conclusion of the t r e a t y . On 11 
August 1971, Spartak Boglov, the 'APN' p o l i t i c a l corres-
pcaident, in an a r t i c l e explaining the sign if icance of the 
Indo-Soviet t rea ty referred to "the tragedy of East Pakistan" 
and the tension on the Indo-Pakistan border along with other 
problems of Asia such as the war in Indo-China, mil i tary 
blocs of SEATO and CENTO, Arab-Israel, conf l ic t e t c , and 
observed that the "main element" behind a l l these prdolems 
was the same, the confrontation between the forces of peace 
and war, between imperialism and the national l ibera t ion" . 
He explained how "imperialism and the forces of war" t r ied 
to maintain t he i r predominance by "direct mi l i tary pressure" 
and by a "divide and irule policy", that i s , by inst igat ing 
one country against another. "The hegemonistic aspirat ions 
of peoples Repxjblic of China leadership", he pointed out, 
31, Ibid. 
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led Peking also to follow an imperial ist l i n r and, he 
continued: " . . . Peking makes active use of any means to 
se t some countries against others . I t i s here, in thfi 
attempt t o se t some nations against others , tha t today 
l i e s the common point between ' l e f t ' opportunism and 
imperialism. I t is enough to compare the conduct of Peking 
and Washington a t various stages of the Indo-Pakistani 
confl ict and during the l a t e s t Pakistani events for th is 
32 analogy to emerge with pa r t i cu la r c l a r i t y " . I t was thus 
evident tha t Moscow placed the problens of the sub-continent 
and those of West Asia or Vietnam on an equal footing and 
the policy of peace which she advocated for South Asia was 
not different from the policy she applied in those regions, 
The Soviet policy of peace, in other words, meant a policy 
in the i n t e r e s t of peace as Moscow understood i t . I t did not 
necessari ly mean a peaceful policy without the use of arms. 
During Mrs Gandhi's v i s i t to Moscow, Kosygin explained 
the Soviet Stand more c lear ly when on 28 Septemb,,r he 
remarked: " I t i s impossible t o jus t i fy the actioj\s of the 
Pakistani au thor i t ies which have compelled over oight million 
people to leave the i r country, land, property an1 to seek 
she l te r in neighbouring India. The mass f l i gh t ot tlie 
population from East Pakistan can only be explaing„| ^^ 




u n b e a r a b l e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s c r e a t e d f o r them t h e r e " , 
Thus, Kosygin h e l d P a k i s t a n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c r i s i s and 
m a i n t a i n e d , l i k e I n d i a , t h a t P a k i s t a n must f i r s t s o l v e 
i t s Eas t P a k i s t a n problem t a k i n g t h e " l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t " 
of t h e p e o p l e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
T a l k i n g t o I n d i a n c o r r e s p o n d e n t s a t Vnukovo A i r p o r t 
b e f o r e Mrs Gandhi took off fo r home, Kosygin s t a t e d t h a t : 
"No q u a r t e r s which committed a t r o c i t i e s can eve r ' enjoy 
ou r s u p p o r t . Our sympathies a r e w i th the d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s 
34 in P a k i s t a n " , Th is a g a i n speaks volume fo r t h e sympathy 
of the USSR w i t h t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of the peop le of E a s t 
P a k i s t a n . I t e q u a l l y , d e m o n s t r a t e s the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s 
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y jvmta of P a k i s t a n , In t h e j o i n t 
s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of Mrs G a n d h i ' s v i s i t t o 
t h e USSR, b o t h the c o u n t r i e s ag reed t h a t f o r t h e main tenance 
of peace in t h e a r e a , " u r g e n t measures" shou ld be t aken f o r 
"a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n of t h e p r o b l e m , , , pay ing r e g a r d s t o 
t h e w i s h e s , t h e i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s and lawful i n t e r e s t s of 
t h e people of E a s t Bengal a s we l l as f o r t h e s p e e d i e s t and 
s a f e r e t u r n of t h e r e fugees t o t h e i r homeland i n c o n d i t i o n s 
35 
of s a f e g u a r d i n g t h e i r honour and d i g n i t y . " 
33 . I b i d , , p . 1 6 . 
34 , Vibhakar , J . , A model R e l a t i o n s h i p , 25 Yea r s of I n d o -
S o v i e t D ip loma t i c T ies (New D e l h i / 1 9 7 2 ) p . 5 3 . 
3 5 , Bangladesh Documents, M i n i s t r y of Ex t . A f f a i r s , (New 
D e l h i , 1971) v o l . 11 , p . 1 6 3 . 
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The Stubborn r e fusa l of Yahya Khan to s t a r t any 
nego t ia t ion with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman u l t ima t e ly led the 
Soviets to support the r i s e of an independent Bangladesh, 
Following the events of 25 March, Moscow was, however, 
cons i s t en t i n i t s opposi t ion to the P a k i s t a n i po l i cy . 
Islamabad' s r u l e in East Pakis tan was descr ibed in the 
Soviet p ress as "the m i l i t a r y occupation regime i n East 
Pakis tan" . ^^ 
Meanwhile, the s i t u a t i o n on the Indian border was 
fu r the r aggravated by the in t rans igent a t t i t u d e adopted by 
Pakis tan and so,on 22 October, the Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Affairs Min i s t e r , N.P, Firyubin, a r r ived in New Delhi fccr 
consu l t a t ions with the Government of Ind ia under A r t i c l e 
IX of the Indo-Soviet t r e a t y which was meant t o be invoked 
37 only when e i t h e r country faced ex te rna l agg res s ion . The 
consu l t a t i ons demonstrated t h a t the USSR meant bus iness 
with Ind ia . On 30 October, Air Marshal P«S, Kutakov, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Sovie t Air Force a r r i v e d in Nev7 
Delhi , for fu r the r consu l t a t ions with the Indian Government. 
On the day he a r r ived New Delhi , Pakistan had fu r the r 
stepped up i t s h ighly provocat ive war l i k e a c t s on India 
38 
3 6, Soviet Review, n.32, p . 30 , 
37. Prasad , B , , n.30, pp. 165-166. 
38. I b i d , , p .169 . 
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b o r d e r s i n t h e West by s e n d i n g two p l a n e s o f i t s a i r f e r c e 
i n t o the a i r s p a c e over Jammu and Kashmir, And between 1 and 
26 Oc tober , P a k i s t a n had committed 138 a c t s of v i o l a t i o n 
a long the 700 Ki lome t re c e a s e - f i r e from K a r g i l in the North 
39 
t o Chhanib i n t h e Sou th . 
Commenting on t h e t e n s e s i t u a t i o n . S e n a t o r Edward 
Kennedy s t a t e d on 1 November in Washington t h a t t he US 
Government " b e a r s a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " f o r t h e t h r e a t 
of war between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . The S o v i e t p r e s s a l s o 
40 
condemned t h e US a t t i t u d e towards I n d i a , 
The S o v i e t Union once aga in c a l l e d on the P a k i s t a n 
government t o s t o p a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t t h e B e n g a l i s and seek 
41 p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t . 
V. Kudryavtsev , l e a d i n g a S o v i e t P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ' 
d e l e g a t i o n , a r r i v e d in New D e l h i on 6 November i n c o n n e c t i o n 
with t h e obse rvance of the I n d o - S o v i e t F r i e n d s h i p Month, 
Speaking a t a Ixincheon meet ing a t t h e P r e s s Club of Ind ia 
on 9 November, he n o t e d new dimensions in t h e s t r u g g l e of 
Eas t Bengal and d e s c r i b e d i t a s a " n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n 
42 
movement w i t h e l emen t s of c i v i l war . " R e f e r r i n g t o t h e 
39 . Vibhakar , J . , n . 3 4 , p . 5 5 . 
40 . I b i d . , p . 5 5 - 5 6 . 
4 1 . I b i d . , p . 5 6 . 
4 2 . The Times of I n d i a (New Delhi ) 10 November 1971. 
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S o v i e t A i r C h i e f ' s t a l k s w i th I n d i a n l e a d e r s , he d e c l a r e d 
a t Poona on 13 November: " M i l i t a r y e x p e r t s a lways d i s c u s s 
s e c r e t l y . But l e t me a s s u r e you t h a t i n t h e e v e n t of any 
a t t a c k of madness e i t h e r by a pe r son o r a n a t i o n , t h e 25 
c r o r e p e o p l e of t h e S o v i e t Union wi th t h e i r might s h a l l 
back I n d i a a s h e r t r u s t e d f r i e n d " , 
On 11 November, t h e I n d i a n Ambassador t o t h e USSR 
Dr. K . S . S h e l v a n k a r met the S o v i e t Defence M i n i s t e r Marshal 
Andre i Grechko . The Ind i an Ambassador was a s s u r e d of S o v i e t 
a s s i s t a n c e t o I n d i a t o cope with i t s t r o u b l e s in keep ing 
44 
v/ith t h e S p i r i t of t h e I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y . 
While t h e S o v i e t Union was p u b l i c l y u rg ing a peace fu l 
s e t t l e m e n t of t he c r i s i s , i t took ' s t e p s a t t h e same t ime t o 
equ ip I n d i a a g a i n s t any e v e n t u a l i t y of v/ar. In t h e months 
p r e c e d i n g t h e a c t u a l f i g h t i n g i n Decerriber 1971, i t was 
r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union had d e l i v e r e d e i g h t s h i p l o a d s 
45 
of arms t o I n d i a . 
On 25 November 1971, Yahya Khan s a i d a t a d i n n e r fo r 
a v i s i t i n g Chinese d e l e g a t i o n t h a t i n 10 days t ime he might 
46 be away f i g h t i n g a war. And he was no t k i d d i n g . At l a s t , 
4 3 . Vibhakar , J . , n , 3 4 , p . 5 6 , 
44. The Times of India (New Delhi) 12 November 1971. 
45. The New York Times. 30 November 1971. 
4 6, Chaudhuri, S., n.4,, p.70. 
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P a k i s t a n d e c l a r e d war on I n d i a b y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b o n b i n g 
s e v e r a l I n d i a n a i r f i e l d s on 3 December 1 9 7 1 . I n d i a h a d t o 
f i g h t b a c k t o d e f e n d i t s e l f . 
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR 
The S o v i e t Union b a c k e d I n d i a d u r i n g t h e war , s i n c e 
i t was n o t i n f a v o u r o f s e t t l i n g t h e c r i s i s b y f o r c e , t h i s 
was s o b e c a u s e i t a p p r e h e n d e d t h a t t h e c r i s i s m i g h t b e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d i f any a t t e m p t was made t o r e s o l v e i t 
t h r o u g h f o r c e . Bu t when war b r o k e o u t b e t w e e n I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n , i t h a d no o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o t a k e s i d e w i t h 
47 I n d i a i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e I n d o - S o v i e t t r e a t y . 
B r e z h n e v w h i l e a d d r e s s i n g t h e s i x t h c o n g r e s s of t h e 
P o l i s h Woarkers P a r t y d e c l a r e d : t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s 
p o s i t i o n was t h a t t h e c u r r e n t I n d o - P a k i s t a n f i g h t i n g s h o u l d 
4 R 
come t o an end w i t h o u t a n y e x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
Wi th t h e P a k i s t a n i a t t a c k , a f t e r Yahya K h a n ' s 10 days 
t i m e t h r e a t of w a r , i t became c l e a r t o Moscow t h a t t h e a t t a c k 
was p r e - p l a n n e d and w i t h a n a i m t o t a k e t h e i s s u e t o t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Moscow r e s i s t e d a l l a t t e m p t s t o i n v o l v e 
o u t s i d e p o w e r s , i t s a im was t o l o c a l i z e t h e war so much 
4 7 , Sha rma , R , , n . l 2 , p , 3 0 4 , 
8^» The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 8 December 1971, 
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s o t h a t i t was n o t p r e p a r e d t o h a v e even t h e UN h a v e any 
t h i n g t o do w i t h t l ie c r i s i s . T h i s e x p l a i n s why t h e S o v i e t 
d e l e g a t e s a t t h e UN r e s t e d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e 
c o n f l i c t i n B a n g l a d e s h on t h e p o l i c i e s a n d a c t i o n s of t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t of P a k i s t a n . 
J a c o b M a l i k , w h i l e d e f e n d i n g I n d i a a g a i n s t t h e US 
a l l e g a t i o n s of c h a r g i n g I n d i a of a g g r e s s i o n a n d a g a i n s t 
t h e a c c u s a t i o n o f " b o r d e r i n c u r s i o n s " , d e c l a r e d ; t h e 
s i t u a t i o n i n E a s t B e n g a l h a d a r i s e n b e c a u s e o f t h e a c t i o n 
of t h e m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . As a r e s u l t o f t e r r o r and 
f o r c e u s e d a g a i n s t t h e p e o p l e of E a s t B e n g a l , m i l l i o n s of 
them had f l e d t o I n d i a a n d became r e f u g e e s . T h i s was one 
r e a l i t y v ^ i c h h a d t o b e n o t e d . He c o n t i n u e d t o s a y , i t 
would b e a g r e a t m i s t a k e t o p u t I n d i a and P a k i s t a n on p a r 
49 i n t h i s m a t t e r , 
THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 
CRISIS 
With t h e r e q u e s t of t h e US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , t h e B a n g l a d e s h c r i s i s was p r e s e n t e d i n 
t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on 4 December 1 9 7 1 . A d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n 
was i n t r o d u c e d s e e k i n g a n i m m e d i a t e c e a s e - f i r e a n d w i t h -
d r a w a l of I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n i t r o o p s t o t h e i r own s i d e s 
4 9 , V i b h a k a r , J . , n . 3 4 , p p , 5 7 - 5 8 , 
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of the indo-Pakistani borders, and at the same time, George 
Bush accused India of an "incursion across the border of 
East Pakistan" • A similar resolution'was introduced the 
following day. 
The Soviet Union vetoed both the resolutions. Eleven 
members voted for the resolution, Britain and France 
abstained from voting, the USSR and Poland casted negative 
votes. The statesman, thanked the Soviet Union for its Veto 
which had debarred the Security Council from ca ling for 
51 
a cease-fire in the Indo-Pakistani war . 
The Soviet delegate pointed out that withdrawal of 
forces without a political settlemement in East Pakistan 
would only serve to perpetuate tyranny and oppression in 
Bangladesh, cease-fire, therefore, he added, must go simul-
taneously with a political settlement? the one could not be 
52 
separated from the other • The Soviet delegate proposed the 
issuing of a call to Pakistani forces to stop "acts of 
violence" in East Pakistan, this was rejected in the Security 
Council, Meanwhile, China had tabled a resolution, seeking the 
condemnation of India for its role in the conflict. The 
Chinese resolution accused India of launching a large-scale 
attack on Pakistan and urged all people to extend support 
50, SCOR, S/PV 1606, 4 December 1971, p.91, 
51, The Statesman (ed.), (New^Delhi), "At least some Friends" 
6 December 1971, 
52, Prasad, B,, n.30, p.170. 
125 
t o the P a k i s t a n i s . I t a l s o c a l l e d f o r a c e a s e - f i r e and 
wi thdrawa l of t r o o p s from t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n b o r d e r s . The 
S o v i e t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a i d t h a t t h e Chinese r e s o l u t i o n 
was u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e S o v i e t Union and i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
53 he would v e t o t h e same. With t h i s , no d e c i s i o n could be 
reached on how t o end t h e i n d o - p a k i s t a n c o n f l i c t , and s o 
on 7 December 1971, t h e US r e f e r r e d t h e m a t t e r t o t h e 
Genera l Assembly as t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l had proved 
54 i n e f f e c t i v e i n the c o n f l i c t . 
The Tas s , i n a r e p o r t on 7 December blamed t h e US 
and China c h i e f l y f o r t h e i n a b i l i t y of t h e UN S e c u r i t y 
Co\incil t o r e s o l v e t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n c o n f l i c t and d e s c r i b e d 
t h e C o u n c i l ' s d e c i s i o n t o r e f e r t h e m a t t e r t o t h e Genera l 
Assembly as an a t t e m p t aimed a t p r e v e n t i n g t h e a d o p t i o n 
of a d e c i s i o n d i r e c t e d a t a j u s t s e t t l e m e n t of t h e c o n f l i c t 
w i t h due r e g a r d s f o r t h e e s s e n c e of t h e problem c r e a t e d in 
E a s t Bengal by t h e a c t i o n s of the P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The G e n e r a l /^sertibly adop ted t h e r e s o l u t i o n on t h e same 
d a y . 
P a k i s t a n a c c e p t e d t o implement t h e G e n e r a l Assembly ' s 
r e s o l u t i o n , wh i l e I n d i a r e f u s e d t o do same and informed the 
57 S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the UN a c c o r d i n g l y , 
5 3 , Vibhakar , J . , n . 3 4 , p . 5 9 , 
54 , UN Documents A / R E S / 2 7 9 3 , 7 December 1 9 7 1 , 
5 5 , Vibhakar , J , , n , 3 4 , p p . 5 9 - 6 0 , 
56, A/8567 and S/10440, 9 December 1971, 
57, A/8580 and S/10445, 12 December 1971. 
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The S o v i e t d e l e g a t e moved h i s own r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g 
upon t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l t o t ake up i t s d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n ^ 
which c a l l e d f o r a c e a s e - f i r e , b u t t h i s was n o t c o n s i d e r e d 
because t h e US d e l e g a t e had i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would n o t 
58 
a c c e p t i t u n l e s s i t was l i n k e d wi th m i l i t a r y w i t h d r a w a l , 
The S o v i e t Union, a l o n g wi th Cuba, Mongol ia and Bhutan 
and most of t h e E a s t European C o u n t r i e s , v o t e d wi th I n d i a 
i n t h e UN Genera l Assembly and opposed t h e r e s o l u t i o n which 
c a l l e d upon I n d i a and P a k i s t a n to " t ake f o r t h w i t h a l l 
measures f o r an immediate c e a s e - f i r e and f o r t h e wi thdrawa l 
of t h e i r armed f o r c e s " from each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r y . J acob 
Mal ik , r e f e r r i n g t o t h e move fo r a cease f i r e and wi thdrawal 
of f o r c e s , s a i d t h a t t h i s would n o t h e l p in r e s t o r i n g peace 
a s t r o o p s would be l e f t w i th f r e e hands t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r 
r e p r e s s i o n a g a i n s t t h e B e n g a l i s , And so , r e q u e s t e d t h e Genera l 
59 Assembly n o t t o c l o s e i t s eyes t o p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . 
The S o v i e t p r e s s , a l s o c r i t i c i z e d t h e UN Genera l 
Assembly 's r e s o l u t i o n and t h e Sino-US c o l l u s i o n i n t h e UN. 
Y u r i Zhukov obse rved in P ravda : 
"They palm off such p r o j e c t s a s a r e p e a c e f u l on t h e 
s u r f a c e b u t a r e i n r e a l i t y charged wi th dynami te , p r o j e c t s 
58 . Vibhakar , J . , n . 3 4 , p . 6 0 . 
59 . I b i d . 
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t h e Implemen ta t ion of which w i l l only a g g r a v a t e t h e 
s i t u a t i c a i . P r e c i s e l y t h i s purpose i s s e r v e d by t h e 
i n t e n s i v e a t t e m p t s over t h e r e c e n t days t o c o n c e n t r a t e 
a l l t h e a t t e n t i o n on c a l l s fo r c e a s e - f i r e l e a v i n g a s i d e 
t h e c a u s e s of c o n f l i c t " , 
The S o v i e t Union used i t s v e t o i n t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l 
on 14 December f o r t h e t h i r d t ime t o b l o c k t h e US r e s o l u t i o n 
c a l l i n g f o r an i rrmediate I n d o - P a k i s t a n i c e a s e - f i r e and 
t r o o p s w i t h d r a w a l of bo th s i d e s . Th is t i m e t h e m a t t e r was 
b r o u g h t t o the S e c u r i t y Coxoncil because I n d i a d id n o t 
c o n s i d e r i t p r o p e r t o a c c e p t the Genera l Assembly ' s r e s o l u -
t i o n . 
As t h e t h r e a t i n c r e a s e d of t h e widening of the i n d o -
p a k i s t a n i c o n f l i c t , w i th the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x t e r n a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , I n d i a and t h e USSR took s t e p s t o ensure the 
c o n t i n u a n c e of h i g h - l e v e l c o n s u l t a t i o n s among t h e m s e l v e s . 
D . p . Dhar, t h e Chairman of t h e P o l i c y p l a n n i n g Committee 
for E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s flew t o Moscow and met A.N, Kosygin 
and o t h e r S o v i e t l e a d e r s i n connec t ion w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n 
62 i n the I n d i a n s t i b - c o n t i n e n t . 
60. pravda, 10 December 1971. 
61. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p,61-62, 
62. Ibid., p.61. 
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SEVENTH FLEET AND THE SOVIET'S ROLE 
A3 t h e d i s c u s s i o n on t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n c o n f l i c t was 
going on a t t h e UN, P r e s i d e n t Nixon on 9 December ordered 
t h e Task Fo rce t o p roceed t o t h e Bays of Bengal , The mot ive 
beh ind t h i s ug ly des igh a c c o r d i n g t o the S o v i e t Union was 
t o d i s c o u r a g e I n d i a from s t r i k i n g a g a i n s t West P a k i s t a n i 
63 f o r c e s . 
The S o v i e t Uhion knew of t h e movement of t h e Seventh 
F l e e t and a s s u r e d I n d i a t h a t t h e Seventh F l e e t be ing s e n t 
by -tile US was b e i n g moni to red as i t was fo l lowed by t h e 
S o v i e t F l o t i l l a and t h e r e f o r e , i t was n o t l i k e l y t o i n t e r -
vene b e c a u s e i t was aware t h a t t he commander of t h e Russian 
Task Force was a u t h o r i z e d t o t ake a c t i o n shou ld t h e 
64 Americans o r t h e Chinese i n t e r v e n e . 
Condemning t h e US a c t i o n of sending -the Seventh F l e e t , 
t h e S o v i e t Union accused i t of us ing " g r o s s b l a c t a n a i l and 
p r e s s u r e " a g a i n s t I n d i a i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e UN C h a r t e r . 
"What b u s i n e s s h a s an American n a v a l squadron i n t h e Ind i an 
ocean"? asked the Pravda Commentator, K o n s t a n t i n Geivandov. 
"Why shou ld they t u r n up in d i r e c t p rox imi ty t o t h e a rea 
6 3 . The Times (London) 8 December 1971 . 
64, The Times of I n d i a (New Delh i ) 18 December 1971. 
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of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s between t h e P a k i s t a n i army on t h e 
one s i d e and t h e Mukti B a h i n i de tachments and t h e I n d i a n 
65 
t r o o p s i n t e r a c t i n g wi th them, on t h e o t h e r " ? 
During t h e war, t he S o v i e t Union s e t up two 
o b s e r v a t i o n S a t e l l i t e - C o s m o s 463 and Cosmos 4 64 - i n 
q u i c k s u c c e s s i o n (on 6 and 10 December 1971) t o over look 
t h e b a t t l e a r e a s and a l s o keep t r a c k of American warsh ip 
66 
movements. Moscow a l s o s u p p l i e d modem arms t o I n d i a t o 
e n a b l e i t meet any e v e n t u a l i t y . I t was r e p o r t e d , t h a t the 
' G h a z i ' submar ine , an American g i f t to P a k i s t a n , could on ly 
be blown of f by some most s o p h i s t i c a t e d n u c l e a r weapons 
which no one e l s e e x c e p t Russ ia had in i t s p o s s e s s i o n . These 
were g iven t o I n d i a by Moscow to d e a l w i t h war machines 
67 
s u p p l i e d by America t o P a k i s t a n . 
Dur ing the e n t i r e c r i s i s , I n d i a remained in h igh 
s p i r i t s b e c a u s e of i t s f a i t h in t h e R u s s i a n s i n ca se of 
any a g g r e s s i o n on h e r . 
D.P» Dhar on t h e 14 December, whi le e x p r e s s i n g I n d i a ' s 
g r a t i t u d e s a i d j 'Th i s f e e l i n g gave us s u s t e n a n c e and moral 
65. Pravda, 16 December 1971. 
66. Indian Express (New Delhi) 8 January 1971. 
67. Sharma, R., n.l2, pp.315-6. 
68. The Times of India (New Delhi) 29 October 1971. 
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s t r e n g t h when we were faced wi th h o s t i l e and unsympa the t i c 
v o i c e s b u t your s u p p o r t was n o t merely s p i r i t u a l , i t was 
69 
m a t e r i a l a l s o * . In f a c t , I n d i a made many demands on t h e 
Russ ians and they responded t o I n d i a ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n : 
R e f e r r i n g t o the g e n e r o s i t y wi th which t h e Sov i e t Union 
responded t o I n d i a ' s r e q u i r e m e n t s , Dhar s a i d : 'you know 
how i n s i s t e n t , how demanding, how a p p a r e n t l y un reasonab le 
a n a t i o n f i g h t i n g fo r t h e defence of i t s v a l u e s i n a h o s t i l e 
world can b e . . . b u t i n such d i f f i c u l t days no f r i e n d could 
70 have been more gene rous , more prompt and more u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' . 
As f o r t h e c o - o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n s of America and 
China, S c h u l z b e r g e r w r o t e in the New York Times, t h a t t h e 
USA and China found themse lves c o - b e l l i g e r e n t s i n back ing 
71 P a k i s t a n . According t o James Reston, t h e US P r e s i d e n t 
suppor ted P a k i s t a n because he saw i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t t h e 
72 po^/er s t r u g g l e between China and t h e S o v i e t Union. 
S imu l t aneous ly , B e i j i n g l e a d e r s h i p too r e s o r t e d t o h i g h l y 
p r o v o c a t i v e a c t i o n s . The Chinese Ambassador a s s u r e d Yahya 
Khan of Ch inese t r o o p s "advancing towards t h e I n d i a n 
b o r d e r " . 
69. The N a t i o n a l Hera ld , 16 December 1971 . 
70. Ib id . 
71. The New York Times, 2 February 1972. 
72. Chaudhuri, S., n.4,, p.73. 
73. Ibid. 
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The whole c o u r s e of e v e n t s demons t r a t ed t h a t t h e 
Chinese were mere ly ' p l a y i n g t o t h e g a l l e r y wi th no i n t e n -
t i o n of i n v o l v i n g themse lves d i r e c t l y i n t h e c o n f l i c t . 
The P a k i s t a n i s l e a r n t t h a t t h e i r ' f r i e n d f o r e v e r ' was on ly 
i n t e r e s t e d i n " s i t t i n g on t h e h i l l t o p w h i l e two t i g e r s 
f i g h t " . "^ ^ 
With t h e s u r r e n d e r of t he P a k i s t a n i f o r c e s in E a s t 
P a k i s t a n , I n d i a hav ing no d e s i r e t o u n n e c e s s a r i l y p r o l o n g 
t h e war announced a u n i l a t e r a l c e a s e - f i r e on t h e Western 
f r o n t which t h e P a k i s t a n i s r e a d i l y a c c e p t e d and became 
e f f e c t i v e from 17 December 1 9 7 1 , Thus , end ing t h e wors t 
75 
c r i s i s i n t h e h i s t o r y of t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t s i n c e 1947. 
A S o v i e t Commentator, T . Beryozov, i n h i s a r t i c l e " t h e 
Roots of t h e C r i s i s " , ma in ta ined t h a t : " t h e t e r r o r un leashed 
by the I s l a m a b a d regime gave r i s e t o t h e movement f o r the 
independence of Eas t Bengal - Bangladesh in B e n g a l i - and 
7fi t h e fo rma t ion of t h e Mukti B a h i n i L i b e r a t i o n f o r c e s " . 
The a t t i t u d e of the S o v i e t Union was h i g h l y a p p r e c i a t e d 
in I n d i a and s o , e x p r e s s i n g I n d i a ' s g r a t i t u d e , Mrs Gandhi , 
on 17 December 1971, wrote a l e t t e r t o t h e S o v i e t p r e m i e r 
77 thank ing him f o r s t a n d i n g by I n d i a t h r o u g h o u t the c r i s i s . 
74. Ibid., p.74. 
75. Prasad, B,, n.30, p.171. 
76. The New Times, No.51, December 1971, p.11. 
77. The Times of India (New Delhi), 19 December 1971. 
CONCLUSION 
The embittered re la t ions between India and Pakistan 
since the b i r t h of the l a t t e r could be accounted for with 
problems such as the minori t ies , border, r iver water, 
evacuee property, the integration of princely s ta tes -
Junagadh, Hydrabad and Kashmir, Hindu^'luslim r ival ry and 
ideology,all these made the relat ions between the two 
countries very complicated. 
The othpr factors l ike Pakistan's joining mil i tary 
pacts, friendship between India and the USSR, the Sino-Pak 
collusion, the Sino-India V7ar of 1962, the Kutch episode 
and the indo-Pak war of 1965, a l l iiiese factors greatly 
disturbed the relat ions between India and Pakistan. 
Pakis tan ' s bid to snatch Kashmir from India was the 
main reason responsible for the 1965 conf l ic t between India 
and Pakistan, After the termination of the 1965 war, a 
conference was called a t Tashkent on the i n i t i a t i v e of the 
USSR, and i t succeeded in getting the Declaration signed, 
After the Declaration, many other factors played 
important ro le in increasing the tensions between the two 
countr ies . These include, hos t i le propaganda against each 
other, the Kashmir issue, minority problem, border violat ions, 
expulsion of diplomats, the auction of the Indian property 
in Pakistan, Farakka Barrage dispute, Agartala conspiracy 
case and the arms given by the US to Pakistan, 
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Pakistan a lso supplied arms and antnunition to the 
Mizos and Nagas rebels and t r i ed to dismember India. This 
act of interference in Ind ia ' s affa i rs i s a c lear case of 
a breach of Art ic le i i i of the Tashkent declaration, which 
forbids interference in each others in ternal a f fa i r , and 
also demonstrated Pakistan 's lukewarm a t t i t ude tov;ards the 
normalisation of i t s re la t ions with India, 
The year 1971 was a landmark in the his tory of Indo-
Pak r e l a t i o n s . The struggle for power in Pakistan s tar ted 
af ter the resu l t s of the election were announced in v/hich 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman*s Awami League stood in a position to 
form the government, while the Pakistan people 's Party led 
by Z.A. Bhutto emerged the main opposition. 
In 1971, a war was fought between India and Pakistan 
which f inal ly led to the b i r th of an independent sovereign 
s t a t e of Bangladesh. The struggle for power a t the i n i t i a l 
stage was mainly directed towards the t ransfer of power to 
the elected representatives of the people but subsequent 
events, compelled the Awami League to declare East Pakistan 
as an independent sovereign s t a t e . The declaration gave a 
rude shock to the Pakistan Government and had to use every 
available means to crush the Bengalis. The Pakistani army 
committed unprecedented a t r o c i t i e s on these people. Millions 
of them had to flee East Pakistan for t h e i r l ives and they 
came to India for refuge, this created innumerable problems 
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socia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l for India, but India, in 
keeping with her t rad i t ion and c iv i l i za t ion did not 
hes i t a t e to give shel te r to them. I t was th i s refugee 
problem, which in turn compelle-d the Indian Government to 
plead the case of ^ast Pakistanis , but she never nursed 
the idea of dismembering Pakistan, as she continuously 
stressed on the p o l i t i c a l settlement of the issue - which 
meant t ransfer of power to the elected people and subse-
quently enable these refugees to return to t h e i r country, 
India by not recognising Bangladesh not u n t i l af ter the 
Pakistani mil i tary junta attacked her on 3 December 1971 is 
an obvious evidence to prove that she was not in favour of 
dismembering Pakistan, nothing should have debarred her 
from doing so ea r l i e r before 6 December 1971 when she 
recognised Bangladesh, 
The misfortune of Pakistan was that the Bengalis 
never r ea l i sed that they were the c i t izens of a free country, 
they constantly nursed the idea tha t the power transferred 
in 1947 was for the West Pakistanis to use i t for the i r 
benefi t a t the cost of the East Bengalis, Economically, 
they remained a down trodden people. So the revolt in E^st 
Bengal was, in the main, the revolt of an economically 
oppressed people against t he i r oppressors. This s i tuat ion 
could not be to lera ted for long, 
While tackling the Bangladesh c r i s i s in 1971, India 
had to overcome several constraints which ea r l i e r could 
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make and unmake i t s policy. One of them was India ' s undue 
Sensitiveness to what the US reactions would be towards a 
par t icu lar l ine of action India proposed to take because 
the US was the foremost aid-giver and could use aid as 
leverage to compel India to do i t s biddings,In this c r i s i s 
Indian government stood firm on what i t considered to be the 
correct a t t i t u d e . Not only tha t but also presuming that tiie 
US would t r y to pressurize India. The Indian government was 
prepared to take effective measures to neutra l ise i t s moves, 
In this respect one factor stood India in good stead, and 
that was the ftiendly re la t ions i t had with the USSR which 
was given e x p l i c i t form in the Indo-Soviet t reaty of 9 
August 1971, In view of th i s development, the US could not 
dare to take any adventurous s t ep , 
Ind ia ' s i n i t i a l response to the s i tua t ion created by 
the mil i tary crackdown in East Bengal and influx of some 
10 million refugees was bewildment, helplessness, and 
i n i t i a l indecisiveness, India was especially staggered by 
the warning tha t i t should expect no assis tance from the US 
in the event of Chinese intervent ion. Given the obvious 
bias of the Nixon Administration, the apparent t a c i t 
a l l iance between the US and China against her, the threat 
to her p o l i t i c a l existence and national integrat ion, 
India f ina l ly determined to defy the US in the Bangladesh 
c r i s i s . I t entered into a t rea ty with the Soviet Union to 
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assure diplomatic protection in case of a war in the sub-
continent. When the war erupted, India was able to i n f l i c t 
a severe mi l i ta ry defeat on America's proxy, Pakistan, and 
administered a serious diplomatic reversal to the Nixon 
Administration, In the process, India created a new s t r a t e -
gic environment and stood forth as the dominant power in 
the sub-continent. 
The Soviet Union remained a firm friend of India 
throughout the c r i s i s . They not only helped but consistently 
assured India of the i r help in any emergency. Perhaps, the 
overriding factor t ha t enl is ted Soviet support for India, 
was that in Internat ional sphere, the Soviet Union f e l t 
isolated because of President Nixon's move to woo China. 
The Indo-Soviet t reaty of friendship betv/een India and the 
USSR was a product of the c r i s i s in Bangladesh and Nixon's 
announcement to v i s i t Peking, in these two developments both 
India and the USSR f e l t concerned and so had to device a 
means which could be of mutual help and further t he i r 
national i n t e r e s t s . 
The year 1971 marked an absolute low point in post-
war re la t ions between the US and India. A se r i e s of US 
actions and postures, flowing out of President Nixon's 
decision to " t i l t " against India, brought the two countries 
to such a pass: the refusal to corrment adversely on the 
mili tary crackdown and genocide in East Bengal, the continued 
shipment of arms to West Pakistan, the evident lack of 
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sympathy for India v/hile i t reeled under the economic and 
social impact of 10 million refugees, the reflex condemna-
t ion of India as i t f inal ly sought to protect i t s in teres ts 
through intervention, the suspension of a l l aid, and 
f inal ly the despatch of a US naval task force t o the Bay 
of Bengal in an obvious show of force. The Anderson papers 
subsequently revealed the depth of h o s t i l i t y of the Nixon 
Administration towards India during the c r i s i s , 
Though Nixon's disaffection witli India and Indian 
leaders and, conversely, his respect and warmth for Pakis-
t an i leaders , was manifested during the c r i s i s , i t would 
not be very r igh t for us to conclude tha t the US policy in 
the region is that of persona l i t i es . Personal re la t ions have 
vindoubtedly had some influence, but more perhaps on the 
s tyle in which policy has been executed than ai the policy 
i t s e l f . I t i s obvious tha t Nixon's record of opposition of 
communism did not in terfere with detente with the Soviet 
Union or with the reversal of policy on China. Behind the 
various d i sc ree t foreign policy actions of the US l i e s a 
larger global s t ra tegy, a more coherent conceptual frame-
work. This has been true of US foreign policy during the 
ent i re post-v.'ar period, 
The American grand design in the post-war period 
has focused on the s t ruc ture of super power re la t ionships . 
The US foreign policy has thxas derived i t s driving force 
not in reference to a given country, but to one or more 
13B 
\*orld powers. The US foreign policy towards India is merely 
the local applicat ion of a global s t rategy, which has l i t t l e 
to do v/ith India specif ical ly except in so far as India i s 
seen as an available instrument or an unnecessary obstacle 
in the execution of tha t s t ra tegy. The US foreign policy 
has often been couched in highly moral terms, but has been 
rooted in r ea lpo l i t i k , designed to serve the US own national 
i n t e r e s t s . Thus, not surprisingly, the US foreign policy in 
the post-war period has embraced a l l manner of p o l i t i c a l 
regimes, as long as th is served US national i n t e r e s t s . The 
US foreign policy of containment has been i t s basic strategy 
in South Asia. The US has therefore been qui te firm with 
i t s a l l i e s , ruthless and even brutal with i t s foes, and 
both scornf\il and s te rn towards neut ra l s . This explains 
why India has often been the recipient of the fury of this 
global s t r a t egy . 
I t has therefore, been the determined policy of the 
US, since the end of World War II to see that no new inde-
pendent centres of power a r i s e , 
During the f i r s t period, from 1945-1955, the us was 
the dominant super power - having for the f i r s t half of 
th i s period a monopoly of nuclear weapon, and in tine second 
half an overwhelming super ior i ty , 
in the f i r s t half of this period, India was too 
pre-occupied with domestic tasks to pay much a t tent ion to 
world a f f a i r s . I t was both suspicious and favourably 
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inclined towards the US - suspicious because i t perceived 
the US as successor to the British imperial policy of 
divide and rule in South Asia, (US policy on Kashmir and 
other local issues was evidence of t h i s ; Nehru saw US 
anti-communism as essent ia l ly f ac i l i t a t i ng the extention 
of US power throughout Hie world) ; favourably inclined, 
because i t was uncertain about the intent ions of both the 
USSR and China, while faced with corrmunist insurrection 
a t home, 
India assuming the leadership of the group of non-
aligned nat ions , came to be viewed by the US decision -
makers both as a continuous i r r i t a n t and as an inveterate 
claimant to an independent role in in ternat ional p o l i t i c s . 
India 's policy became objectionable not only becau3e i t 
placed an obstacle in the way of the US pol icy towards the 
USSR, but a l so because i t attempted to c rea te an additional 
world force. Accordingly, Pakistan was armed to the teeth 
as a counter of Ind ia ' s pol icy. The maintenance of 
mil i tary par i ty between India and Pakistan by the US 
should be seen as having i n i t i a l l y been sole ly the conse-
quence of a global policy of containment aimed a t the 
Soviet Union and China. The mil i tary pa r i ty between India 
and Pakistan thus became the f i r s t p i l l a r of post-war US 
foreign policy in South Asia, 
The second period in US foreign policy covers the 
years from 1955 to 1962, The USSR now quickly jumped over 
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the l ine of containment and established friendly relations 
with important Third world countries such as India and 
Egypt, who were eager for tha t , for the local US military 
a l l iances had limited the i r s tatus in in ternat ional p o l i t i c s . 
As a consequence, the US now placed a major emphasis on 
economic instruments in winning over the countries in the 
region, while acknov/ledging the vi r tues of nationalism and 
independence among them. The second p i l l a r of US policy 
towards the region in general and India in par t icu la r 
emerged from t h i s . 
As economic re la t ions between India and the US deve-
loped, so did p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i ons . Relations a lso advanced 
becaxjse of the deter iorat ion of India ' s re la t ionship with 
China. The cordial re la t ions between India and the US became 
marred because of Ind ia ' s action in Goa without informing 
the US. 
However, in 1962 the indo-US re la t ions reached a new 
peak, with the Sino-lndian border war and the US readiness 
to ship small arms to India. The US v/as prepared to be India ' s 
mil i tary protector , if India accepted the ro le of US c l ien t 
and protec tora te , but was not ready to help India establish 
the where withal to become an independent centre of power. 
The US readiness to assure.India of a i r protection 
revealed a th i rd p i l l a r , which had, perhaps, been implici t 
a l l along. This was not welcomed by Pakistan, 
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The thi rd post-war period roughly corresponds to the 
years 1963 to 1968. The two super pOv;ers now sought to 
maintain t h e i r unique positions by working together to 
prevent the elevation of any other nations to subject 
roles in in ternat ional p o l i t i c s , resul t ing in cooperation 
in the i so la t ion and containment of China, in the Test Ban 
Treaty, and in the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 
However, larger s t r a t eg ic i n t e re s t s were paramount. 
With the containment of China as i t s f i r s t p r io r i ty in Asia, 
the US was not ready to countenance any further weakening 
of the Indian po l i ty . On the other hand Pakis tan 's close 
re la t ionship with China annoyed the US, 
The s t r a in s of the Vietnam c r i s i s , led the US to 
tenta t ive ly concede the responsibi l i ty for the settlement 
between India and Pakistan to the USSR. Ear l ie r , the two 
super powers had cooperated in the United Nations to bring 
the 1965 India-Pakistan war to an end before intervention 
by China could aggravate matters , 
The US, due to demands on i t ar is ing from the 
Vietnam c r i s i s , developed aid weariness in re la t ion to 
India, and foundations of the second p i l l a r - massive 
aid to counter Soviet influence began to erode. But the 
US would not allow the Soviet Union or China to emerge 
effor t less ly as a dominant external power in e i ther India 
142 
or Pakistan - I t would maintain a strong enough presence 
to balance the Soviet Union in India, and China and the 
Soviet Union in Pakistan. 
The fourth period began with the Nixon Administration 
in 1969. The US role in India was eroding while that of the 
Soviet Union was growing, and president Nixon forged a new 
strategy to place the internat ional order on a different 
footing. I t acknowledged the l imitations of US pov;er, and 
accordingly determined to reduce its commitments in Asia. 
Tlie key motivation, however, was to preserve the US' s position 
as chief subject in in ternat ional p o l i t i c s . Accordingly, in 
an endeavour to place constraints on the Soviet Union's 
expanding role, to persuade i t to make concessions, and to 
f a c i l i t a t e the ex t r ica t ion of the US from Vietnam, the US 
moved towards a rapprochement . with China as a third 
"subject" in in terna t ional p o l i t i c s . 
The decision to move towards a rapprochement with 
China eliminated the rat ionale for US support for India 
as par t of the policy of containment against China. On 
the contrary, tiie US soon acknowledged China in i t s new 
subject ro le as having legitimate in te res t s in South Asia, 
primarily in the containment of India through support of 
Pakistan. 
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In the pursui t of a more f ru i t fu l re la t ionship with 
China, the prevention of a possible economic or p o l i t i c a l 
weakening of India was no longer of Central concern to the 
US, Apparently, India was now written off by the Nixon 
Administration, merely because of i t s refusal to s;3bordinate 
iti5 in te res t s to those of the US, and because of the 
growing intimacy between India and the USSR. 
The US policy during the Bangladesh c r i s i s was there-
fo re ' not t o t a l l y unexpected. I t s policy was received with 
moral reprobation in India and in many other parts of the 
world, including the US, This may have been jus t i f i ed , but 
tha t policy must also evoke awe for i t s consistency. I t s 
chief aim was to safeguard the developing US rela t ions with 
China. 
The role of the People's Republic of China in the 
c r i s i s of the sub-continent in 1971, i l l u s t r a t e s the view 
tha t Peking made a gross error of judgement about India 
and i s new trying to rect i fy t h i s , China's b ^ a v i o u r in 
1971 was based on a mixture of the fodlowing components: 
t ha t nothing would happen mi l i t a r i l y because the Indians 
were simply t a lke r s ; tha t the US was there to support 
Pakistan; tha t Pakistan was in a strong posit ion m i l i t a r i l y ; 
t ha t Bangladesh was not capable of f ight ing. On these, Peking 
thought i t was backing the winner. Furthermore, the a n t i -
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India reasoning was shaped by China's geo-pol i t ica l thinking, 
When India signed the Indo-Soviet t reaty in August 1971, 
th i s strengthened the Chinese belief that she was playing 
the Soviet game of encirclement. India, therefore had to 
be stopped, China thus supported Pakistan to the l a s t . 
The dynamics of Chinese decision - making during and 
after the 1971 war point to two in te res t ing features. 
Firs t , having backed the losing side, the Peking leadership 
could not eas i ly re t rea t from i t s or ig inal l ine that 
Bangladesh was created by the Indian "react ionaries" and 
that developments in the sub-continent represented a part 
of the Soviet game of encirclement. The problem of saving 
face led China to encourage Pakistan to take a tough stand 
on the question of recognizing Bangladesh, Such encourage-
ment became apparent when Mr. Z.A. Bhutto fai led to 
implement h is promise made a t the Simia Summit to recognize 
Bangladesh by August 1972. China's veto of Bangladesh's UN 
membership -was also a logica l consequence of her ear l ie r 
policy towards India. 
The second feature, which became apparent more recently, 
suggests t ha t China's s ty le of thinking has changed, and this 
in turn has a l te red her assessment of Ind ia ' s external 
behaviour. Consequently, her idea that India is a par t of 
the Soviet policy of encirclement has changed; that i s , the 
obsession with the Soviet th rea t has not changed but the 
perception that the Indians were a part of t h i s scheme has, 
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The above explains the Chinese reaction during the 
ent i re c r i s i s of 1971. Peking accepted Islamabad's account 
about the or igin and character of the Bangladesh problem, 
denounced Ind ia ' s interference in Pakistan's in ternal 
affa i rs and promised fu l l support to President Yahya Khan 
against the danger of an external aggression. There was no 
humanitarian aspect in China's reaction - no cr i t ic ism of 
Islamabad's mi l i tary action against the Bengalis, no sympathy 
for India on account of the refugee burden and no contribu-
t ion for any re l i e f purpose. Peking declared India as an 
aggressor and so took side with Pakistan. 
Unlike the US and China's support t o Pakistan the 
USSR sided with India. The forces that made the USSR to 
support India could be seen from her policy towards the sub-
continent, 
When India become independent and power transferred 
to both India and Pakistan in 1947, the USSR fai led to grasp 
the significance of India ' s independence in the region. The 
Soviet react ion to India independence was d i s t i nc t ly 
unfriendly. 
The Mountbatten-Plan, under which independence was 
given to India and Pakistan, was c r i t i c i zed , and the 
leadership of the Congress Party was considered to have 
gone over to reaction by agreeing to Bri t ish terms for a 
p o l i t i c a l set t lement , flehru, who had been regarded as a 
progressive l i b e r a l , was now accused of having moved to the 
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r i g h t with such reac t ionary leaders as p a t e l . Even Gandhi 
was not Spared. The Indian pol icy of non-alignment was a l so 
condemned and was considered to j u s t i f y a po l icy of 
co l l abora t ion with English Capital ism, a po l i cy of e s t a b l i -
shing c l o s e r con tac t between the India bourgeo i s i e and 
English Cap i t a l i sm. The pro-west stand of Nehru equal ly led 
to the l e s s c o r d i a l a t t i t u d e of the USSR towards I n d i a . 
However, i n order to obviate the i n e v i t a b l e impression 
that . Ind ia was slowly s l i d i n g in t he Western Camp, Nehru, 
a t the same t ime, made i t a point to express openly h is 
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t views. 
With the communization of China, the r e l a t i o n s between 
India and the Sovie t Union became even more s t r a i n e d . For 
the Soviet l e a d e r s , the communist revolu t ion in China was 
only a confirmation of the long-held view regarding the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of communist revolu t ions in Asia . The USSR 
while welcoming the communization of China, was equal ly 
fea r fu l of the important inf luence China could exerc i se 
on the Asian Communist P a r t i e s . 
Por Ind i a , the dramatic events of China were hardly 
a favourable s i g n , for they had not only skewed the 
Asian balance of pov;er in favour of the apparen t ly mono-
l i t h i c communist world, bu t had, with the Chinese occupation 
of Tibe t ,b rought a dynamic and unfriendly communist S t a t e 
t o the very doors of India.Under t h i s s i t u a t i o n , a l l i a n c e 
with the west was excluded, so a l s o a l l i a n c e 
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with the Communist world because of India ' s policy of non-
alignment. A new approach had therefore become necessary 
for India so far as the Communist countries were concerned, 
F i rs t of a l l , a number of po l i t i c a l and mi l i ta ry 
steps were taken to strengthen India ' s defence, 
But most of these steps were primarily diplomatic, 
administrative and police measures. Defence preparations 
were avoided because of a fear of an adverse reaction 
from China and because of economic reasons, 
However, India soon realized that the best l ine of 
action was p o l i t i c a l rapprochement with the communist world. 
And so India s t a r t ed to seek normalization and complete 
understanding with the communist China, which slowly 
s ta r ted abondoning i t s bel l igerent l i ne . India was no 
longer considered to be t ied to the apron s t r ings of tlie 
West, 
Within a shor t time af ter the sh i f t in Chinese policy, 
the USSR too began to show defini te signs of change and she 
was not prepared to leave the region to Chinese influence, 
A rapid change was therefore ins t i tu ted in Soviet 
ideological thinking and policy, instead of s t r iv ing for 
immediate control over these areas, Soviet diplomacy now 
limited i ts objective to the task of detaching them from 
the"Imperial is t bloc", and then slowly attaching them to 
the "camp of peace and socialism". 
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The Soviet Union had therefore taken a considerable 
in t e res t in South Asia in the post-war period par t ly to 
project i t s own ideology and par t ly to fo res ta l l Western 
and Chinese moves in the region, prejudicial to i t s security. 
And so had gone out in a big way to cu l t iva te the various 
countries of the region by means of trade, aid, technical 
and mil i tary assis tance, and cu l tura l exchange. On the 
p o l i t i c a l plane, i t has no doubt sought in i t s own way to 
win them over to i t s side in the context of the Cold war. 
Where th i s has not been possible, i t has encouraged them to 
stay e i ther non-aligned or neu t ra l . 
For the facts t ha t the Soviet Union is a super pov;er 
supported by a World - embracing ideology and neighbour 
of the region and because the countries of South Asia have 
played a notable part in world affairs with t h e i r espousal 
of non-alignment and are l ikely t o continue to play an 
equally important role in the years to come in view of 
the i r s t ra teg ic location on the Indian ocean, the i r massive 
populations, t ie i r promixity to China, and so on. The USSR 
aim in the region was therefore, to promote friendly 
re la t ions with both India and Pakistan and thus to reduce 
the Chinese influence in the region. However, there were 
two major hurdles barring the v/ay for the successful 
implementation of th i s policy: one was the mutual r iva l ry 
between India and Pakistan and the other was the l e t t e r ' s 
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expecta t ion of Chinese support in i t s c o n f l i c t with I n d i a . 
Both jbhese obs t ac l e s would have been re.tioved with the 
es tabl ishment of an Awami League Government in Pak i s t an . 
The USSR saw t h a t , t h a t par ty was favourably disposed 
towards Ind ia , b u t the pro-Peking forces of Pakis tan were 
h o s t i l e to i t . The non-aligned and peaceful foreign pol icy 
advocated by the Awami League was admirably s u i t a b l e for the 
Kremlin, The USSR expected t h a t in a par l iamentary system 
headed by the Awami League, the Coinnunist pa r ty of Pakistan 
would regain i t s l e g a l ex is tence and in an atmosphere 
f ree from r e l i g i o u s fanat ic ism, the pro-Moscow forces would 
be able to mould the p o l i t i c s of the country e f f e c t i v e l y . 
But the confusion t h a t overtook the country in the course 
of t r a n s i t i o n t o the par l iamentary system over the d ra f t ing 
of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n , became a source of g rea t concern 
for MOSCOW. The way in which Pres iden t Yahya Khan u l t imate ly 
t r i e d to solve the problem was not acceptable to the 
Soviet Government. Moscow undoubtedly p re fe r red on Awami 
League Government to the cont inuat ion of the Yahya Khan's 
regime which i t considered was being con t ro l l ed by "power-
ful l oca l monopoly groups" and "foreign c a p i t a l " and v/hich 
looked mainly to Peking for a s s i s t a n c e in i t s c o n f l i c t 
with I n d i a , 
So when the Pak i s t an i c r i s i s erupted, the Sovie t 
Union in tervened openly. 
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On 2 Apr i l 1971, Nikolai podgorny sent a message to 
Yahya Khan in h i s capac i ty as head of the Soviet S t a t e , 
expressing concern a t the suffer ings and p r iva t ions of the 
people of Bangladesh and urged, an immediate stoppage of 
the bloodshed and a "peaceful p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement" with 
the e lec ted l eade r s of tlie peop le . But Yahya Khan ignored 
the Kremlin 's appea l . Meanwhile the US got involved and 
issued a warning t o India t h a t in the event of Chinese 
in te rven t ion in t h e c r i s i s , Ind ia should not expect US 
he lp . The. Indian saw Pakistan as success fu l ly coordinat ing 
i t s p o l i c i e s with Peking and Washington. India stood 
i s o l a t e d , 
In the midst of th i s Indian predicament, came the 
displomatic explosion of our t ime, which was the s e c r e t 
journey of Kiss inger to Peking t h a t was arranged through 
the good of f ices of Pakis tan, and the announcement of an 
upcoming Nixon v i s i t to China. The Sino-American diplomatic 
breakthrough c r ea t ed i d e n t i c a l percept ions in India and 
the USSR of an emerging " a l l i a n c e " between the US and 
China t h a t would be d i rec ted aga ins t the Soviet Union. 
Since Pakis tan was a firm a l l y of China, the new Sino-US 
linkage could work in South Asia ©nly t o the deter iment 
of Ind i a , 
Percept ions of a looming t h r e a t to the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s 
and even the s u r v i v a l of India and the Sov ie t g loba l i n t e r e s t s 
cemented the Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p on 9 August 1971, with a 
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20 year t rea ty pf peace, friendship, and ccx)peration. The 
t rea ty committed the Soviet Union to meet the securi ty needs 
of India in the event of aggression or threa t of aggression, 
In signing the treaty the Indians did not believe 
that they gave the USSR more than they expected to get from 
the i r a l l y . The Indian government claimed that the t rea ty 
ended the i so la t ion of India, safeguarded i t s independence 
and t e r r i t o ry , and was a deterrent to aggression from any 
quarter . The t e s t of the t rea ty lay in hov; India used i t to 
gain i t s own s t r a t eg ic objectives in the sub-continent, 
that i s , by securing Bangladesh, by fighting a war with 
Pakistan and avoided the involvement of China in the war. 
The war tha t was fought between India and Pakistan 
for two weeks in December 1971, saw the Soviet Union taking 
a firm stand by India. Two days af ter the outbreak of the 
war, the Soviet Union warned a l l nations to keep out of i t : 
the message was obviously addressed to Peking. The Soviet 
Union blamed the war on the refusal by Pakistan to come to 
a p o l i t i c a l settlement with the' elected leaders of the 
Bangladesh people. I t called for the speediest ending of 
bloodshed, and in the UN Security Council i t vetoed three 
resolutions backed by the United States and China cal l ing 
for an inmediate cease-f i re . When the US government dispatched 
a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal, presumably to 
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intervene-^ the Soviet Union assured the Indian government 
t h a t i t V7ill not allow the Seventh Flee t to in tervene in 
the Bangladesh War, The USSR a l s o helped India by providing 
i t with amis . And so, the Soviet stood by India throughout 
the c r i s i s . I n d i r a Gandhi declared a u n i l a t e r a l cease - f i r e 
immediately a f t e r the Pak i s t an i surrender in Bangladesh 
whether she did t h i s on her own or under Soviet p ressure , 
i t was the crowning success for Soviet diplomacy during the 
war. I t earned the USSR c r e d i t from Nixon himself for 
r e s t r a i n i n g India from a conquest of V*est Pakis tan , This 
t r i b u t e enabled the Pak i s t an i e l i t e to see the Soviet 
Union as a sav iour of Pakis tan, Though Ind ia never had the 
designs t o ca r ry the war to West Pakis tan , bu t China and 
the US had t h i s apprehension. The ro le of the Soviet Union 
was highly apprec ia t ed in Ind ia , 
In t h e changed environment i n t he sub-con t inen t , the 
US i s sure t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t cannot hope to contain Soviet 
influence in South Asia by p i t t i n g a h o s t i l e Pakis tan 
aga in s t Ind i a , 
A comment on the United Nations r o l e in t h e e n t i r e 
c r i s i s might no t be out of place h e r e . The United Nations 
proved a t o t a l f a i l u r e in the c r i s i s , because she was 
being con t ro l l ed by the i m p e r i a l i s t s . The debates and 
r e so lu t i ons in the United Nations were obviously one s ided . 
On the b a s i s of the above s tudy, we may suggest the 
following ways and manners t o avoid a s i m i l a r occurrence 
in fu tu re , 
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For the nomialization of Indo-pak r e l a t ions , i t is 
suggested t ha t both the countries should enter into di rect 
negotiations in an effort to solve the ex is t ing problems 
without a th i rd party; Pakistan should abandon i t s re lent -
less pursuit in internat ional fora . to seek equality with 
India in almost every f ield, because this drive seems to 
increase the tension between the two countr ies ; India and 
Pakistan should sign a no-war pact as th i s would mi l i ta te 
against a future war between them. An external agency like 
the UN should be accepted by the two countries as the enfor-
cement agent; effor ts should be made to make the people of 
Pakistan to shed the feeling that India is out to devour 
Pakistan and a l so the Indians to shed the feeling tha t 
Pakistan wants to dis integrate India; trade between the two 
countries should be enhanced and v/ere there i s any fear on 
e i ther side of goodsfrom one side dominating the o ther ' s 
market, effor ts should be made to sort out the ba r r i e r s 
on the basis of experience. 
We may be tempted t o suggest that the fact that 
Pakistan has fai led up t i l now to have democracy established 
in that country had made the normalization of Indo-Pak 
re la t ions d i f f i c u l t . I t is therefore, our opinion tha t 
Pakistan should return to complete democracy in the rea l 
sense, because fa i l ing to do t h i s , would logical ly compel 
i t s neighbours especial ly India to consider whatever regime 
there, as i l l eg i t ima te and dangerous. 
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V?ith regards to the US, I t is suggested tha t i t should 
reconcile i t s e l f to the Indian policy of non-alignment as 
th is policy i s essent ia l ly peaceful, thus, helping, in the 
maintenance of peace and securi ty; the US should stop giving 
disproportionate mili tary aid to Pakistan more than i t s 
national defence requirements and should stop i t s war of 
proxy, because we tend to see the war between India and 
Pakistan in 1971 from the point that the US used Pakistan 
in the role of proxy in the region. 
Txirning to the Soviet Union, i t i s suggested tha t i t 
should continue i t s peaceful policy in the region because 
once i t is abandoned, the region might be engulfed in 
graver c r i s i s tha t may spel l doom for the world, 
After the Liberation of Bangladesh, i t was quite 
natural for Bangladesh people to feel grateful to India but 
they did not remain eternal ly thankfxil for Indian sympathy 
and help, India have consistently t r ied to maintain 
cordial re la t ions with Bangladesh. India have been up and 
doing in avoiding anything which could hurt the suscepti-
b i l i t i e s of the people of Bangladesh, However, Maulana 
Bhashani's utterances regarding a United Bengal consisting 
of Bangladesh and V e^st Bengal and other small s ta tes of 
northeast region is not a healthy signal for both the 
countr ies , 
155 
There are certain elements in Bangladesh v/ho blamed 
India for anything that went against them in the internal 
politics of the country, India on her part had done well 
to keep itself away from the internal controversies and 
disputes. Just recently, Islam is being made the state 
religion in Bangladesh, In the bargain, India is witnessing 
today postures that are apparently anti-India. There are 
certain other irritants between the two countries for 
example, the farakka Barrage question, India is therefore 
adviced to take it cool and easy for it is all part of the 
game, 
India should not be surprised as Bangladesh seems to 
have forgotten the past bitterness and even gone closer to 
Pakistan whose sole aim, would be to woo Bangladesh in 
every possible manner. 
We therefore, suggest that under no circumstance should 
India try to show big brother attitude towards Bangladesh, 
Small nations are very sensitive in this respect, India 
should offer advice and help only when the government of 
Bangladesh asks for. The final decision on every other 
matter must be Bangladesh' s. This should suit India v/ell 
for Bangladesh can only be a strong partner to India in so 
far as it is independent. Similarly, Bangladesh having been 
economically exploited for a long time, India should not 
feel bad when Bangladesh is driving a hard bargain in trade 
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or commerce. To the maximum extent that India can, it 
should try to adjust their claims and give them all trade 
facilities which they consider necessary for their economic 
development. 
APPENDIX-I 
THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE^ FRIEI'JDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION 
9 AUGUST 1 9 7 1 . 
D e s i r o u s o f e x p a n d i n g and c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e e x i s t i n g 
r e l a t i o n s of s i n c e r e f r i e n d s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m , b e l i e v i n g 
t h a t t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of f r i e n d s h i p a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n 
m e e t s t h e b a s i c n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s of b o t h t h e s t a t e s a s 
w e l l a s t h e i n t e r e s t s o f l a s t i n g p e a c e i n A s i a and t h e 
w o r l d , d e t e r T i i n e d t o p r o m o t e t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l 
p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y and t o make s t e a d f a s t e f f o r t s f o r t h e 
r e l a x a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s and t h e f i n a l e l i m i n a -
t i o n s o f t h e r e m n a n t s of c o l o n i a l i s m , r e a f f i m d n g t h e i r f i r m 
b e l i e f i n t h e p r i n c i p l e s of p e a c e f u l c o - e x i s t e n c e a n d 
c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n s t a t e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l and 
s o c i a l s y s t e m s , c o n v i n c e d t h a t i n t h e w o r l d t o d a y i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l p r o b l e m s can o n l y b e s o l v e d by c o - o p e r a t i o n and, n o t 
b y c o n f l i c t , r e a f f i r m i n g t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o a b i d e by 
t h e p u r p o s e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s c h a r t e r , 
t h e R e p u b l i c o f I n d i a on t h e one h a n d , and t h e Union of 
S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s on t h e o t h e r , h a v e d e c i d e d t o 
c o n c l u d e t h e p r e s e n t T r e a t y , f o r which p u r p o s e t h e f o l l o w i n g 
p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s h a v e b e e n a p p o i n t e d : 
On b e h a l f of t h e R e p u b l i c of I n d i a - t h e M i n i s t e r of 
E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f I n d i a , Swaran S i n g h , 
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On behalf of the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Repub-
l i c s - the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A.A, Grornyko, 
Who, having each presented t h e i r c r e d e n t i a l s , which 
are found to be in proper form and due order , have agreed 
as fol lows: 
(Ar t i c l e 1) 
The High con t rac t ing p a r t i e s solemnly declare t h a t 
enduring peace and f r iendship s h a l l p r e v a i l between the 
two count r i es and t h e i r peop les . Each pa r ty s h a l l respec t 
the independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of 
the o ther and r e f r a i n from i n t e r f e r r i n g in the i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s of the o the r . The High con t rac t ing p a r t i e s sha l l 
continue to develop and s t rengthen the r e l a t i o n s of s incere 
f r iendship , good neighbour l iness and a l l - round cooperation 
e x i s t i n g between them, on the bas i s of the above mentioned 
p r i n c i p l e s as wel l as the p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l i t y and mutual 
b e n e f i t . 
(Ar t i c l e I I ) 
Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible 
way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, 
the High contracting parties declare their determination to 
continue their efforts to preserve and strengthen peace in 
Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to 
achieve general and complete disarmament, including both 




Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality 
of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, the 
High contracting parties condemn colonialism and racism in 
all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination 
to strive for their final and complete abolition, 
The High contracting parties shall cooperate with other 
states in achieving these aims and to support the just 
aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colo-
nialism and racial domination. 
(Article IV) 
The Union of Soviet Socia l i s t Republic respects India 's 
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that t h i s policy is an 
important factor for maintaining universal peace and in ter -
national securi ty and for easing tension in the world. 
The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of 
the Union of Soviet Socia l is t Republics aimed a t strengthen-
ing friendship and co-Operation with a l l peoples. 
(Article V) 
Being deeply interested in ensuring universal peace 
and securi ty, and attaching great importance to t h e i r 
mutual co-operation in the internat ional f ie ld for achieving 
160 
these aims^ the High contracting parties will maintain 
regular contacts v;ith each other on major international 
problems affecting the interests of both the states by 
means of meetings, and exchanges of views between their 
leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and 
Special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplo-
matic channels. 
(Article VI) 
Attaching great importance to economic, sc ien t i f i c 
and technological co-operation between them, the High 
contracting par t i es wi l l continue to consolidate and expand 
mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in 
these f ie lds as well as expand trade, t ransport and 
communications between them on the basis of the principles 
of equali ty, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation t r e a t -
ment, subject to the exist ing agreements and the Special 
arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the 
Indo-Soviet trade agreement of 26 December 1970. 
(Article VII) 
The High contracting pa r t i e s shall promote further 
development of t i e s and contacts between them in the fields 
of science, a r t , l i t e r a t u r e , education, public health, 
press, radio, te levis ion , cinema, tourism and 'Sports. 
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(Article VIII) 
In accordance with the traditional friendship estab-
lished between the two countries, each of the High contrac-
ting parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into 
or participate in any military alliances directed against 
the other party. 
Each of the High contracting parties undertakes to 
refrain from any aggression against the other party and not 
to allow the use of its territory for committing any act 
that may cause military damage to the other High contracting 
party. 
(Article IX) 
Each of the High contracting partieis undertakes to 
refrain from giving any assistance to any th i rd party taking 
par t in an armed confl ict with the other par ty . In the 
event tha t any of the par t ies is attacked or threatened 
with attack, the High contracting par t ies will irrmediately 
s t a r t mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this 
th rea t and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure 
peace and secur i ty for the i r countr ies . 
(Article X) 
Each of the High contracting parties solemnly declares 
that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, 
with regard to one or more states incompatible with the 
present Treaty. Each of the High contracting parties declares 
further that it has no commitments towards any other state 
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or states and shall not undertake any commitments that 
may cause military damage to the other party, 
(Article XI) 
The present Treaty is concluded for the duration of 
twenty years and will be automatically extended for each 
Successive period of five years unless one of the High 
contracting parties declares its intention to terminate its 
Operation by notifying the other High contracting party 
twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treafy. The 
Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into 
force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of 
Ratification which will take place in Moscow v/ithin one month 
of the signing of this Treaty. 
(Article XII) 
Any differences in in terpreta t ion of any a r t i c l e or 
a r t i c l e s of the present t reaty that may a r i se between the 
High contracting par t ies shal l be se t t l ed on a b i l a t e r a l 
bas is by peaceful means in a s p i r i t of mutual respect and 
understanding. 
The above-mentioned plenipotent iar ies have signed 
the present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, a l l the 
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texts being equa 
th.ereto, 
lly authentic, and affixed their seals 
Done in New Delhi on 9 August 1971. 
ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
( S d . ) A .A. Gromyko, 
M i n i s t e r of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s 
ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA. 
( S d . ) Swaran S i n g h , 
M i n i s t e r of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . 
S o u r c e : S u r v i v a l , X I I I O c t o b e r 1 9 7 1 , p p . 3 5 1 - 3 , 
APPENDIX-II 
R e f e r t o : 1 - 2 9 6 4 3 / 7 1 
Memo on 3 December m e e t i n g 
SECRET SENSITIVE 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n c e 
W a s h i n g t o n D . C . 20301 





INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
Sx jb j ec t : WSAG M e e t i n g on I n d i a / P a k i s t a n 
p a r t i c i p a n t s ; 
A s s i s t a n t t o t h e p r e s i d e n t f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y 
A f f a i r s - Henry A. K i s s i n g e r 
Under S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e - J o h n N, I r w i n 
Depu ty S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n c e - D a v i d P a c k a r d 
D i r e c t o r , C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency - R i c h a r d M. Helms 
D e p u t y A d m i n i s t r a t o r ( A . I . D , ) M a u r i c e J , W i l l i a m s 
Cha i rman , J o i n t C h i e f o f S t a f f - Admira l Thomas M o o r e r 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ( N . E . A . ) - J o s e p h J . S i s c o 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n c e ( I . S . A . ) - G.V^arrent N u t t e r 
A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ( 1 , 0 . ) - Samuel DepaLna 
P r i n c i p a l D e p u t y A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n c e ( I . S . A . ) 
- A r m i s t e a d I , S e l d e n J r . 
A s s i s t a n t A d m i n i s t r a t o r ( A . I . D . / N . E . S . A . ) - D o n a l d G, 
M«cDonald 
Time and P l a c e : 3 December 19 7 1 , 1100 h o u r s , s i t u a t i o n room, 
Wh i t e H o u s e . 
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Surnmary 
Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in 
the West Wing. C.I.A, agreed to produce map showing areas 
of East Pakistan occupied by India , The President orders 
hold on issuance of additional irrevocable l e t t e r s of 
c red i t involving $ 99 mill ion, and a hold on further action 
implementing the $ 72 million p.L. 480 c red i t . Convening of 
Security Council meeting planned contingent on discvission 
with Pak /embassador th i s afternoon plus further c l a r i f i ca -
tion of actual s i tuat ion in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked 
for c l a r i f i ca t ion of secret special in terpre ta t ion of 
March 1959, b i l a t e r a l U,S. agreement with Pakistan. 
KISSINGER: I am gett ing hel l every half hour from the 
President t ha t we are not being tough enough on India, He 
has jus t cal led me again. He does not believe we are 
carrying out h i s wishes. He wants to t i l t in favour of 
Pakistan, He feel-s everything we do comes out otherwise. 
HEI/4S: Concerning the reported action in the West Wing, 
there are confl ic t ing reports from both sides and the only 
comtion groxmd i s the pak at tacks on the Amritsar, pathankot 
and Srinagar a i rpo r t s . The paks say the Indians are attacking 
a l l along the border; but the Indian off ic ia ls say this is 
a l i e . In the East Wing, the action i s beccxning larger 
and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts 
involved. 
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KISSINGER: Are the Indians se iz ing t e r r i t o r y ? 
HELMS: Yes, smal l b i t s of t e r r i t o r y d e f i n i t e l y . 
SISCO: I t would help i f you could provide a map with a 
shading of the a reas occupied by Ind ia , V^hat i s happening 
in the West - i s a f u l l - s c a l e a t t ack l i ke ly? 
MOORER: The p r e s e n t pa t t e rn i s puzzl ing in t h a t the Paks 
have only s t r u c k a t three small a i r f i e l d s which do not 
house s i g n i f i c a n t number of Indian combat a i r c r a f t . 
HELMS; Mrs. Gandhi 's speech a t l:30ir:ay well announce 
recogni t ion of Bangladesh, 
MOORER: The Pak a t t a c k i s not c r e d i b l e . I t has been made 
during the l a t e af ternoon, which d o e s n ' t make s e n s e . We do 
not seem to have s u f f i c i e n t fac ts on t h i s y e t . 
KISSINGER: IS i t poss ib le t h a t the Indian a t t a cked f i r s t , 
and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in 
response? 
MOORER: This i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e . 
KISSINGER: The P re s iden t wants no more i r r evocab l e l e t t e r s 
of c r e d i t i ssued under the $ 99 mi l l ion c r e d i t . He wants the 
$ 72 mil l ion P.L. 480 c r e d i t a l so he ld . 
WILLIAMS: Word w i l l soon get around when we do t h i s . Does 
the P res iden t understand t h a t ? 
KISSINGER: That i s h is order, but I w i l l check wi th the 
Pres iden t a g a i n . I f asked, we can say we a re reviewing our 
whole economic programme and t h a t the grant ing of f resh aid 
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i s being suspended in view of condi t ions on the sub-
con t inen t , The next i ssue i s the UN. 
IRWIN: The Sec re ta ry i s call ing in the Pak Ambassador this 
af ternoon, and the Secretary leans towards making a US 
move in the UN soon. 
KISSINGER: The Pres ident i s in favour of t h i s as soon as 
we have some confirmation of liiis l a r g e - s c a l e new a c t i o n , 
I f the UN c a n ' t operate in t h i s kind of s i t u a t i o n e f f ec t ive ly , 
i t s u t i l i t y has come t o an end and i t i s u s e l e s s t o th ink 
of UN guarantees in the Middle Eas t , 
SISCO: We w i l l have a recommendation for you t h i s afternoon, 
a f t e r the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the 
Ambassador time to wire home, we t e n t a t i v e l y p lan t o convene 
the Secur i ty Council tomorrow. 
KISSINGER: We hope to take a c t i o n . The P re s iden t i s blaming 
me, but you people a re in the c l e a r . 
SISCO: Tha t ' s i dea l l 
KISSINGER: The e a r l i e r d r a f t s ta tement for Eush i s too 
even-handed. 
SISCO: To r e c a p i t u l a t e , a f t e r v;e have seen the pak 
Ambassador, the Secre ta ry w i l l r epo r t to you. We wi l l 
update the d r a f t speech for Bush. 
168 
KISSINGER: We can say we favour political accomodation 
but the real Job of the Security Council is to prevent 
military action, 
SISGO; We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or 
Mrs. Gandhi. 
WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic s teps with Pakis tan a lso? 
KISSINGER: Wait u n t i l I t a l k with the P r e s i d e n t . He h a a n ' t 
addressed t h i s proble;Ti in connection with Pakis tan y e t . 
SISCO: I f we a c t on the Indian s ide , we can say vie a re 
keeping the Pakis tan s i t u a t i o n 'under r e v i e w ' . 
KISSINGER: I t ' s hard to t i l t toward Pakis tan i f we have to 
match every Indian s t e p with a Pakistan s t e p . If you vjait 
u n t i l Monday, I can get a P r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n . 
PACKARD: I t should be easy fo r us to inform the banks 
involved t o de fe rca t ion in as much as we a r e so near the 
weekend. 
KISSINGER: We need a ViSAG in the morning. V/e need to th ink 
about our t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s . I remember a l e t t e r or memo 
i n t e r p r e t i n g our e x i s t i n g t r e a t y with a s p e c i a l India 
t i l t . When I v i s i t e d Pakistan in January 1962, 1 was 
b r i e f ed on a s e c r e t document or o ra l understanding about 
cont ingencies a r i s i n g in o ther than the SEATO con tex t . Perhaps 
i t was a P r e s i d e n t i a l l e t t e r . This was a s p e c i a l i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n of the March 1959 b i l a t e r a l agreement. 
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Prepared by: 
j s | i n i t i a l s 
James M. Noyes 
Deputy Assis tant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and 
South Asian Affairs 
Approved: 
I l l eg ib l e s ignature 
for G. Warren Nutter 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for Internat ional Security 
Affairs, 
Source: New York Herald Tribune, paris edition, 6 January 
1972. 
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